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ABSTRACT 
^^SIS 
When India became independent she found herself in a position to face the 
challenges of cold war scenario. India had to face the international reality of 
super powers rivalry and at the same time to adjust with this explosive situation. 
India remained non-aligned but had a soft comer for strategic and economic 
requirements for Soviet Union. This relationship was always misunderstood by 
the U.S.A. However, Nehru very tactfully developed special relations with Soviet 
Union. No, doubt the developmental process of relations between India and Soviet 
Union starts only in midfiftees. During the last four decades, the two have always 
stood by each other as good friends. The recent changes in Soviet political system 
have not affected their relations. 
Nehru was a man of great foresight. In 1927 he forsaw that Britain would 
eventually become a satellite of America and that the latter would emerge as the 
greatest inperialist power. He also forsaw that the only power to oppose the 
new imperialism would be the Soviet Union and that India and the USSR would 
have to work together to fight against imperialism and support the subjugated 
nations in winning independence. In the beginning though Indo-Soviet relations 
were at halt, he did not loose hope, but continued his efforts to foster those 
relations. When the Soviet Union also perceived the logic of Nehru's thinking, 
there was nothing to bar the steady growth of those relations. 
As against this, American policies from the very beginning of India's 
independence were directed to prevent the emergence of a powerful India. India 
[U] 
did not count in American policies because India was not willing to serve 
American interests. The Soviet Union, on its part, has expressed, time and again, 
through its leaders that it wants to see India emerge as a powerful country in the 
world. Just as India saw the need to work together with the Soviet Union in 
order to defeat imperialism, the Soviet Union, too, perceived that friendship 
with India was a vital factor in the Soviet struggle against imperialism. It is this 
factor that the USSR in the mid 1950's hailed Indian non-alignment as a positive 
force in would affairs, made India the leading recipient of its foreign aid 
programme, and gave unreserved support to India's position on such sensitive 
issues as Kashmir and Goa-On its part, India welcomed the willingness of the 
USSR to co-exist as equals. From 1959 onwards China posed an increasing 
concern for both New Delhi and Moscow. By then the Indo-Soviet relationship 
had passed through a stage of cautions co-existence to a phase which might be 
termed as peaceful co-operation. It is this inter locking interest that has provided 
the most powerful rationale to this friendship. 
The study of India's relations with the USSR reveals that despite wide 
defferences in outlook and policy great advance towards mutual understanding 
and cooperation was made. In spite of the earlier Soviet indifference and basic 
differences in socio-political sustems of the two countries, mutual relations 
improved markedly from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which 
demanded India to move closer to the USSR. Among many underlying factors, 
geo-political considerations are of considerable importance. Secondly, there 
[iii] 
was the practical consideration of the soviet economic aid. Thirdly, to secure 
political and diplomatic support on Kashmir issue. The most important factor 
was the identity of views of both the countries on imperialism, colonialism and 
racialism. 
However, it was the US military pact with Pakistan which transformed the 
entire countext of Indo-Soviet relations and greatly affected India's policy. To 
Nehru, the military alliances were opposed to non-aligned India's view that 
military blocs were a step towards war rather than peace. He was also convinced 
that the inclusion of Pakistan into military alliances would threaten to introduce 
a system of military blocs into India's immediate neighbourhood, thereby 
transforming the subcontinent into a theatre of cold war and at the same time 
would strengthen the latter not agains the USSR but against India with which 
many important and explosive problems still remain unresolved. In short, military 
pacts had given India a sense of encirclement. The US militrary presence in the 
subcontinent and massive flow of American arms into Pakistan had a tremendous 
impact on India's policy makers. As a result India began to move closer to the 
USSR. The indication of this trend was Nehru's acceptance of Soviet invitation 
to visit Moscow. It was largely around Nehru's perspective of the world, his 
initiatives and preferences that India's relations with the USSR developed. The 
image of Soviet Union in his mind was that of anti-imperialist nation trying to 
build a new socialist-order. He attached highest priority to India's relations with 
the USSR. 
[ i v ] 
By 1955, India had achieved considerable success in its long cherished 
aim of establishing an understanding with the USSR without entering into any 
formal pact or alliance. Nehru's visit to the USSR in early 1955 was one of the 
most important events in the annals of Indo-Soviet relations. The enthusiastic 
reception given to Nehru in the Soviet Union and later, the hearty reception 
accorded to the Soviet leaders in India manifested the feelings of the genuine 
respect, sympathy and friendship developing between the two nations. The 
exchange of state visits affirmed the tremendous goodwill that had been 
generated in the preceding two years in relation between the two countries. 
In the year 1958-59 Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of strain. The 
emerging diffences between Moscow and Beijing concided with major Soviet 
attempts at rapprochement with the west. China's changing attitude on Sino-
Indian border problem in 1958-59 resulted in chillness between India and China. 
Therefore, when China claimed 25,000 square miles of Indian territory in the 
beginning of 1959, India suddenly faced hostile China. 
Hostility to India was a deliberate choice of policy on the part of China. It 
was no longer in China's interest to play second fiddle to the Soviet Union. In 
asserting China's claims to leadership of the communist bloc and in attaining 
what China believed to be a more equitable distribution of power, it became 
necessary to disrupt the existing equilibrium of forces in South Asia. This could 
be achieved only by destroying India's prestige. It was a policy designed to expose 
India's weakness in order to consolidate China's position among the Afro-Asian 
[V] 
countries. At the same time China wanted to challenge the Soviet thesis of 
co-existance with the West, and USSR'S support to India's policy of 
nonalignment. Thus, China became a source of common concern to both the 
countries. This added a new demension to Delhi-Moscow relationship and greatly 
strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries. Their national 
interests demanded close collaboration with each other to contain China. 
Morever, both India and the Soviet Union attached great significance to 
peaceful settlement of international issues, specifically through the United 
Nations. These crises appeared as a common concern of Soviet Union and India 
alike as they characterized them as western colonialism. Thus Nehru and Soviet 
leaders had their identical viewpoints on many international issues and, 
particularly, colonial problems and they were endorsing each others viewpoints 
too. 
It may be said that a community of interests between India and the USSR 
resulted in a steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. Indo-
USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarily 
of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though, for different 
reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in Asia, checking the 
arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and NATO, and at a later stage, 
containing China. Almost through out this decade i.e. from 1953 - 1964, India 
had a sense of common purpose with the USSR. During this decade, the USSR 
remained India's principal source of strength in international affairs, as well as 
[ v i ] 
in her material needs. It goes to the credit of shrewd diplomacy of Jawaharlal 
Nehru that without entering into any formal treaty or alliances or giving the 
impression of being subservient to the USSR, he secured all from the USSR to 
suit the national interest of India. India under Nehru's stewardship always retained 
the freedom of action in her foreign policy. 
Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the relations between the 
Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and there is a great scope for 
deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. The Indo-Russian relations are 
based on the strong foundations of good neighbourly ties, liberal political 
ideology, convergence of national interests, geopolitical settings, economic 
opportunities and international interdependece. 
The most concerete expression of the new thinking was provided during 
the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 
1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia, China and 
India were able to form a regional bloc. A lot depends in the region on the policies 
of China, Russia and India, he said that India is a great power and our relationship 
is based on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two countries for stability 
in the world. Primakov also reiterated the Russian stand that Russia supports 
India's claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. 
Putin's visit in December 2002, sealed a new special relationship between 
India and Russia. President Putin described that he was the best friend of India. 
A statement endorsed by Prime Minister Vajpayee, describing the Russian leader 
[ vii ] 
as a trusted friend of India. The Putin -Vajpayee summit produced a strong 
statement called upon Pakitan to fulfill its obligations by preventing infiltration 
of terrorist across the line of control and eliminating the infrastructure of 
terrorism as a pre-requistite for the renewal of peaceful dialogue. Russia 
unambiguously endorsed India's stand that the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore 
declaration provide the sole framework within which any India-Pakistan dialogue 
should eventually take place. 
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Few other states are so much bound by so many ties as India 
and the USSR. India's friendly stance towards the USSR has greatly 
been exaggerated, misunderstood and misinterpreted in India and 
abroad. An examination of the subject appeared necessary in order to 
explain the nature, extent, direction, and implications of India's 
relations with the USSR. It is all the more essential as there is a 
noticeable tendency among some quarters to gloss over certain events 
and decisions which do not fall in line with their own views and 
heavily underscore those which do so. An attempt has been made to 
analyse India's policy towards the USSR during Nehru era and place 
it in proper perspective. 
The ever growing friendly relations between the two 
neighbours are the result of many factors such as the complementarity 
of their national interests and the constantly changing national and 
international situations. The Soviet Union's huge size, its vast 
potentialities and the geo-political situation compelled Indian leaders, 
Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, to realize, even before India attained 
independence, the need to develop close and friendly relations with 
the Soviet Union. 
The present study seeks to discuss and analyse India's 
relations with the USSR during a period when crucial transformations 
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took place in the interaction between India and the USSR. It covers a 
period of a decade after the death of Stalin and discusses how the 
relations between the two countries were gradually widened and 
deepened. The period under discussion i.e. 1953-1964 was very 
important as well as critical from the point of view of their bilateral 
relations and the emerging political scenario which tended to turn the 
bi-polar world into a multi polar world. The whole decade had 
witnessed a number of political developments which has great impact 
on Indo-Soviet relations. The crisis situations in Korea, Vietnam, 
Suez and Hungary resulting in the conferences of Bandung and 
Belgrade to bring about a peaceful resolution of international 
conflicts. In this situation when the world was divided into two 
militarily hostile power blocs, demarcated by their military pacts, 
such as the US led NATO and the USSR led Warsaw pact, India had 
opted to join none of them. During this phase, almost every 
international crisis has had its repercussions on India's relations with 
the USSR. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse objectively the nature 
and contents of India's policy towards the USSR from the point of 
view of India's national interest. The best way of determining the 
relations between the two states should be the attitude and response of 
a country towards one another in moments of crisis for either. For this 
purpose the issues of national importance for each country have been 
critically studied. 
INTRODUCTION 
It was Nehru, having an international bent of mind who 
visualized the significance of Russian Revolution of 1917. Nehru 
realized that it was a powerful blow to imperialism and that Soviet 
Russia had emerged as an anti-imperialist force, as an ally of subject 
peoples. If a new world order was to be created free from 
imperialism, he argued, India must work together with the Soviet 
Union. In short, Nehru's policy of friendship with the Soviet Union 
was inevitable from the premises of his outlook. That was why even 
when Soviet developments did not always find favour with him, he 
was confident that the new Soviet society would maintain the main 
direction of its growth and policies. 
Nehru was a man of great foresight. In 1927, he foresaw that 
Britain would eventually become a satellite of America and that the 
latter would emerge as the greatest imperialist power. He also foresaw 
that the only power to oppose the new imperialism would be the 
Soviet Union and that India and the USSR would have to work 
together to fight against imperialism and support the subjugated 
nations in winning independence. In the beginning though Indo-
Soviet relations were at halt, he did not loose heart, but continued his 
efforts to foster those relations. When the Soviet Union also 
perceived the logic of Nehru's thinking, there was nothing to bar the 
steady growth of those relations. That they are backed by a powerful 
logic in our times is exemplified by the fact that there was not one 
instance to mar those relations in all those forty-four years. 
INTRODUCTION 
As against this, American policies from the very beginning 
of India's independence were directed to prevent the emergence of a 
powerful India. India did not count in American policies because 
India was not willing to serve American interests. The Soviet Union, 
on its part, has expressed, time and again, through its leaders that it 
wants to see India emerge as a powerful country in the world. Just as 
India saw the need to work together with the Soviet Union in order to 
defeat imperialism, the Soviet Union, too, perceived that friendship 
with India was a vital factor in the Soviet struggle against 
imperialism. It is this factor that the USSR in the mid 1950's hailed 
Indian non-alignment as a "positive force" in world affairs, made 
India the leading recipient of its foreign aid programme, and gave 
unreserved support to India's position on such sensitive issues as 
Kashmir and Goa. On its part, India welcomed the willingness of the 
USSR to co-exist as equals. From 1959 onwards China posed an 
increasing concern for both New Delhi and Moscow. By then the 
Indo-Soviet relationship had passed through a stage of cautious co-
existence to a phase which might be termed "peaceful co-operation". 
It is this inter locking interest that has provided the most powerful 
rationale to this friendship. 
Nehru was the architect of this friendship. He was also its 
proponent and philosopher. If India has inscribed socialism as one of 
its goals in its constitution, it was because of Nehru's perceptions and 
policies. If we remain non-aligned, it was because of our experience 
of imperialism and colonialism, which Nehru articulated. If we 
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remained friends of the Soviet Union, it was because we were so 
before and during the war years, and later, when alone among the rest 
of the world, the Soviet Union went out of its way to stand by India at 
every moment of its crisis and to aid and assist it in the fulfillment of 
the aspirations of our people. 
In the first chapter an attempt has been made to provide a 
general historic background, focusing on Russia and British India, the 
effect of the 1917 revolution on the minds of the Indians in general 
and on Nehru in particular.'Vhe October Revolution stirred the people 
of India, as nothing else has done before, and broadened their interest 
in Russia. However, the admiration for the achievements and policies 
of Soviet Union was never uncritical. While Indians appreciated the 
policy of peace and anti-imperialism, and heroic efforts made to 
achieve rapid economic development, they were highly critical of 
certain other aspects of the Soviet system. There was unreserved 
disapproval of the excessive use of violence. Nehru also abhorred 
what he characterized as "unnecessary regimentation of life and 
suppression of civil liberties". However, inspite of his likes and 
dislikes, Nehru always realized, on the whole, the need to forge close 
relations with the Soviet Union and regarded the USSR as country of 
great importance for India. It also focuses on Nehru's participation in 
the Brussels's Conference 1927, followed by his visit to the USSR, 
and his views on the USSR and communism. 
The Second Chapter discuses the attitude of the USSR 
towards the independent India during the early years and the 
INTRODUCTION 
consolidation of the Indo-Soviet friendship from 1953 onwards. This 
chapter also discusses the relations between India and the United 
States of America, her attitude and policies towards India and also her 
attitude towards the policy of non-alignment. It also deals though in 
brief, the relations, attitude and policies of the Peoples Republic of 
China towards India. 
The Third Chapter discusses the interplay of Indian and 
Soviet diplomacy during various international crisis and effect of 
these crisis on Indo-Soviet relations. 
Chapter Fourth deals with the study of China as a factor in 
the Indo-Soviet relations. It also deals with the impact of 
deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations on Soviet policy towards India in 
the context of the two Sino-Indian border conflicts. 
The Final Chapter discusses the Soviet programme of 
economic, technological and military assistance to India, and the 
commerce and other transactions between the two governments. It 
also discusses the nature of cultural relations among the two nations. 
The present study tries to analyse Indo-Soviet relations 
broadly, covering all aspects during the period of Nehru's Prime 
Ministership. In the light of their relations, the difficulties India had 
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CHAPTER - 1 
INDO-SOVIET HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Impact of Russian Revolution on Indian National Movement: 
Two International events which moulded the substance and 
character of the Indian National Movement were the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-05 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Japan's success 
inspired India to the realization that it would be only a matter of time 
when her people would also be able to hold their own as free people 
in their own country. The cry of Swaraj which came in its wake was 
deafening for the British rulers. The official opinion was that had 
Russia defeated Japan, there would have been none of the political 
troubles in India, and the British anticipated that now the Russian 
Revolution was going to have a similar effect.^ 
The Revolution in Russia received more enthusiastic 
response from the Indian people than the defeat of Russia by Japan 
had received in 1905. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was a major 
blow to the western capitalist system and the imperialist order, which 
the colonial powers had established over the larger part of the world. 
The Russian Revolution was a milestone in the history of the human 
race, which ushered in a new era of hope, a new civilization and a 
new relationship between man and man. Above, all it marked the 
point of transition from the era of capitalism to the era of socialism 
2 
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on a world scale. The movement reached the masses, who posed a 
challenge not only to British imperialism but also to the capitalists 
and the landlords. 
The stand of the Russian Revolutionary leaders on 
imperialism, capitalism and the principle of national self-
determination naturally produced a very favourable impression in 
India and among other subject peoples about the Russian Revolution. 
Indian leaders were convinced that the revolutionary upsurge in 
Russia would speed up the process of decolonization and strengthen 
their own freedom struggle. Praising the Russian revolutionaries for 
their achievements, Mrs. Annie Besant wrote in New India (Madras) 
on May 26, 1917 that the "Tzardom has fallen and the exiles are 
welcome by crowds rejoicing in the freedom won by their sufferings". 
She reminded the British rulers that "the whole youth of a nation 
cannot be permanently crushed. Russia tried to do it with a 
ruthlessness and thoroughness that can never be surpassed and we see 
the result is revolution which is applauded by the civilized world".^ 
Leading Journals both in English and in Indian languages 
published articles and commentaries on the happenings in Russia, 
emphasizing the force of nationalism working behind them. As early 
as 24 '^' December 1917, a leading nationalist daily of Bombay, The 
Bombay Chronicle, wrote : "We recognize the fact that they could 
never have met with the present success had their not been something 
in their programme that was attractive and of promise to serve the 
Indo-Soviet Historical Perspective 
present fear. The Bolshevik came with a definite scheme which took 
into consideration the necessities of the peasants and promised 
immediate confiscation of lands for the people".^ 
The influential nationalist Journal Modern Review of 
Calcatta commented: "It is refreshing to turn from the chorus of 
abuses and misrepresentation directed against the Russian Soviet by 
the capitalist press to the illuminating sketch of the framework of the 
Soviet State We are at last given an insight into the mighty 
efforts of the revolutionary Russia to organize herself and work out 
her communist ideals Infact, (the Bolshevik) is striving to make 
Russia better and nobler than anything she has ever been" / 
Another interesting article came out in the Bombay 
chronicle under the title, "Lenin, the man and WiAaims". The article 
ridiculed the idea that the Lenin was a German spy and discussed his 
programme. It concluded : "If Lenin is successful, the February 
Revolution will sink into insignificance before the November 
Revolution, for its success is nothing less than the end of the upper 
middle class and the final triumph of the common people".^ 
The Soviet pronouncement on the right of self-determination 
and of all nations had played its role, though a minor one, in 
projecting the concept of self-determination and also its practicability 
to the Indian scene, soviet influence proved even more far-reaching 
and effective than is generally understood because of the sharp 
contrast in implementing the principle of self-determination in Allied 
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and Soviet policy. The Indian people saw for itself that self-
determination was proclaimed by the Allies but was not applied to 
India. On the contrary, they noted that the Soviet Government not 
only promised but also implemented it in the former Tsarist colonies.^ 
The impact of the October Revolution was phenomenal. It 
had three distinct dimensions-stimulating the consciousness of the 
Indian people, widening the basis of the national movement and 
above all, hastening the evolutionary process of the Indian left 
movement, particularly the Communist movement. 
The Great October Revolution and Lenin's political thought 
considerably influenced the leaders of the Indian National Movement, 
Jawaharlal Nehru in particular. This is how he assessed the "powerful 
effect" of this. He said : "A study of Marx and Lenin produced a 
powerful effect on my mind and helped me to see history and current 
affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social 
development appeared to have some meaning, some sequence, and the 
future lost some of its obscurity. The practical achievements of the 
Soviet Union were also tremendously impressive. Often I disliked or 
did not understand some developments there and it seemed to me to 
be too clearly concerned with the opportunism of the moment, of the 
power politics of the day. But despite all these developments and 
possible distortions of the original passion for human betterment, I 
had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society 
by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be 
Indo-Soviet Historical Perspective 
smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new 
civilization towards which the world could advance".^ 
The president of the Calcatta session of the Indian National 
Congress, held in December 1917, the first to be held after the 
Revolution contrasted the despotic nature of British rule in India with 
that of its "free and self ruling neighbours across the northern 
frontiers" and declared that "in future unless India wins self-
government, she will enviously look at her self-governing neighbours 
and the contrast will intensify her interest".^ 
British Propaganda & Neliru's Attitude Towards i t : 
The success of Russian Revolution no doubt alarmed the 
British imperialists. Records of this period, the correspondence 
between the viceroy and the secretary of state for India, Chamberlain, 
as well as between local British officials in India-reveal the extent of 
the fears entertained by the British on the impact of the October 
Revolution on their Indian possession and on the nationalist 
movement within their country. Chamberlain went to bed with "his 
mind full of the Revolution in Russia" and considered it "as one of 
those events, which though long discussed and even foretold, take the 
world nonetheless by surprise when they happen".^ To Chelmsford, 
the viceroy, the revolution in Russia came "as a great shock".'° 
To counter the fear, Britain told the Indian people that since 
Bolshevism had been checkmated in Europe, it was now lookiiig 
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towards India to advance its objective of world revolution. Beginning 
with the October Revolution, British propaganda in India thus 
concentrated mainly on discrediting Bolshevism and the achievements 
of the young Soviet State. But the Indian people refused to believe the 
British propaganda. In any case, they saw no Bolshevik threat to 
India, which was the main line of British propaganda. 
It did not however, take long for a somewhat clear picture of 
the Russian Revolution to emerge in India through articles and 
comments in the Indian press. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, The New 
India and the Bombay chronicle declared from the house tops that 
"Bolshevism had been much misrepresented by the enemies", and 
considered it their duty to publish true facts about the success of the 
Russian people. The Bombay chronicle regarded its success as 
"nothing less than the end of the upper middle class and the final 
triumph of common people"." 
The Kesari, a Marathi Paper founded by Tilak was another 
paper, which took up the cudgels against the British criticism of 
Lenin and the October Revolution. 
The most powerful writings in support of the October 
Revolution, however, came from the Independent, a daily started in 
1919 from Allahabad by Motilal Nehru. In an editorial on January 14, 
1920, under the caption "The Red Menance"? It gave an unequivocal 
analysis of the Russian Revolution. It said: "...From the time. 
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Bolshevism first raised its head uptill now, it has steadily grown in 
power and prestige". 
The Independent provided a much clearer analysis of the 
political and economic objectives of the Bolsheviks. The Independent 
went on to explain that Bolshevism has declared war on western 
capitalism which had influenced both politics and economics. It was 
natural, it said, that the capitalists should look upon Bolshevism as its 
greatest enemy. The Independent further emphasized the fact that no 
one who had not realized these facts could understand, why the West 
talked of the 'Bolshevik menace'. 
Indeed, this was the best analysis of the Russian Revolution 
and the developments taking place in Russia. It is, of course, difficult 
to say as to who actually wrote these editorials in the Independent, 
but in thought, dictum and mood the stamp of Jawaharlal Nehru is 
already there. During the short lived existence of the daily, Jawaharlal 
Nehru was its virtual editor, albeit not openly. The editorials show a 
deep knowledge of European politics which neither nor any body else 
in the nationalist circle, except Jawaharlal Nehru, could have 
possessed in those days. During his stay abroad and as a result of vast 
readings, Jawaharlal Nehru had learned how the British government 
functioned, how it served the interest of the British capitalist class. 
He never believed the British propaganda that Russia may 
threaten our freedom. But, of course, she was certainly powerful 
enough and favourably placed to attack India. But should India fear 
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such an attack? He did not think so : "For generations the bogey of a 
Russian invasion has been held up to us during the days of Tsars we 
were told that it was Russian imperialism thrusting down to the sea, 
and now it is communism trying to subvert the world. So we are told 
by the British".'^ 
He also did not believe this line of talk and attributed to it 
"the traditional rivalry between England and Russia". He saw no 
reason why India "should inherit the hate and fear of Russia 
from England". Moreover the Soviet Government was beset with 
many difficulties and enmities which were likely to continue. It could 
hardly "embark on an aggressive campaign" and indeed, needed peace 
more than any other country. Russia, he maintained, "suffers from a 
fear complex", but she would "have nothing to fear from free India" 
on the contrary, he argued : "The danger from Russia is caused solely 
by the rivalry between England and Russia. It ceases as soon as the 
British connection is severed. Our position thus, in a military sense, is 
better and stronger as an independent country than it would be if we 
were within the fold of the British group of nations".''* 
He admitted that Russia "offers a peculiar problem which 
requires special attention. She had "adopted an economic policy with 
the rigid faith of a new religion and she is continually trying to spread 
it to other countries". Whether India adopted that policy "or some 
other form of socialism", however, should not in his view be an 
impediment to establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
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whose record in international affairs showed her to be "in favour of 
the fullest self-determination of various peoples" and one of support 
for the oppressed and exploited. He considered the possibility that 
Soviet Russia might develop imperial ambitions one day. But he 
believed that to be so remote a possibility that it was not immediately 
relevant. For reasons of self-interest, he said, for the present the 
Soviet Union was likely to be friendly towards the oppressed 
nationalities. "India", he felt, had "every reason to develop friendly 
relations with Russia. In many ways conditions in Russia are not very 
dissimilar to Indian conditions, in education and agriculture and the 
beginnings of industry to mention some instances, and we could learn 
much from studying their methods". 
It is clear from the above assessment that the Indian national 
opinion did not foresee any threat to India from Russia. Instead they 
welcomed and hailed the October Revolution, expressed great 
appreciation for Lenin and applauded the enlightened principles of 
Soviet foreign policy, which were advancing the cause of peace and 
self-determination of the subject peoples. 
Early Soviet Interest in India: 
Shortly after the October Revolution the Soviet Government 
turned its attention on India and other Eastern countries. In June 1918 
the Soviet commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomendel) published 
a "Blue Book" containing secret documents taken from the archives 
of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry. The documents on India contained in 
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the "Blue Book", edited by K.M. Trionovsky were mostly confidential 
dispatches from the Tsarist Consul General in India to the Foreign 
Ministry. Trionovsky's 12 page introduction is significant because it 
is the first of many commentaries on Indian conditions providing 
some clues to the nature of Soviet interest in India. The introduction 
by him indicated boldly the Russian policy towards India and the 
"role which the Russian Revolution could play in combating the 
world imperialists". 
After briefly describing the deplorable economic, social and 
political conditions of India under British rule, the author rightly 
noted that a national liberation movement was growing and 
threatening British rule in India, a movement which "for the time 
being has an exclusively national character, uniting all conscious 
classes and sections of the populations".'^ 
India in revolution , Tronovsky asserted, "would became 
our national ally in the struggle against the common enemy".'^ He 
pleaded for self determination for India and spoke of the importance 
of the Russian experience for India "Our revolutionary path in 
the not distant future will bring forth joy", he said "not only on the 
plane of the struggle for national liberation from foreign domination 
but also for the socialist order".'^ Towards the end, the writer hinted 
that "\ye must join our hands with India in her struggle against 
imperialism. We must help her to free herself from the detested 
English Yoke". The success of revolution in India was necessary as it 
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would influence the political events of the whole world"/^ The 
Bolsheviks were convinced, he wrote further, " that in the British 
Empire the most vulnerable part was India and they cherish it as an 
article of faith that unless India was liberated Russia would not be rid 
of the menace of England".'^ 
In 1918-19, the Soviets gave a little more attention to India. 
In spite of the pre-occupation of the Soviet Government with the 
prospects of revolutions in the west, the growing upsurge of the 
National Movement in India did not pass unnoticed. The first 
Congress of the Communist International issued a manifesto in which 
the new national upsurge in India was noted : "In India the 
revolutionary movement has not subsided for a single day and has 
lately led to the greatest workers strike in Asia which the British 
Government met by ordering its armoured cars into action in 
Bombay".^ ° 
The tragedy of the Jalianwala Bagh in April 1919, when 379 
people were shot down by the British army was immediately 
broadcast by Moscow Radio to show that the British were fighting for 
their lives in India.^' 
In the summer of 1919, a book was published in Moscow 
dealing with British rule in India, which characteristically enough, 
using charts and figures showed the great economic advantage the 
British were deriving from India.^^ The author Kerzentsev noted that 
India occupied a pivotal position in the struggle against imperialism. 
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He pointed out that from the point of view of two important results; 
first, it would deprive British imperialism of source of huge profits, 
and second, it would ignite a series of revolution against imperialism 
through out the colonial world.^^ Such commentaries on Indian 
affairs, through ill-informed and indeed very limited, tended to show 
that the importance of India was slowly being realized by the Soviets. 
By virtue of its size and population and its recognized value 
as the most prized possession of the leading imperial power of the 
day, India occupied a key position in the operation of such a policy. 
Lenin took note of the general ferment that manifested itself in India 
immediately after the First World War. He regarded it as indicating a 
revolutionary situation, and hoped that the masses would rise against 
their foreign masters. In 1920 Lenin sent a brief message to the Indian 
Revolutionary association (Mahendra Pratap's Provisional 
Government of India in Exile in Kabul) in reply to a resolution 
adopted at a mass meeting held in Kabul on February 17, 1920. The 
message stated : "I am glad to hear that the principles of Self-
determination and the liberation of oppressed nations from 
exploitation by foreign and native capitalists, proclaimed by the 
workers and peasants republic have met with such a ready response 
among progressive Indians who are waging a heroic fight for 
freedom".^^ 
As its hope of a revolution erupting in the west were not 
fulfilled, the Soviet Government turned its attention increasingly to 
Indo-Soviet Historical Perspective 
the colonial world, especially to India. The last article to come from 
Lenin's pen, "Better Fewer but better", stated : "In the last analysis, 
the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, 
India, China etc. account for the overwhelming majority of the 
population of the globe".^^ 
Soviet Writers 
Lenin's interest in India inspired several Soviet writers to 
observe the Indian situation and present explanations for the events 
taking shape in India. Thus I.Vanien, in an article entitled "Facts and 
Impressions of Post War India" (1922), gave an account of some 
important episodes of Indian history. He mentioned the growth of 
industries, the development of indigenous capital, and the rising of 
1857. He described how, when the Prince of Wales visited Madras in 
1921, the people observed hartal and staged demonstrations. He 
compared the Jalianwala Bagh tragedy of 1919 to the events of 
January 9, 1905 in Russia.^^ 
In his article entitled "The ways and perspective of Indian 
Revolution" (1922) Tivel outlined the class character of the national 
revolutionary movement in India. He expressed the view that the 
Indian National Congress should radically change itself if it wanted to 
retain control over the masses. Since a revolution was imminent in 
India, the class controversies would assume importance, and workers 
and peasants would raise the question of social liberation in India.^' 
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In an article entitled "India's struggle for liberation" (1925), 
"Big Ben" observed that, on the one hand, the temporary stabilization 
of capital in India improved the economic situation of the country and 
strengthened the influence of British capital; and that, on the other, 
there was the awakening of the masses who had enthusiastically 
reacted to the October Revolution. The slogan of self-determination 
had reached the people. In support of this statement he cited the 
defeat of All-India Congress committee (AICC) resolution of 
condolence on the death of Lenin by a mere nine votes, which was 
significant in his opinion. He hoped, in conclusion, that the impact of 
the revolution would grow day by day.^ * 
Thus Soviet writers kept up their interest in India. Indeed, 
events in India formed an important part of their study of world 
affairs. 
Brussels Conference & Nehru's Brief Visit to Moscow : 
During a brief visit to Berlin towards the end of 1926 Nehru 
learned about a proposed Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at 
Brussels in February 1927. Impressed by the idea, Nehru proposed to 
the Indian National Congress that the latter should take an official 
part in the forthcoming Brussels Congress. The proposal was 
approved and Nehru was appointed to be the spokesman of the Indian 
National Congress at Brussels. 
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On February 10, 1927, the Congress of Oppressed 
Nationalities met in Brussels at the Palais Egmont and remained in 
session for five days. The first of the 40 resolutions passed by the 
Congress, moved by Nehru, extended the warm support of the 
Brussels Congress to the Indian National Movement for "complete 
freedom" because the "liberation of India from foreign domination 
and all kind of exploitation is an essential step in full emancipation of 
the peoples of the world". He told the cheering delegates that the 
Indian National Congress had commissioned him to affiate the latter 
with the League against Imperialism, the organization which was 
founded by the Brussels Congress.^^ 
Who sponsored the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and 
founded the League Against Imperialism? Nehru was not sure, but he 
had no doubt that the League "was friendly toward the communists".^° 
Though the subsequent activities of the League made it unmistakably 
evident that it was nothing more than a appendage of the Communist 
International, the League Against Imperialism was considered, at its 
inception, as an organization genuinely interested in the emancipation 
of oppressed people. Infact, the German Council of the League had 
five-well known figures as its honorary presidents " Albert Einstein, 
Romain RoUand, Madame Sun-Yet-Sen, George Lansbury and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. 
The Brussels Congress proved to be a milestone in the 
development of Nehru's political thought, notably his espousal of 
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socialism and a broad international outlook. It was there that he first 
came into contact with orthodox communists, left-wing, socialists and 
radical nationalist ft-om Asia and Africa. It was there that the goals of 
national independence and social reform became linked inextricably 
in his conception of future political strategy. It was there, that the 
notion of an Afro-Asian group of nations cooperating with one 
another was conceived. Indeed, the Bandung Conference in 1955 may 
be seen as the fruition of an idea which first found emotional 
expression at Brussels almost thirty years earlier. 
Nehru himself sees Bandung in this perspective. In talking 
about the Bandung Conference he remarked, 'I will tell you a old 
story. Perhaps you have come across the fact that I attended a 
conference in Brussels in 1927'. The Asian delegates wanted to meet 
regularly thereafter but 'found that it was not possible for us to meet 
anywhere except in some country of Western Europe. When I 
interjected, 'the world has changed since then', his face glowed and, 
in slow, measured words, he said, 'the world has changed and of 
course we meet'.^' 
In a report submitted to the All India Congress Committee, 
Jawaharlal Nehru termed the Brussels Congress "an event of first 
class importance" that was likely to have a far reaching impact. 
Although he could not predict the future of the League, Nehru 
enthusiastically commented : 
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"It is a study infant with great possibilities 
of growth it has the germs in it of 
developing into a real league of Nations of 
peoples, a truer one than the league of 
Governments which sits at Geneva". 
"It is clear of course that any association with the league 
does not limit in anyway the freedom of activity of our Congress."^^ 
The idea for an anti-imperialist conference came from a 
small group of revolutionaries in Berlin, then the European Centre of 
political exiles from the colonial world. It had strong moral support 
from Moscow which welcomed such a gathering as a device for 
infiltration into nationalist circles through out Asia.^ ^ Diverse 
European intellectuals and leftist trade union leaders were drawn by 
sympathy for the underdog and, possibly, by a sense of guilt over the 
unsavoury aspects of European domination. Many delegates had 
strong communist sympathies, though the ideologies of those present 
varied considerably, from left-centre to orthodox Marxism. 
Nehru recognized that the Brussels Congress was entirely in 
keeping with Russia's present policy of encouraging and supporting 
every form of nationalism, and indeed, every other force which can 
help them break imperialism, especially British imperialism.^'^ Nehru 
observed that the Soviet Union "approved" the idea of Brussels 
Congress, though "they kept themselves severely aloof from the 
Congress because they thought that too close an association might 
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frighten away many people. Thus there was no representative from 
any Russian organization.^^ Nonetheless, there was "a strong 
undercurrent of sympathy for Russia among the delegates", "Every 
reference to Russia was cheered", Nehru noted and pointed out the 
case of an African Negro delegate, who said that his people did not 
know much about communism but felt that Soviet Russia brought a 
message of hope to the down trodden and the oppressed.^^ 
Nehru dismissed the propaganda put out by the British and 
French media of the day that the whole show at Brussels was a puppet 
play with the strings being pulled by the Soviets. But he saw that 
many of speakers were inclined to accept communism as an article of 
faith and some were even more communist than Moscow. As he 
explained in his report of the Working Committee : 
"The Brussels Congress was so far as 
its delegates were concerned, by no means 
purely communists. There were important 
labour leaders who have openly opposed 
Communism and the Third International. But 
the organizers were certainly communists or 
people having full sympathy with Russia. 
There was also a strong under current of 
sympathy with Russia among the delegates. 
As one of the Negro delegates from Africa 
put it, his people did not know much about 
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communism but they felt that Soviet Russia 
brought a message of hope to the down 
trodden and oppressed". 
At the plenary session of the conference he delivered an 
impassioned address on India's exploitation-how India is maltreated, 
repressed and plundered. In tone and language it was typical of the 
radical Socialist pronouncement then in vogue, an angry critique of 
imperialism and all its misdeeds. He was acutely aware of India's 
pivotal role in the Afro-Asian world. Politically and strategically 
noting that many countries in the area would achieve their freedom 
only when India itself were independent. There was evident, too, of a 
marked socialist outlook. The resolution on India, drafted and moved 
by Nehru, declared that 'this congress further trusts that the Indian 
National Movement will base its programme on the full emancipation 
of the peasants and workers of India, without which there can be no 
real freedom'.^* 
Nehru's attraction to Marxism was perhaps the most striking 
feature of his role at the Brussels Congress. Nor was he unaware of 
the communist bias of its creation, the league against imperialism. 
But at this stage of his political outlook, and indeed for the next 15 
years, collaboration between nationalism and communism seemed to 
him natural and desirable. It was not Marxist theory that attracted him 
at the outset; rather it was an emotional aversion to the social 
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democrats and faith in the Soviet experiment. Recalling this period in 
his autobiography he wrote : 
"As between the labour worlds of the Second 
International and the Third International my 
sympathies were with the latter. The whole 
record of the second International from the war 
onward filled me with distaste, and we in India 
had had sufficient personal experience of the 
methods of one of its strongest support - the 
British labour party. So I termed inevitably with 
goodwill towards communism, for, whatever its 
faults, it was atleast not hypocritical and not 
imperialistic These attracted me, as also the 
tremendous changes taking place in Russia". 
And yet, even at this time, Nehru had serious reservations 
about his communist colleagues. 
"But communists often irritated me by their 
dictatorial ways, their aggressive and rather 
vulgar methods, their habits of denouncing 
everybody who did not agree with them".^' 
Moreover, it was at Brussels that he had his live contact 
with representatives of resurgent China. Like many among the 
political intelligentia of his and succeeding generations in India, he 
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had followed the course of China's national and revolutionary 
upsurge with great interest and sympathy which, perhaps, was not 
always to be reciprocated in an equal measure He had been 
particularly incensed and outraged by the British use of Indian 
Soldiery and police to shoot and put down the Chinese people with 
whom India had deep sentimental ties even though in recent history 
any direct intercourse had minimal 
He was at paine to stress for the benefit of his congress 
colleagues not to base their judgement on the Chinese question on the 
news they read in the Indian papers "The news that reaches India 
about the Chinese struggle", he wrote, "Comes almost entirely 
through British official or semi-official agencies and the real truth 
seldom appears in the Indian papers" Therefore, must establish 
effective channel of communication for free flow of information and 
organize exchange of visits for substantial dialogue, if possible, in 
China and India on suitable occasion, or in third country if the British 
Government put obstacles in the way 
The working committee had complied with his plea by 
passing a resolution which was not very strong but stated that it was 
"not satisfied with the arguments used by the British Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister (Austin Chamberlain) to the necessity of 
sending any troops to China and demands that the Indian troops sent 
there be brought back to India forthwith " The resolution called upon 
"the country to insist on the Government's compliance with this 
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demand". While about it, the working committee authorized the 
Congress president to cable the greetings of the Indian National 
Congress to the secretary of the Congress of Oppressed Nations, 
Brussels, and offering its "fullest cooperation in world campaign 
against tyranny of imperialism", and assuring it that all shades of 
Indian opinion unanimously condemned "employment of Indian 
troops against China and viceroy's action preventing Legislative 
Assembly from discussing the subject". 
In his statement to the Press at Brussels Nehru had referred 
to Lord Irwin's veto and added : "India today is with China not only 
because she has every sympathy for her but because she feels that 
China's successful fight is the most hopeful sign of the future 
downfall of imperialism". And he had gone on to argue that "the 
attempt to use India against China makes it all the more necessary for 
the forces of nationalism in the subject nations to cooperate together 
for their common good"."*" 
The Chinese at the time seemed desperately keen to draw up 
a programme for Sino-Indian co-operation as he reported to the 
working Committee : "I had many talks with Chinese delegates in 
Brussels. Faced as they were with a critical situation, they naturally 
wanted immediate action and were intolerant of delay. I pointed out to 
them that however much we might sympathise with them our internal 
difficulties prevented us from doing much at present. We would try to 
do our best now but what was more important was to lay the 
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foundations of future cooperation. The joint declaration of the British, 
Indian and Chinese delegates were very keen on the canton 
government sending a permanent representative to canton or Hankaii. 
I agree with them about the desirability of the proposal and said that I 
would place it before the working committee of the Indian National 
Congress with my strong recommendation. But I pointed out that 
there may be many difficulties in the way of Indian National Congress 
and they may not be able to send such a representative. A 
representative from the canton Government to India would of course 
be warmly welcome".'" 
His cautionary words notwithstanding, the Chinese were so 
insistent on an agreement on certain immediate steps taken that Nehru 
assented. It was not so much a hard and fast agreement as a 
memorandum of understanding. But it cannot be overstressed. The 
Chinese delegates were, after all, representatives of a Sovereign 
Government; though admittedly that Sovereignty was wider severe 
pressure from a combination of colonial powers, principally Britain. 
They knew that Nehru did not represent a Government, much less a 
Sovereign State, but national movement struggling for freedom. That 
they were anxious to win its moral backing and even exchange 
representatives with it gives some indication of the importance they 
attached to the Congress as the arbiter of Indian destiny, if not a 
putative Government; at the time. 
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Inspite of his early rupture with the Congress of oppressed 
Nationalities and the League, Nehru's participation in their activities 
had an abiding influence on his views and political platform. This 
experience confirmed Nehru as a staunch fighter against imperialism 
and strengthened his belief in the necessity to fight for genuine and 
complete independence, and not just for domination status. His 
experience in the Congress of oppressed Nationalities and in the 
League Against Imperialism also heightened his interest in social 
problems, in the conditions of the working masses. He also 
understood that the struggle for independence should be linked with 
the struggle for socialist ideals. Nehru now viewed the future of India 
in an international context. He was getting more and more 
internationalist in his political philosophy and became aware of the 
need to unite all colonial and dependent peoples. Nehru discovered 
for himself, and largely for the National Liberation Movement in 
India and other countries, the possibility for a firm alliance with 
world's first socialist state, with the communist and democrats in the 
west in the struggle against imperialism. 
While in Europe, he continued to give much thought to the 
Soviet developments. His attitude to the Soviet remained extremely 
favourable as he considered the emergence of Soviet Russia as a very 
significant factor in the anti-imperialist struggle. In an article which 
he wrote on September 13, 1927 from Montana, Switzerland"*^ Nehru 
viewed the international situation. He out-rightly rejected the British 
contention that Russia posed a danger to India. Analyzing 
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independent India's Foreign Policy Vis-a-vis Soviet Russia, he 
pointed out that Soviet aims were peaceful and that India had nothing 
to fear from Soviet Russia. 
Nehru also did not feel that the new social system of the 
Soviet Union would stand in the way of friendly relations between 
India and the Soviet Union. Even if India Choose a different system, 
he was confident, it could establish good relations with Russia. "We 
need not to be communist", he wrote, "nor need we agree with their 
gospel of communism in order to appreciate much that they have 
done". 
Nehru's gravitation towards the world of Socialism could be 
judged from his short visit to Moscow in November 1927. This 
enabled him to verify in some measure with direct observation his 
notions about the first socialist state in history. He was not of course, 
a communist at any stage in his life. But as he wrote in his short book 
on Soviet Russia, "I must confess that the impression I carried back 
with me from Moscow were very favourable and all my reading has 
confirmed these impressions, although there is much that I do not like 
or admire"."^ ^ Thus, it can reasonably be claimed, that many elements 
in the Foreign Policy of India which he was to pursue when he 
became the External Affair Minister as well as free India's first Prime 
Minister were already well crystallized in his mind by the end of 
1927. 
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Jawaharlal Nehru visited Moscow with his father Motilal 
Nehru when the Soviet Society for cultural relations with Foreign 
Countries invited Nehru's for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the 
October Revolution when they were in Berlin. Russia is the first to 
invite dependent India to join in international politics and accorded a 
fitting reception to Jawaharlal Nehru, who represented India. 
Nehru's visit to Moscow was a chance event and Nehru was 
greatly impressed by whatever he saw and his admiration for the 
Soviet Union and its people grew immensely. Nehru was also greatly 
influenced by the personality of Lenin, the leader of the Russian 
Revolution. He considered Lenin as a political genius and a man of 
action. In a tribute to Lenin, he wrote : 
"By an amazing power of will, he 
hypnotized a nation and filled a disunited 
and demoralized people with energy and 
determination and strengthen to endure and 
suffer for a cause".'*'* 
His hosts made it possible for the Nehrus to see various 
aspects of Soviet life and Jawaharlal Nehru made good use of the 
opportunity. Nehru was more interested in the Soviet realities, how 
the new state was tackling its various Socio-economic problems, for 
he knew that they had a relevance to India as they were more or less 
identical for both countries. Such commonality made him write : "if 
27 
Indo-Soviet Historical Perspective 
Russia funds a satisfactory solution for these, our work in India is 
made easier"/^ 
Nehru's were on a conducted tour, seeing only what they 
were allowed to see; he knew too that conditions in the sprawling 
provinces hardly came up to what was to be found in Moscow. Yet he 
was convinced that the Soviet Union had made rapid progress in 
agriculture, prison reform, the eradication of illiteracy, the treatment 
of women, the handling of the problems of the minorities and the 
removal of the sharp contrast between luxury and poverty and of the 
hierarchy of class. He was sure too that the Soviet Union had much to 
teach India, which also was a large agricultural country with a poor 
and illiterate population. He was demonstrably impressed by what the 
Soviets were doing and planned to do. This is abundantly clear from 
the series of articles he wrote for the Indian News Papers and 
periodicals on returning to India, eventually to be published as a book 
entitled Soviet Russia. It was the first critical but sympathetic account 
of the Soviet Union by an Indian political leader of All India stature 
who was not a devout communist and for the Indian reading public it 
opened a many window on the young Soviet State, still in the heroic 
phase of its revolution, making light of all the hardships with which it 
was beset. It certainly confirmed him in his view that Indian people 
should steer clear of any war, whether hot or cold, which the 
imperialist powers might launch against Soviet Russia. As Nehru 
wrote in his book Soviet Russia: 
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"It is inconceivable that Russia, in her present 
condition at least, and for a long time to come, 
will threaten India. She can desire no additional 
territory, and even if she did the risks are too 
great for her. She is still mainly an agricultural 
country trying to develop her industries. For this 
she requires capital and expert knowledge. She 
gets neither from India. She produces raw 
materials, in abundance and not manufactured 
articles for export and dumping in Foreign 
countries, so does India. The two countries are 
today too similar to be exploited by each other, 
and there can be no economic motive for Russia 
to covet India. Ordinarily Russia and India 
should live as the best of neighbours with fewest 
points of friction. The continual friction that we 
see today is between England and Russia, not 
between India and Russia. Indians have for 
generations been told to fear Russia, and it is 
perhaps a little difficult to exorcize this fear 
today. But if we face the facts, we can only come 
to one conclusion, and that is that India has 
nothing to fear from Russia "''^  
This was by far the most positive pronouncement on the 
Soviet Union that any Indian leader of national stature had made till 
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then. However, even Nehru himself some years earlier had been 
inclined to equate some aspects of Soviet Communism with Fascism 
which was not surprising, considering that a relentless and systematic 
campaign of disinformation had been going on in the capitalist press 
ever since the Russian Revolution and this provided the main source 
of news even for the nationalist press in India. But having glimpsed 
the Soviet reality in its light and shade, even though briefly, Nehru 
had revised his views and judgement about it. 
Nehru fully realized the importance of understanding Soviet 
Union and having friendly relations with her. He wrote; "Russia again 
cannot be ignored by us, because she is our neighbour, which may be 
friendly to us and co-operate with us, or may be thorn in our side. In 
either event, we have to know and understand her and shape our 
policy accordingly Indifference is out of question"."*' 
Nehru's stay in Europe had refreshed his mind and 
broadened his outlook as he wrote in his Autobiography: "I was 
returning from Europe in good physical and mental condition. I felt 
full of energy and vitality, and the sense of inner conflict and 
frustration that had oppressed me so often previously was for the time 
being absent. My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed 
to me definitely a narrow and insufficient creed. I felt I had a clear 
perception of World Affairs, more grip on present day world, ever 
changing as it was. Soviet Russia despite certain unpleasant aspects 
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attracked me greatly and seemed to hold forth a message of hope to 
the world"/^ 
With the passage of time his belief that Indo-Soviet 
friendship and co-operation were a historical necessity and imperative 
for durable peace and progress in Asia and broader sense, the world-
was to ripen into something akin to a firm conviction. 
At the end of December 1927 Jawaharlal Nehru 
demonstrated his mature outlook on national and international affairs 
by having the Madras session of Indian National Congress pass three 
resolutions of considerable importance. Addressing the delegates as 
"comrades", Nehru had the Congress resolve people was complete 
national independence with no ties with the British whatsoever. 
Nehru's favourable view of the USSR at this time also 
derived in large measure from the fact that the USSR was the only 
European nation calling for an end to British rule in India. Speaking 
in Calcatta, he stressed the anti-imperial record of the USSR: 
"And Russia, what of her. An outcast like us 
from nations and much slandered and often 
erring. But in spite of her many mistakes she 
stands today as the greatest opponent of 
imperialism and her record with the nations of 
the East has been just and generous"."*^ 
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By 1936, Nehru's interest in world affairs had become very 
deep indeed and so also his attachment for the Soviet Union, while in 
prison during 1932-33 he spent a good deal of time pondering over 
the events in other countries and seriously analyzing the world 
situation. The more he studied this subject the more fascinated he 
grew 'India with her problems and struggles', he writes 'became just 
a part of this mighty world drama, of great struggle of political and 
economic forces that was going on everywhere, nationally and 
internationally'. And in that struggle Nehru's sympathies went 
increasingly to the communist side. 
While presiding over Lukhnow Session of the Indian 
National Congress in 1936, he said : "If the future is full of hope, it is 
largely because of Soviet Russia and what it had done. The new 
civilization will spread to other lands and put an end to the wars and 
conflicts which capitalism feeds".^° 
Nehru found himself in disagreement with several policy 
moves of the USSR. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact puzzled 
him. He was much dismayed by the Pact and their subsequent actions. 
He expressed his dissatisfaction in these words: 
"The Russio-.German Pact, the Soviets 
invasion of finland, the friendly approach of 
Russia towards Japan. Were there any 
principles, and standards of conduct in this 
world, as was it all sheer opportunism".^' 
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At the same time Nehru maintained that the USSR had no 
other alternative after their efforts to contain Germany through 
common action had failed. He looked at this development against the 
background of British policy towards her in the past. He observed: 
"There can be and there is going to be no real alliance between Hitler 
and Stalin. But both are willing enough to play the game of power 
politics. Russia has suffered insult enough at the hands of England to 
resent it bitterly"." 
However, after Hitler's attack on Russia, Nehru took the 
first opportunity after his release from prison to land the heroic 
struggle of the Soviet people. Acting largely upon his advice, the 
Congress Working Committee at its Bardoli meeting in 1941 in a 
resolution expressed its sympathy for the Soviet Union. That country, 
it declared, had stood for certain human, cultural and Social alues 
which were of great importance to the growth and progress of 
humanity. ^ '^  
After the war during negotiations between Indian leaders 
and the British spokesmen the Soviet Press referred to the 
inadequacies of the British proposal and pleaded for the immediate 
grant of independence. At the San Francisco Conference of the United 
Nations, the Soviet Foreign Minister sadfuUy observed that they had 
at the conference an Indian delegation but India was not yet an 
independent state; they should all hope that a new team would soon 
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come and the voice of an Independent India was heard in the UN 
circles. 
The Interim Government was formed on 2 September 1946 
with Nehru as Vice-President of the ministerial council. In the first 
broadcast on 7 September 1946 Nehru greeted the Soviet Union 
which, he said, 'carries a great responsibility for shaping world 
events' and added that as 'neighbours in Asia we shall have to 
undertake many common tasks and much to do with each other'. It 
was indeed a bold statement as at that time the USA with it's the then 
monopoly of the atomic secrets was speaking in very threatening 
terms to Russia. The cold war had reached a high pitch and it needed 
courage to make such a bold statement. In January 1947 a delegation 
from the Soviet academy of sciences came here on invitation sent at 
the instance of Nehru to the session of the Indian Science Congress 
where on 7 January he told the guests that "once diplomatic relations 
are established, the door will be opened for close contacts in many 
fields of beneficial human activities"." 
Thus, the Russian Revolution laid the foundation for the 
building and expansion of new kind of ties between the Indian people 
and the people of USSR. These friendly relations naturally entered a 
new phase after India became an independent and sovereign state in 
1947. 
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CHAPTER-2 
1947-YEAR OF INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE & THE 
RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION 
The core of India's foreign policy since independence has 
been the non-alignment with major power blocs. When India became 
independent, the world was divided into two. Nehru did not choose 
either. India wanted to free herself from the coils of Big Power 
diplomacy ever since her independence. Indian leaders were 
convinced that to become embroiled in this bipolar struggle would be 
tantamount to loosing everything that India had gained in her long 
struggle for national independence. Nehru declared in 1952 : 
"If there is a cold war today, certainly we are 
neutral. It does not matter who is right or who 
is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of 
mutual abuse".' 
Nehru the chief architect of India's foreign policy, believed 
that the ideological struggle between East and West was the result of 
different economic and political systems, suited to different societies. 
On March 22, 1949 he observed : 
"we must realize that there are different types 
of economic policies in the world today in 
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different countries and they are believed in by 
their people. Well, the only thing to do is to 
leave them to work out their destiny. It may be 
that one of them justifies this policy, another 
justifies another. It may be that a third follows 
the middle course...we must proceed on the 
basis of leaving every country to shift itself in 
regard to its internal affairs. Any effort to 
change the economic policy, or any other 
internal policy, forcibly or to bring pressure to 
bear upon it, leads to counter-pressure and to 
continuous conflict...We have had a type of 
philosophy which is a live and let live 
philosophy of life. We have no desire to convert 
other people to any view or thought". 
India has been against the cold war ever since her 
independence and was not ready to see world in terms of communism 
and anticommunism. She as the largest democracy of Asia, believed 
in the democratic way of life. Nehru time and again advocated and 
emphasized that both America and Russia solve the crisis and save 
humanity from the ultimate disaster. 
Emphasizing the importance of those countries who did not 
belong either to capitalists or communists, he said : 
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"Millions of people believe in what is called 
western capitalism; millions also believe in 
communism. But there are many millions who 
are not committed to either of these 
ideologies, and yet seek, in friendship with 
others, a better life and more hopeful future". 
According to the United States and the thesis of Western 
Block countries the whole basis of the western bloc was that Soviet 
Russia and Communist China along with other smaller communist 
countries, had hostile and aggressive intentions towards non-
communist world. But India rejected this thesis on the plea that India 
did not see any direct threat or danger to herself from the communist 
world. India did not believe that Soviet Union would attack India 
rather she had friendly relations with Russia. It was because of non-
recognition of this threat that India did not support the defence 
arrangements and actions of the western block and avoided external 
pressures. 
India's Policy towards the Cold War has been one of 
keeping out of it. In her view it existed because the West and the 
Soviet Union found themselves engaged in a grim competition for 
world power and position and that Asia and Africa were not in the 
picture except as play things of the Big Powers. G.L. Mehta, Indian 
Ambassador to the USA, once wrote : 
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"The conflict between the United States and 
the Soviet Russia which has thus become basis 
is partly ideological and partly a reflection of 
power politics. In any case distrust and fear of 
the Soviet Union are at the root of American 
strategy and tactics. It is these feelings which 
make the government give the first priority to 
building up an alliance against Soviet and 
communist powers in both military and 
economic spheres. It is the cleavage which 
makes them think in terms of "bipolarization" 
of the world. And from this top priority given 
to making the world safe from the communist 
menace arise many of the difficulties of 
American foreign policy".'' 
Writing clearly in his book The Discovery of India about 
India's role to be played after independence in world affairs he 
insisted that India could not play a secondary role in the world affairs. 
Nehru's mind and thought were working to the future shaping of 
Indian foreign policy, VIZ, the concept of non-alignment. It reflects 
that India should have its own independent policy in regard to 
establishing relations with countries of the world. He was firm that 
India would never be a protege of any big power and her freedom 
would make a vital difference to Asia and therefore to the world. 
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Nehru who was the witness to the games of power politics 
and holy alliances during the two world wars was very careful and 
cautious in aligning India definitely with any one of the emerging 
power blocs. He proposed, as far as possible, to keep away from the 
politics of groups aligned against one another which had led in the 
past to world wars and which might again lead to disaster on an ever 
vaster scale.^ It was this experience and realization that Nehru after 
independence made it a corner-stone of his foreign policy to remain 
non-aligned and away from blocs. No doubt he himself realized that it 
was difficult position, because, when people were full of fear of one 
another, any person who tried to be neutral was suspected of 
sympathy with the other party. Replying to a debate on the objectives 
of Resolutions in the Constituent Assembly on January 22, 1947, 
Nehru declared, "I am not enough of prophet to know what will 
happen, but I do know that those desire peace must deprecate 
separate block which necessarily become hostile to other blocs. 
Therefore, India in so far as it has foreign policy, has declared that it 
wants to co-operate on equal terms with all countries".^ 
Nehru, however never lost sight of the two powers - USA 
and the USSR. He realized that these two powers counted in the 
ultimate analysis. The USA was almost unapproachable and their 
resources were enormous. The Soviet Union was not so situated 
geographically but was yet almost unbeatable. All other powers were 
of the second rank compared to those two and had to rely on alliances 
for their protection.^ He proposed to keep on the closest terms of 
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friendship with other countries unless they themselves created 
difficulties. In a speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly on 
December 4, 1947, Nehru voiced his feelings, saying, "we shall be 
friends with America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet 
Union".* 
Nehru considered that non-alignment was a technique, a 
method by which one keeps out of trouble by decreasing tension. He 
pursued as a way of life and action, a matter of principle not of 
opportunism or of convenience.^ Nehru's idea was that the approaches 
to world affairs of both the powerful blocs were out of date in this 
atomic age and non-alignment was the only possible road to peaceful 
relations and co-existence which meant no prior commitment coupled 
with dynamic participation in world affairs. Nehru also stood for 
ideological disarmament and in this connection he criticized 
organizations like cominform which were against peaceful co-
existence and entirely opposed to Panchsheel principles.^'' 
The term "non-alignment" according to Michael Brecher, 
was first used by V.K. Krishnamenon at the United Nations in 1953-
54. Between 1947-54 the term neutrality was often used to describe 
the attitude of the non-aligned countries. 
While in jail (1942-45) Nehru clearly foresaw the 
emergence of two power blocs in the post-War world. Writing in 
1944, he noted that the outstanding international consequences of the 
second world war could be the supremacy of the USA and the Soviet 
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Union, and much in the world was going to depend upon the policy 
pursued by these two countries and on the degrees of co-operation or 
conflict between them. He was the proud man and an intellectual, and 
was proud of his intellect. Accordingly he strongly resisted any 
attempt to make him yield his right of individual judgement through 
blind obedience or subservience to the judgement of other leaders, 
even if they were leaders of large and powerful countries. Once he 
said : 
"I am not prepared even as an individual, 
much less as an foreign minister of this 
country, to give up my right of individual 
judgement to anybody else in other countries. 
That is the essence of our policy. And that is 
the essence of non-alignment"." 
From this point of view non-alignment can claim, perhaps, 
to have survived the pulls and pressures, the stress and strain from 
various quarters and became a viable policy especially suited to the 
needs, requirements and aspirations of the Third World. This was 
because newly independent countries wanted to rebuild their society 
in accordance with their cultural identities and their own peculiar 
needs. 
Jawaharlal Nehru mooted the idea of Asian Conference 
which could promote Asian solidarity, much before he became the 
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Vice President of the Executive Council of the Viceroy and formed an 
Interim Government for India on September 2, 1946. Once he wrote : 
"There is much talk now of some kind of an 
Asian Federation. The immediate need is, 
however, for a drawing together of the 
countries of Asia so that they can consider 
their common problems together I trust 
that a fully representative Asian Conference 
will be able to meet before long probably 
India will be best place for such conference 
to meet".'^ 
This conference which represented all Asian Countries 
except Japan and Six Soviet Asian Republics reflected growing 
awareness of Indian interest in Asian affairs and also the conviction 
that with India on the verge to complete political freedom, she should 
take the initiative in Asian affairs. This was in line with a statement 
by Nehru to the Constituent Assembly in December 1946 in which he 
had expressed his hope that the new constitution would not only 
permit India to realize real freedom, but would also lead to the 
freedom of other countries of Asia. 
Nehru while addressing the conference revealed acute 
consciousness of Asian affairs. He said : 
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"Standing on the watershed which divides 
two epochs of human history and endeavour 
we can look back on our long past and look 
forward to the future that is taking shape 
before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of 
quiescence, has suddenly become important 
again in world affairs".'^ 
At this conference, which heralded the solidarity movement 
of the Afro-Asian countries, Nehru said : 
"For too long, we, of Asia have been 
petitioners in western courts and 
chancelleries. That story must now belong to 
the past. We propose to stand on our own feet 
and to co-operate with us. We do not intend 
to be the playthings of others".^ "^ 
The Soviet observers were carefully watching the political 
dimensions which arose out of this conference. One Soviet observer 
reported to Moscow that the Indian efforts at the proceedings were 
opposed sharply by the delegates of "those countries within US 
sphere of influence". The Chinese "counter imperialism" which 
developed during the meetings, he pointed out, was equally 
denounced with the Indian by the Southeast Asian delegates who 
"vigorously expressed the imperialist nature of the Pan-Asiatic 
theories of Japanese militarists and called for an attitude of the 
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greatest circumspection towards the attempts of certain Indian and 
Chinese delegates to revive Pan-Asiatic slogans".'^ 
In America and Europe the conference was viewed as some 
kind of a Pan Asian movement directed against Europe or America. 
Nehru, however, declared that India has no designs against anybody, 
"we propose, he said, to stand on our own legs and to co-operate with 
all others who are prepared to co-operate with us"/^ 
India is often looked upon by Asian countries as a big and 
reliable brother and India proved her capacity to interpret faithfully to 
the world the mind and spirit of resurgent Asia. In a way India is the 
natural and focal point of many forces at work in Asia. It was 
imperative for Asia to draw close together to put her house in order 
for defence and to further world peace. 
At the end of the conference it was decided to establish 
Asian Relations organization and Nehru because of his key role was 
unanimously elected President of its provisional general council. The 
same concern for Asia led Nehru to convene two years later another 
conference in Delhi to support the cause of Indonesian independence. 
When the Dutch launched their military action on July 20, 1947, New 
Delhi became in a sense the capital and clearing house for the 
"movements of protests which arose through out Asia"." 
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Opposition to Military Alliances : 
India deprecated military alignment of nations, because in 
her view, the same led to the creation of a 'War Psychosis', 
increasing fear and race of armaments, all these factors working 
together in the direction of war. While not denying the rights of 
nations to take legitimate precautions for self defence, Nehru held 
that defensive alliances openly aiming against some other country or 
countries defeat their own purpose of trying to 'maintain peace 
1 fi 
through strength". This is what he said at a press conference on July 
27, 1953 : 
"...Large organizations have grown up ....It is 
open for any country to have such 
organizations. But if I may say so, with all 
respect to them, my own approach to this 
question is without creating any hostile 
alliance. I do not deny the necessity of any 
country or group of countries protecting 
themselves or taking steps to protect 
themselves against possible danger. They may 
do so by all means. At the same time again 
and again what a country should decide is, 
whether its policy generally leads towards 
promoting a peace or war atmosphere. 
Sometime I find very little difference - people 
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talk of defence-whether it is defence or 
something else - one country calls it defence 
and the other country says that this defence is 
aimed against it. The other country also talks 
about defence and takes some other measures. 
So they go on mounting armaments".'^ 
Here again India's attitude with the western bloc as to the 
nature of the communist threat, and, of course, from her main 
objective of not getting involved into a world war, for which end she 
wanted to minimize international tensions. Since, in her view, 
military and defensive pacts added to these tensions, India's general 
attitude was that she could not fully support the western bloc's view 
that peace could be maintained only through such alliances, as the 
communist bloc would not dare to risk a war if the west was strong. 
Another argument which, in India's opinion, went against such 
alliances was the fact that these inter-linked defence arrangements 
might lead to a general conflagration, out of local troubles where 
otherwise the same might be localized. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization : 
So far as the western bloc is concerned, the NATO has been 
their chief defencive measure and the reaction of the Soviet Union to 
this also has been extremely unfavourable. In the North Atlantic Pact 
India saw provisions which could be interpreted to mean that this 
huge bloc of western nations might intervene on behalf of those of its 
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members, which were colonial powers, to protect their colonial 
establishments. 
As India strongly opposed colonialism in any form, she had 
a particular interest in this aspect of the North Atlantic Pact. 
Moreover two of the NATO members, France and Portugal, held 
small colonial territories on the Indian main land itself.^" Otherwise 
India did not consider NATO as too directly affecting her, 
notwithstanding the fact that she regarded the alliance as born out of 
fear and creating counter fear. On June 21, 1952 Nehru expressed 
himself on NATO in the following words: 
"I do not know if NATO affects India; may be 
very distantly. We are not worried about the 
Atlantic Pact. I was thinking of certain 
general trends like the Atlantic Pact based 
very rightly on self-denfence, mutual defence 
against aggression obviously they have every 
right to do that. But geographically it spreads. 
I have no objection to that But what is 
more important is the tendency for the Pact to 
include in its scope the protection of colonial 
territories of Atlantic Powers. The Pact does 
not contain this but subsequent conversations 
between Foreign Ministers and others 
gradually bring that in, thus changing its 
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character. With regard to that, I thought that 
there was something essentially opposed to 
the basic character of the United Nations". ' 
SEATO and Baghdad Pact : 
In the Past, India had been opposed to these pacts and 
alliances in principle only, since they did not directly affect her, but 
with the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty organization and the 
Baghdad Pact in the course of 1954 and 1955, her opposition could 
not be limited to principle, but became matter of practical policy. 
Nehru believed that these alliances represented an indirect return of 
western power to former colonial areas to exploit them. He believed 
that the cold war between the Super powers served as a deterrent to 
world peace and could eventually precipitate an armed conflict. 
Raising his powerful voice against SEATO on September 29, 1954, in 
the Lok Sabha he said : 
"Honourable members may remember the old 
days when the great power had spheres of 
influence in Asia and else where It seems 
to me that this particular Manila Treaty is 
inclined dangerously in the direction of 
influenced to be exercised by powerful 
countries.... After all, it is the big and 
powerful countries that will decide the matter 
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and not the two or three weak and small Asian 
Nations that may be allied to them". 
He did not leave at that. He pointedly said : "One can 
understand mention of external aggression in a defence treaty, but 
there is reference also to a fact or situation created within this area 
which might entitle them to intervene".^^ 
Jawaharlal Nehru warned the members of the Lok Sabha to 
"observe these worlds" and said, "They do not refer to external 
invasion. Any internal development in that area might also entitle 
these countries to intervene". 
Besides these objections, India was directly affected by the 
SEATO because India came under the 'treaty area' of the pact, as 
well as the fact that a none-too-friendly Pakistan was one of its 
members. India believed that the only reason for her joining the Pact 
was her hostility towards India. This was obvious from the facts while 
signing the Manila Treaty on the SEATO, the Pakistan Foreign 
Minister emphasized the point that it was aimed at 'aggression' from 
whichever quarter, i.e., not merely from the communist quarter - it 
may proceed in a region where 'aggression has unhappily been a 
common experience during the past many years.^ "^  
Another consideration was the apprehension of India that the 
SEATO would mean a return of the west to Asia^^ and a domination 
of a Asian countries in a new form because the western powers would 
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provide the military assistance under the pact and naturally the Asian 
countries would be dominated by those powers and would only be 
junior powers to the pact. 
Though India did not join the communist block, the signing 
of the SEATO did help India in coming to a better understanding with 
that bloc, and added to the suspicion of the west in the minds of the 
Indians.^^ 
The Indian attitude to, and opinion on, the Baghdad Pact 
which was established in April 1955, was not very different. In the 
Indian view, there was even less justification for the Baghdad pact 
than for the SEATO. It was justified by its members, more especially 
the united Kingdom, on the ostensible ground of Russian designs on 
West Asia. India was not convinced of this reason because the pact 
came after the Soviet Union had settled its frontier dispute with Iran 
and after it had publicly renounced her claim to Turkey's Eastern 
Province; there was also little communist activity in West Asian 
countries at that time. Indian opinion believed that the Baghdad Pact, 
instead of assuring security to West Asian region, actually brought 
insecurity, partly by provoking active Soviet interest in the region and 
partly by bringing about a split among the Arab countries because 
Iraq, a member of the Arab League, became a member of the pact and 
persistently tried to enlist more members to the Baghdad Pact -
resulting in bitterness between two opposing groups, and 'disruption, 
insecurity and discontent'.^^ In so far as India's own interest were 
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concerned, Nehru observed that the Baghdad Pact had a 'greater 
relation to us than the SEATO Pact. Its effect on India will be more, 
if not today, then tomorrow or the day after. 
Early in 1956, the Indian attitude and opinion in respect of 
military alliances received support from an unusual, but extremely 
competent, source. Former US secretary of state. Dean Acheson, who 
wrote in the New York Times Magazine on April 15, 1956 that 
military pacts in west and South Asia had not produced 'strengh and 
unity. They have produced division and weakness. They have not 
been a supplement to economic development. The West, far more than 
the Russians, has succeeded in cancelling out its own efforts'. The 
Indian attitude was also demonstratively vindicated by the events that 
led to the resort of force by Britain and France in Suez and by the 
Soviet Union in Hungary in October - November 1956. Indian 
opinion believed that the Baghdad Pact was in a way responsible for 
the events leading to Anglo-French action. The Hungarian tragedy 
occurred largely because of the Warsaw Pact and presence of Soviet 
armed forces in Hungary under that pact. Indian opinion therefore 
hoped that the realization of the futility and dangerousness of the 
military alliances and the existence of foreign military bases would 
lead to -a change of policy on the part of the Greater Powers, of both 
the East and the West, so that the world might go back to the normal 
sense of relative security. Only Panchsheel and the Bandung 
Principles could assure the peace and security sought by the two blocs 
9 Q 
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Thus, Nehru combined the realistic and the practical when 
he emphasized that Afro-Asia needed a generation of peace to allow 
its plan of economic development to get underway/'' and that non-
alignment helped forward the great cause of world peace by holding 
the balance of power between the two sides; this it did by keeping 
them guessing and by extending the area of non-military buffer 
zone. This reasoning not only provides non-alignment with a moral 
basis against the 'immoral' Cold War, it also enables Afro-Asia to 
play a distinctive part in great affairs.^^ 
Indo-US Relations and Non-Alignment: 
In August 1947, India had just attained her independence. 
She was internally and militarily weak and ridden by internal strife 
and economic distress. In the sphere of foreign affairs she did not 
wish to concern herself with other people's troubles, and was content 
with taking a vocal and diplomatic stand on issues of colonialism and 
the practice of racial discrimination. Towards the cold war her 
attitude was definitely cold. The United States on the other hand, at 
this stage, was devoting all her attention to contain communist 
expansion in Western Europe. 
But, Nehru was not blind to the role which the United States 
was playing and expected to play in the future. He looked more 
towards the United States with some feeling of confidence which was 
necessary before India could really develop co-operative relations. It 
was desirable and perhaps inevitable that India and the United State 
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should know each other more and co-operate with each other more. 
Nehru believed that what happened in India would attract attention in 
the United States and that they would seek to understand India's 
problem in relation to the world, for on the United States ultimately 
would fall the burden of the future, whether they wished it or not. He 
realized material resources of that country and her dominating and 
major position in international affairs is, more especially because of 
her leadership of the forces of democracy. Nehru who was inspired by 
President Roosevelt's leadership felt that to "keep ablaze the flames 
of human liberty, reason, democracy and fair play" the United States 
would have to throw their weight on the side of liberty and democracy 
in other parts of the world also, so that out of choas and violence, real 
peace and freedom might emerge.^^ 
The US response to New India was cold and disinterested. 
When the newly independent India was engaged in the crucial task of 
strengthening it, American efforts were directed to inducing the 
Indian government to follow a pronouncedly pro-American policy. 
The US Ambassador Henry F. Grady stated on December 7, 1947 : "It 
is tremendously important to keep India on our side in the world 
struggle," '^* but this statement was not backed by any action and was 
merely tautological. 
The record of Indo-American relations since 1947 reveals a 
deep and abiding friction between the two largest democratic states in 
the world. The United States department sees the contemporary world 
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in a rigid black and white perspective, as a struggle between good and 
evil, between democracy and communism. The great issue of our time 
is freedom or slavery. There is no room for a 'middle way'. Non-
alignment is immoral or at the very least, amoral, for how can a state 
be neutral in a contest of this kind? Non-alignment weakens the 'free 
world' and serves objectively to strengthen the communist bloc. Not 
all Americans share this view. But it is clear that United States policy 
makers think and act within this frame of reference. 
Nehru rejects the premises and, therefore, the policy 
implications of this arguments. To divide the world into rigid moral 
categories, he replies is to indulge in fanciful self-righteousness. No 
state or way of life has a monopoly of truth or virtue, though one may 
be more admired. None is an absolute threat to peace and freedom. On 
the contrary, both East and West share the blame for international 
tension which hangs like a shadow of impending death over the entire 
planet. Both are guilty of provocative deeds and words. Indeed, the 
moral imperative is to rule out war and to concentrate on the difficult 
but essential task of relaxing tensions, to recognize the harsh realities 
of international life, and to search unceasingly for a negotiated 
settlement between the two blocs. The greater the scope of the bloc 
system, the greater the likelihood of ultimate war. Hence non-
alignment is vital to peace, an ethical and practical necessity. As long 
as India and the 'uncommitted' countries persist in this policy, they 
help to delay a catastrophe. And in positive terms they fulfill the 
historic role of maintaining a bridge between the hostile blocs.^^ 
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Jawaharlal Nehru, far sighted as he was, correctly visualized 
that Indo-Soviet and Indo-US relations could not develop on the same 
line. Nehru got his first share of disappointment with US policy back 
in 1949 when the American government attempted to link economic 
assistance with political commitments. The leaders of American 
diplomacy thought that they were in a position to foist terms upon a 
country which was experiencing tremendous economic hardships. 
However, Nehru refused to accept American aid on terms that might 
jeopardize India's sovereignty and might draw it into the Cold War : 
"We do not seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of 
our hard-won freedom".^^ This move caused displeasure in the Indian 
reactionary circles and irritated the Americans in the talks. The New 
York Times called Nehru "one of the greatest disappointment of the 
post-war era".^^ 
In the early fifties, Indian public opinion was outraged at the 
ruthless ways of American warfare in Korea. It rightly saw that the 
American policy in Asia was not a series of action with no concern 
for Asian lives or interests. It was in this direction that Nehru again 
and again pressed the proposal at all national and international forums 
for a peaceful solution of the conflict in Asia. This stand of Nehru 
was described in the American press as the voice of abnegation and a 
policy of appeasement. 
When India started openly resisting the American pressure 
on its relations with the People's Republic of China and the question 
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of its admission to the United Nations, it became the target of even 
more violent American attacks. India's boycott of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty made the American policy makers resort to harsher steps 
towards this country. The Americans looked at India's emerging new 
foreign policy based on independent assessment and sovereignty with 
disfavour and distrust. On August 28, The New York Daily Mirror 
accused Nehru of "Asiatic intrigue" and charged that "one of the 
enemies of this country is the India of Nehru". 
Looking back, Nehru was vindicated when America decided 
to arm Pakistan in 1954. And yet Vice President Richard Nixon gave 
Nehru the impression that the USA appreciated Indian fears. But as 
soon as Nixon reached Karachi from Delhi, he briefed Robert 
Trumbell of The New York Times to write that the USA had decided 
to arm Pakistan and that the time had come to put "an end to 
Washington's patience with Asian nationalism". 
The Unity of the non-aligned on different issues had worried 
the USA and it gave free expression to its fears. It was reported, by 
The New York Times on September 25, 1975, that Dr. Kissinger said: 
"as tensions between the two original blocs 
had eased, a third grouping increasingly 
assumes the characteristic of a bloc of its own 
the alignment of the non-aligned"."^^ 
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A most important foreign policy problem which the Indian 
government had to tackle at the end of 1949 was the question of 
India's relations with China. India was one of the first non-socialist 
State to recognize the Chinese People Republic on December 30, 
1949. In a parliamentary speech Nehru rightly said that "it was not a 
question of approving and disapproving the changes that have taken 
place. It was a question of recognizing a major event in history and 
appreciating and dealing with it. The new government was a stable 
government and there is no force likely to supplant or push it away.''° 
Following the formation of People's Republic of China in 
1947, Nehru gave clear instructions to the then representative at the 
UN regarding China's admission to the UN. He said : 
"we recognize the new China and deal with it 
through our embassy. We do not recognize the 
Kuomintang, wherever it might be, it is clear 
that the Chinese government has a right to 
Formosa, which is Chinese territory. If 
Formosa rebels against it, it is another matter. 
But for the USA to come into the picture as 
defenders of Formosa is clearly an 
intervention by an outside power in favour of 
a regime which has been knocked out of 
China. It is a challenge to the China with 
which we wished to be friends".'^' 
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India had been trying not only to make the world more 
acceptable to China but also to make China more acceptable to the 
world.''^ India recognized Communist China not because she liked 
communist bloc and also not because she wanted to win support from 
the communist countries. She also did not intend to pose any hostile 
attitude towards the United States, but it recognized a simple fact i.e., 
the existence of People's Republic of China. 
But unfortunately the way China behaved can be 
characterized in the mildest terms, as breach of trust India's growing 
support to China and the fraternal relationship that was becoming 
increasingly cordial made some people think differently. India 
appeased her, as Peter Calvocoressi puts it, in hope that India China 
could together constitute a third force, which might perhaps build a 
bridge between Washington and Moscow.''^ 
But all hopes of India for maintaining good relations, and 
the feeling that China was Asian first and communist afterwards were 
belied when China launched a massive attack on India, violating all 
rules of international morality and abandoning the Five Principles 
(Panchsheel) saying that she would respect them at her own 
convenience.'*"* 
After the Chinese aggression Nehru made a frank admission, 
when he said that India had been out of touch with reality in modern 
world and living in an artificial atmosphere of her own creation."*^ 
Nehru behaved with great restraint "what China has done is an insult 
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to the conscience of the world. That is clear from the very great 
response we have received from a large number of countries. We still 
hope that our peaceful approach will be agreed to otherwise, this 
conflict may spread and may bring widespread disaster not only to 
India and China, but the whole world".''^ 
Indo-Soviet Relations : Stalin Era : 
Indian independence according to the Soviet press, was the 
outcome of the "Political Compromise" of the "Indian bourgeoisie", 
the Indian leadership in Soviet assessment continued to be "lackeys" 
and "vassals of Anglo-American imperialism". 
After the collapse of Kuomintang regime in China, Dyakov 
wrote that the Nehru government was turning India into an "Anglo-
American colony in the East", and that, "recent lessons of history 
show that the role of imperialist comes to a sad end for those who 
choose to assume it"."*^  For Soviet Press, India's decision to join the 
Commonwealth, was tantamount to remaining "a part of British 
Empire."*^ 
According to an Izevestia article, "In 1947, India was 
divided into two states. In January 1950 the dominion of India was 
proclaimed a Republic. This Republic however, remained a part of the 
British Empire and recognized the hegemony of the king of England. 
The dominant position of the English capital remained intact in all 
English colonies now called "independent"."*^ 
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But, the significant feature that marked India's attitude 
towards the Soviet Union was the personal initiative of the Indian 
Prime Minister towards the development of bilateral relations 
between the two countries. 
Soon after the formation of the interim government early in 
September 1946 Nehru, as its head, announced his policy of 
developing close and friendly relations with the USSR. In his very 
first policy speech, Nehru laid great emphasis on relations with the 
Soviet Union saying that with our neighbours in Asia we shall have to 
undertake many common tasks. 
But the British government was opposed to this suggestion 
on the ground that Soviet government was out to harm British 
interests in India and the other adjoining countries, that the Indian 
leaders were novice in international politics, certainly naive about the 
Soviet policy and the Soviet diplomatic mission would subvert Indian 
Socio-economic structure, thereby harming India in particular and the 
west in general. These arguments were repeated by the British 
Foreign Office to the State Department in Washington to influence 
their mind to take such a pessimistic view of Indian initiative. 
Despite these British objections, Nehru remained firm in his 
resolve. Towards the middle of September he asked Krishna Menon 
who had for long been working in London for Indian independence to 
seek an interview with Soviet foreign minister Molotov and propose 
the idea of having diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
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Menon met him in Paris on September 28, 1946, when the Soviet 
leader was there for some UN meeting. Menon discussed with him 
two issues; the desirability of establishing diplomatic contacts 
between India and the USSR and the possibility of the Soviet Union 
supplying food grains to India which was likely to face soon the 
situation of famine. Molotov favoured the idea of having diplomatic 
relations between the two countries and asked him to go ahead with 
follow up measures but as regards the supply of food grains he 
expressed his country's inability to do anything in that respect as his 
country was badly ravaged during the war particularly the Ukraine 
region which was the wheat bowl of the Soviet Union. It was also 
realized in the political circles in India that the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries would facilitate such a 
transaction. 
In this context, it should be stated that the Russian attitude 
towards the interim government was one of doubt and suspicion. In 
his talks with Menon, Molotov raised the question of Indian 
delegation that was working in the UN then. He doubted whether it 
was going to represent the spirit of free India. Menon had to tell him 
the truth that the Indian delegation to which he referred was 
appointed by the British government before the formation of the 
interim government and as such it was likely to be what it was. He 
assured that henceforward Indian delegation would be in composition 
and ideological make-up truly Indian. 
65 
1947-Year of India's Independence & The Relations Witii Soviet Union 
As a result of these negotiations, an announcement was 
made on April 13, 1947, that the government of India and the USSR 
had agreed to exchange diplomatic relations at the ambassador's 
level.^ *^ It means that diplomatic relations were established between 
the two countries four months before India actually became 
independent. The initiative and the promptness on the part of India in 
this regard well demonstrated Nehru's intense desire to establish 
contacts with Moscow as early as possible. The importance that India 
attached to the USSR was manifested when Nehru appointed his own 
sister as ambassador to the USSR. It was in a sense, symbol of India's 
desire for close relations and cooperation with the USSR. With a 
powerful and resourceful country like the USSR, India wanted to 
maintain friendly but not subservient relations. In the course of a 
foreign policy speech, Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly : "'We 
intend cooperating with the United States of America and we intend 
cooperating with the Soviet Union".^' On the other occasion, Nehru 
emphasized the need for cultivating the USSR in these words : 
" The Soviet Union being our neighbour, 
we shall inevitably develop closer relations 
with it. We cannot afford to antagonize 
Russia."" 
Mrs. Pandit, who stayed in Moscow for about two and a half 
years used to feel lonely and isolated. The movements of foreigners, 
including diplomats, were restricted. What is worth noting is that 
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during her entire stay Mrs. Pandit never felt encouraged to seek an 
interview with Stalin. This she could not do because the entire 
atmosphere was surcharged with indifference and suspicion. It was 
also because Stalin did not seem to be happy with the policy of 
equidistance that India had preferred to follow with regard to the two 
super powers. 
In the first place, the USSR pointedly refused to 
acknowledge India's sovereign status for some years after India 
became free in August 1947. The news of the transfer of power in the 
sub-continent was never published in the Soviet press. One of the 
secretaries of the CPSU, Zhdanov declared in September 1947 that 
the imperialists were keeping China and India in "obedience and 
enslavement".^^ This clearly indicated that the USSR considered 
India's status after August 1947 at par with that of China under 
Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly, E. Zukov, a Soviet writer on Eastern 
affairs, ridiculed the US secretary of state Acheson's contention that 
India was free and China was not.^'' The Soviet government official 
organ published an article entitled "The colonial Policy of the British 
Labourite" as late as September 1950 in which the author argued that 
the British Act of granting independence to India had in no way 
changed the latter's status in the British Empire.^^ These extracts 
amply demonstrate that the USSR did not accept the genuineness of 
India's independence for quite some time. 
67 
1947-year of India's Independence & The Relations With Soviet Union 
During this period, the Soviets did not hesitate to call 
Mahatma Gandhi, a "bourgeosie reactionary". While the grief evoked 
by Gandhi's assassination was almost universal, K.P.S. Menon noted : 
"one country, and one only passed over his death in silence. No 
message of condolence came from Russia, not a word of comment 
appeared in the Soviet newspapers''.^^ 
According to T.N. Kaul, "the most astonishing thing was the 
failure of the Soviet government to even send a message of 
condolence on Gandhi's assassination"." In the United Nations, the 
Soviet delegate spoke rather formally and very briefly.^^ 
Further it was alleged that Nehru government was 
deliberately following anti-Soviet policies. Thus its criticism tended 
to be unsympathetic and sometimes even hostile. Everything for 
which India stood was strongly criticized and ridiculed. The objective 
of democratic socialism set out by the Congress Party was ridiculed 
and the policy of non-alignment was dubbed as a myth designed to 
confuse socialist states and thus regarded too rediculous to be taken 
seriously. 
At the same time in the United Nations, the USSR 
successfully opposed India's candidacy for a seat in the security 
council in June 1947. The USSR supported the Ukraine while the 
United States backed India. India lost the bid as a result of previous 
understanding between the USSR, UK and China commenting on this, 
K.M. Pannikar wrote : 
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"It was clear that Russia had become 
uncertain of India's attitude and was 
generally suspicious of our approach to 
questions of vital interests".^^ 
The question of Kashmir which came before the Security 
Council in January 1948, the USSR took up an indifferent attitude. An 
analysis of speeches made by the Soviet delegate on this issue reveals 
that right upto early 1952, when the council discussed the Graham 
Report, the Soviet representative rarely participated in the 
deliberations. On an occasion when he spoke he dealt either with 
some procedural matters or referred to some aspects of a resolution 
under consideration. Being indifferent to the issue, his participation in 
the Kashmir debate, was on occasions, pointless. 
However, despite mounting Soviet criticism, Nehru kept the 
door open for cordial relations with the USSR. Although dismayed by 
the verbal assault, Nehru was not too surprised, for over the twenty 
years he had observed the fluctuations of Soviet policy and was 
accustomed to its abrupt shift. Illustrative of Nehru's attitude towards 
this treatment by the Soviet media is the following incident recalled 
by H.V.R. lenger. One day he brought a sheet of extracts from Radio 
Moscow broadcasts which described Nehru as a tool of British 
imperialism. Nehru glanced cursorily at the extracts, smiled a little 
wanly, and said, "The heat is not against us though it looks like it. the 
heat is against the British. The British have always tried to keep 
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Russians out of this sub-continent, and the Russians cannot believe 
that the policy has changed. Let us wait and see. If we show the world 
that we are, infact, an independent country, the world will change its 
attitude to us. In the meantime, you may study these things, but do not 
get bowled over by them".^° 
The above cited incidents illustrate that Nehru had decided 
to embark on a policy of almost unilateral effort for the cultivation of 
friendship regardless of the Soviet attitude. 
Post-Stalin Era : 
The shift in the Soviet Policy came soon after Stalin's death, 
almost as soon as Malenkov came to power the Soviet ceased being 
hostile to India. In a speech to Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, 
Malenkov said : "The position of such a considerable state as India is 
of great importance for strengthening of peace in the East". 
Recognizing India's role in ending the Korean War, he said, "we hope 
that relations between India and the Soviet Union would continue to 
develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote".^' 
However this change towards India was exploited mainly by 
Khrushchev. His most notable contribution to communist ideology is 
contained in "his doctrinal development of the strategy of peaceful 
coexistence. He maintained that peaceful co-existence was the only 
alternative to the "most devastating war in history. There is no fatal 
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inevitability of war",^^ said Khrushchev. Explaining the point further 
he said : 
"In this nuclear age war can no longer be a 
means of setting controversial international 
questions and the policy of peaceful co-
existence is the only foundation upon which 
the states can and should build their 
relations"." 
This thesis of peaceful co-existence has tremendous 
implications for the underdeveloped countries. The policy of 
"peaceful competition from the position of strength ushered in an era 
of Soviet diplomacy at once mature and flexible imaginative 
Khrushchev not only recognized non-alignment of underdeveloped 
nations but supported it. It is interesting to note that Stalin had 
referred to co-existence but only as an extremely temporary 
expedient. Now the situation has changed. The Soviet leaders are 
well aware that nuclear explosions know no political boundaries. 
Khrushchev advocated communist alignment with all the progressive 
forces in the underdeveloped countries, and in this context it is 
important to note that he regarded Nehru as a "progressive leader". 
By the end of 1954, the Soviet media began to speak highly 
of Nehru government. Some articles praised the peace loving nature 
of the Indian people while others the diversity of Indian culture. In an 
editorial Pravda acknowledged India's valuable contribution for 
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strengthening peace.^^ Referring to the rapid shift in the Soviet 
treatment of India, a Congress M.P. S.N. Sinha pointed out in the 
Indian Parliament : 
"Formerly they (Soviets) used to criticize us 
and say that our government was a tool of 
British imperialism Any Soviet Paper 
you will find today is all praise for our 
culture, for our government, for our Prime 
Minister".^^ 
The ties between India and USSR were strengthened by the 
mediator's role which India played during the Korean Peace 
conference in Geneva in May-July 1954. The conference offered the 
USSR an opportunity to capitalize on Indo-American tensions. The 
US opposition to India's participation in the conference hightened 
Moscow's campaign to demonstrate its friendship for New Delhi. The 
USSR pleaded for India's inclusion and recognized India's desire to 
be included in the conference where the future of Asia would be 
discussed. The American effort to exclude India from the conference 
was criticized by the Soviet delegate at the UN and the Soviet press 
played up the American opposition in an attempt to stimulate anti-
American feeling in India. 
It is worth noting that shortly after the Geneva Conference 
Indo-Soviet contacts increased markedly. India accepted the Soviet 
offer of assistance for her Second Fi ver Year Plan. It may be inferred 
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that Nehru attached considerable significance to the Soviet behaviour 
at Geneva. The atmosphere between New Delhi and Moscow began to 
clear rapidly after the negotiated settlement on Indo-China at the 
Geneva Conference. Any Indian reluctance to request Soviet 
assistance disappeared. 
A potential stumbling bloc to further improvement in Indo-
Soviet relations was removed in 1954 when a Sino-Indian agreement 
on Tibet was reached; this settlement, by which India withdrew her 
troops stationed in Tibetan trading centers and recognized Chinese 
sovereignty in the region and received in return special trade 
privileges, was noted approvingly in the Soviet press.^^ The Nehru's 
visit to Beijing which followed set the stage for the historic exchange 
of visits with Soviet leaders during the following year. During the 
course of that year Nehru's Foreign Policy received favourable 
comment in the Soviet press. In appreciation the Soviets gave 
manifest support to the Indian claims to the Portuguese enclave of 
/ T O 
Goa. By the end of the year, some fourteen Indian delegations, 
ranging from a soccer team to industrialists visited the Soviet Union. 
Returning Soviet artists noted the Charms of India^^ - a practice 
which sharply contrasted with Stalinist accounts of the abject poverty 
of India. 
The momentous year of 1955 which marked the culmination 
of the Soviet efforts to court India commenced with a significant 
Pravda editorial commemorating India's Republic Day.^ " Not only 
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was the Foreign Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru praised, but the domestic 
accomplishments of the Indian government in the fields of 
agriculture, education and public health were listed as well. 
Establishing the ideological rationale for the Soviet aid to India, the 
editorial accused British and American capital of hampering India's 
independent development through their competitive struggle to 
dominate the Indian market. 
Soviet aid, therefore, would help India resist western 
economic penetration and contribute to her struggle for economic 
independence. Thus, whereas under Stalin economic dependence was 
taken as proof of Indian political submissiveness, now Indian political 
independence was acknowledged as fact with the battle for economic 
independence still in the forefront. The editorial then prepared the 
Soviet public for the signing only a few days later of the Bhilai 
agreement on terms more generous than those offered by the Western 
countries for similar projects in India.'' 
The Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, with much 
fanfare was the largest and perhaps the most significant gathering of 
the representative of Afro-Asian countries, the conference 
promulgated the much heralded Panch Shila or five principles of 
international affairs, which served as a diplomatic bridge upon which 
close relations between communist and non-communist states could 
be constructed. 
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The Bandung conference marked the beginning of a new era. 
For Nehru it was the realization of a long-cherished dream. He saw at 
Bandung that 'we are the future in Asia and Africa'.^^ In asserting at 
the conference the importance of this new force in the world he 
maintained : 'We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or 
Russians. We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for 
our dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of America 
or Russia or any other country of Europe'. 
Bandung thus provided a new experience and belief, shared 
and cherished by all the participants irrespective of their different 
creeds, ideologies and alliances. Among the concrete achievements of 
the conference, however, was the assurance which Chou-En-lai gave, 
convincingly to the leaders of Asia that China would not participate 
in any subversive activities. He declared that China would strictly 
adhere to the Five Principles in her relationship with the countries in 
the world. Chou virtually dominated the proceedings. His 
reconciliatory and understanding attitude, which he displayed more 
often in dealing with the delegates of such nations as Pakistan, 
succeeded in creating, among the Afro-Asian states, a new image of 
China as a reasonable and peaceful neighbour. 
TheBandung Chorus was unexpectedly interrupted by the 
Cylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala who launched an attack 
on another form of colonialism, Russian domination in central and 
Eastern Europe. Kotelawala's speech created a split at Banding when 
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the western oriented nations rallied to his side in condemnation of 
Russian colonialism. Nehru saw in this division a threat to Afro-Asian 
solidarity and to the non-aligned world, and in opposing this 
disruptive trend he made a positive statement to the effect that he 
regarded the states of central and Eastern Europe as independent 
nations and not as the colonies of the Soviet Union. This must have 
gratified the Russian leaders - Khrushchev and Bulganin. 
Despite the criticism, the Soviet Union's reaction to 
Bandung gave no indication of any offence. The Soviet reaction to 
Bandung was favourable mainly because the soviet leaders clearly 
realized that the desire for Afro-Asian solidarity among the Bandung 
powers was basically an attempt to eliminate Western influence from 
Asia and Africa. 
Nehru's contribution to the successful organization of this 
conference, his ever-increasing personal rapport with the Chinese 
Premier, demonstration of the influence that he commanded among 
the Afro-Asian leaders and, above all, Bandung's advocacy of the 
Panchsheel spirit with its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance 
were bound to be appreciated by the Soviets. By this time, the Soviet 
leadership was busy preparing a Psychological background at home, 
to launch a new policy of active relations with the newly independent 
Asian countries in the spirit of peaceful co-existence. Bandung 
naturally came in handy for their new course and was praised by 
leading Soviet academician, E.M. Zhukov. The author, who had 
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participated in this conference as an observer, referred to Lenin's 
view on peaceful co-existence and drew strength from his conviction 
that close cooperation was quite possible and had become rather much 
more essential between the communist and the nationalist against 
their common enemy - world imperialism.^^ 
Bandung confirmed the credentials of India as a peace 
loving country, willing to co-operate with the socialist community, 
befriend China and support the principles of peaceful co-existence. 
Impressed by India's ever increasing international stature the Soviet 
Government invited Nehru to pay a state visit to the USSR in June 
1955. 
Nehru's Moscow Visit : 
Nehru visited Soviet Union in June 1955 (7-23 June). 
Referring to Nehru's arrival at Moscow air-port on June 7, K.P.S. 
Menon writes that "the entire presidium, headed by Bulganin, went to 
the airfield to receive him". As to the stately banquet organized in 
honour of the visiting Prime Minister, he further notes that the 
Kremlin was never "used for such a function since the war, and rarely 
since the revolution".^^ "To be dramatic, one might say about Nehru's 
visit to the Soviet Union that he too came, saw and conquered", 
Menon observed.'^ "No one has ever received a more tumultuous 
welcome" - Menon recorded in his autobiography.^^ The Washington 
Post observed that "reddest of the red carpets" was unfolded for 
Nehru. ' Pravda editorially welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in a 
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manner, reserved exclusively for a leader of a communist country.^^ 
Menon records in his autobiography that when a foreign 
correspondent asked Nehru as to whether a crowd in Moscow was 
"organized", Nehru gave the reply that "you cannot organize men's 
hearts".^' 
During his two week tour of the Soviet Union, Nehru 
travelled several thousand miles and visited the Republics of Georgia, 
Uzbekistan, Khazakhistan and the Russian cities of Stalingrad, Yalta, 
Magnitogorsk (the 'Steel town' in the urals) and Leningard wherever 
he went, he received spectacular receptions and was mobbed by 
crowds and received numerous gestures of friendship and admiration. 
The Soviet Government also paid him the unprecedented compliment 
of being shown round their highly secret atomic power station - he 
being the first non-communist ever to visit it - and he was deeply 
impressed by the great achievements of the Soviet Union. 
Nehru used this visit to win the confidence of the Soviet 
leaders. Addressing a record gathering at the Dynamo stadium on 
June 22, at the end of his visit which was attended by top leaders of 
the Soviet Union, Nehru observed : 
"Even though we pursued a different path in 
our struggle under the leadership of Mahatma 
Gandhi, we admired Lenin and were 
influenced by his example. In spite of this 
difference in our methods, there was at no 
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time an unfriendly feeling among our people 
towards the people of the Soviet Union".^^ 
While paying tributes to the "great and novel experiment of 
the Soviet Union", he referred to attempts at creating "a socialist 
pattern of society" in India "through peaceful methods".^^ Nehru 
spoke high of the "passion for peace" in the Soviet Union.^^ 
In the joint communique issued at the end of Nehru's visit, 
it was resolved that relations between the two would continue to be 
guided by the principles of Panchsheel. The two Prime Ministers also 
affirmed that in the observance of these principles by nations in the 
conduct of their mutual relations lies the main hope of banishing fear 
and mistrust from their minds and thus lowering world tensions. In 
the rest of the communique they commended the results of the 
Bandung Conference, and urged the representation of People's 
Republic of China in the United Nations and peaceful settlement of 
the Farmosa dispute. 
According to "The Times", there were 'whole passages' of 
the joint-statement which are clearly his (Nehru's) and his alone.**'' In 
his memoirs K.P.S. Menon wrote : 
"It must be said that at no time did they 
(Soviet leaders) try to use the slightest 
influence, let alone pressure to swing India to 
their side. They made it clear from the onset 
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that they would leave it to us as guests to draft 
the joint statement. The joint statement was, 
thus, entirely Indian in style and in 
substance".^^ 
Nehru's visit produced a powerful impression on the Soviet 
leaders, who made several references to its significance in their 
subsequent meetings with heads of other states. Thus, when the Big 
Four met at Geneva, Bulganin mentioned Nehru's visit as an event of 
great importance.^^ In his report to the Supreme Soviet on the Geneva 
Conference of the Big Four in 1955 Bulganin again referred to 
Nehru's visit and noted that both countries "take the same position on 
urgent problems concerning the struggle for peace, and this of great 
importance in the settlement of pressing Asian and Far Eastern 
problems and in easing international tension". In June 1955, in his 
speech at the tenth anniversary session of the United Nations, 
Molotov referred to the visit of Nehru as "especially noteworthy" for 
lessening international tensions and promoting peace.^° 
The Soviet trip made a tremendous impact on Nehru, who 
expressed his gratitude to his hosts by saying, "I am leaving my heart 
behind".^' The Western press did not take kindly to Nehru's visit to 
the USSR. The New York Times warned Nehru that he might be 
"skillfully mouse trapped in Moscow".^^ The London Times 
commented editorially on June 24 that the Indo-Soviet communique 
would contribute little to the "Peace and equanimity of the world. 
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One cannot doubt that it is his (Nehru's) desire to contribute to world 
peace .... But it is a pity that Mr. Nehru's contribution to this ideal 
should have been a general acceptance of the Soviet policies".^'^ The 
most absurd reaction of the American press was that because of the 
general identity of Soviet and Indian views on world issues, India had 
compromised her policy of non-alignment. But, by and large the rest 
of the world's press was appreciative, each for some of the 
achievements of the visit. The Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo) 
commenting, for instance, that Nehru's visit to Moscow had 
'extended the peace area of the Soviet Union. 
Return Visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev : 
The return visit to India by Bulganin and Khrushchev in 
November 1955 marked another watershed in Indo-Soviet relations as 
India was the first non-communist country they visited. The visit 
demonstrated a change that was coming over in the relations between 
the USSR and non-communist nations. Its importance was magnified 
many times more because of the statements made by the Soviet 
leaders in the course of their visit. It is worth pointing out that by the 
end of 1955 Pakistan had become the Western anchor of SEATO and 
the Eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact. By then Pakistan had also 
signed mutual defence agreement with the United States and had 
received substantial military and economic assistance from that 
country. On the very day of the Soviet leaders arrival in India, the US 
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had announced an offer to construct 20 million dollar airfield in 
Pakistan.'^'* 
When the Soviet leaders arrived in New Delhi on November 
18, the Indian people fully reciprocated to the guests the same 
exuberantly popular and affectionate welcome that the Soviet people 
had given Nehru in the Soviet Union only a few months before. So 
impressive was the popular reception to the Soviet leaders that the 
Western press and political leaders who had reacted earlier merely by 
irritation and annoyance to the Russian reception to Nehru, now 
reacted to the Indian reception to the Russian leaders by outright 
resentment. Wherever they went, they received tumultuous popular 
welcome and were greeted with slogans Hindi-Rusi Ek Hai and Hindi-
Rusi Bhai Bhai speaking at a Delhi civic reception to the visitors, 
Nehru spoke for all Indians when he said : 
"This day will go down in history as a very 
important event. The two visitors represented 
more than the meeting of the leaders of two 
great countries They signified something 
deeper and more far-reaching, VIZ., the 
meeting of the two great people, and this had 
a great significance".^^ 
The Soviet leaders referred to the identity of Soviet and 
Indian views on many world issues and paid high tributes to India's 
contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international peace 
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and security : citing the instances of the Korean war, the Indo-China 
conflict, the Farmosa straits crisis, the demand for representation of 
People's China in the United Nations, the attitudes regarding weapons 
of mass destruction and disarmament, opposition to military pacts and 
alliances and emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Khrushchev sought to flatter Indians by stating that India was not 
counted as a 'Great Power' in spite of her standing and achievements 
because 'the colonizers wish to humiliate your state, your people'. He 
added that India is a Great Power and she must belong to one of the 
first places among the great states of the world. 
However, from India's point of view the most important 
pronouncements of the Soviet leaders was the Soviet pledge of 
unreserved support to its claim on Kashmir. India's stand was 
publicly and categorically endorsed. In his speech at Srinagar, 
Khrushchev declared : 
"The question of Kashmir was a matter for a 
Kashmiris to decide. But the question of 
Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic 
of India had been settled by the people of 
Kashmir when they decided to join the Indian 
Union. The Soviet Union accepted their 
verdict . 
It was the first time that any foreign country had openly 
expressed support for India's hold on Kashmir. Although Nehru later 
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said that the Soviet leaders "expressed their opinion after due 
consideration and great deliberation".^^ 
Equally important was the unequivocal Soviet support to 
India's stand on Goa. On several occasions during their visit, the 
Soviet leaders attacked Portugal for refusing to withdraw from Goa 
and emphatically supported India's claim on it bractically in all major 
speeches Khrushchev mentioned Goa and forecast its early freedom.^^ 
In short the visit demonstrated a historic transformation that 
was coming over in the relations between the Soviet Union and non-
communist nations.^^ The visit was highly successful enterprise in 
public relations. It made a deep impact on Indian people about the 
USSR's sincerity in the pursuit of peace in spite of her enormous 
nuclear power and also her genuine appreciation of India's non-
alignment and extension of peace area. The statements of the visiting 
Soviet leaders, with reference to further Indo-Soviet cooperation in 
various fields and on Kashmir and Goa, evoked great satisfaction and 
goodwill in India. The Soviet posture was obviously appreciated in 
India, especially in the context of the current Republican attitude in 
the USA, which equated non-alignment with immorality and by 
including Pakistan in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact gave India a 
sense of encirclement. 
If 1954 marked the beginning of Sino-Indian brotherhood 
(i.e. trade agreement), 1955 inaugurated the era of Indo-Soviet 
brotherhood, and the latter in some measure came to diminish the 
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former. The Indian gain from the Indo-Soviet rapport was Russian 
support for India's claim on Kashmir, a support which from now on 
was to be continuously displayed at the United Nations. Nehru's 
status increased and with it rose India's credit in the world market. 
Indo-Soviet rapport gave further strength to the principles of co-
existence, and emboldened the non-aligned nations to remain 
unaligned, while accepting at the same time money and skills from 
both the Soviet Union and America. What until recently might have 
been regarded as impossible in international relations was now made 
possible by India's example. The Soviet leaders visit to India also 
opened up the prospect, as was intended by Nehru, for a 
rapprochement between the two super-power blocs. But this was take 
time, for the mutual suspicion and fear that existed between America 
and the Soviet Union constituted a powerful deterrent to any such 
rapprochement. Any reconciliatory move that was hedged with 
suspicion and caution was most likely to end up in a diplomatic 
imbroglio, as was shown by the events of 1956. 
Suez and Hungary : 
The events of 1956 (the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 
31 October, and the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution 
in November) put the clock back. It was thus for Nehru a year of 
hopes and disappointments, and of conflict between high principles 
and national interests. 
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Disappointment and hopes figured in Nehru's attitude 
towards the Hungarian tragedy, which coincided with the Suez crisis. 
Although the Indian interests were not directly involved in the 
Hungarian issues, the Indian leadership was shocked to see the 
display of stalinian behaviour under Khrushchev. It is a measure of 
the strength of Indo-Soviet ties that in times of crisis the Indian 
leadership was motivated with a view to minimizing the damage 
rather than widening the gap by lining up against the accused. If 
India's cautious reaction to the Hungarian crisis showed the 
limitations of her antagonism against Soviet Russia at a time when the 
latter was supporting her on Kashmir and providing valuable 
economic assistance, the Soviet Support to Indian proposals on the 
Suez canal issue revealed the common outlook of both the countries 
towards some problem created by some western imperial powers. If 
the crisis created by Soviet invasion of Hungary provided a rude 
shock to Nehru, the crisis created by the Anglo-French attack on 
Egypt brought to him the necessity of maintaining India's 
companionship with Soviet Russia in world affairs and thus when 
both the crisis were over, the Indo-Soviet relations remained on 
balance unimpaired. 
The continuity of friendly relations between India and the 
Soviet Union is a salient feature of the Khrushchev period. In the 
days following Suez and Hungary the course of Indo-Soviet relations 
travelled the old post-Stalin way, until the time when the Soviet 
policies towards India were under visible strain, as Russia's relations 
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with Red China had fast deteriorated with the increasing involvement 
of India in it. so far as Indo-Soviet relations were concerned, Hungary 
was an unhappy occurance; but since it came along with Suez in the 
days when a Soviet veto on Kashmir averted the passage of Anglo-
American sponsored resolution on Kashmir which favoured the 
dispatch of UN forces to conduct a plebiscite there, Indo-Soviet 
relations followed the smooth course out of necessity. Soon after the 
second general election in April 1957, Khrushchev said : 
"The Soviet people greatly value the brotherly 
friendship with the Indian people, for the 
growth of which you did so much and which 
is already demonstrating its firmness as a 
factor in the world we are confident that the 
Soviet-Indian friendship will in future grow 
and strengthen in the minds of peoples of both 
countries".'"'' 
Khrushchev came to India on his second visit in February 
I960, when he was on way to Indonesia. His second visit had a larger 
significance than as an event in the bilateral relations between the two 
countries, as the Soviet leader was trying to patch up his differences 
with Mao during this period. Even at a time when he was 
endeavouring to improve Soviet relations with China, he accepted the 
Indian government's invitation to break his journey in India while on 
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way to Indonesia - an indication of his unwillingness to compromise 
with Mao on the question of Soviet relations with non-aligned India. 
At a time when Khrushchev had reconciled to his Russian 
position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, an event happened which showed 
the extent of Khrushchev's consideration for Nehru's feelings even on 
a matter which involved Russian defence stakes and in which Indian 
interests as such was not directly involved. The first conference of the 
non-aligned nations was held at Belgrade in September 1961. On the 
day before the Belgrade Conference began, on the 30 August the 
Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device at its Arctic testing grounds 
and announced that this was the beginning of a new series of atomic 
tests. Never before had an international conference met so 
immediately or so directly under the shadow of the mushroom cloud, 
which obviously disturbed Nehru. 
There were twice as many non-aligned representatives 
present at Belgrade as at Bandung, and everyone knew that there 
could, and should, have been many more. Non-alignment was an idea 
on the march. Further, at the United Nations the non-aligned countries 
had shown on several issues that they could act with both 
independence and responsibility. 
Once again at Belgrade, Nehru was able to point out that the 
course of events since the issue of the invitations had enhanced the 
conference's intrinsic importance. Like the meetings at Colombo, at 
the time of the Indo-China settlement, and at Bandung, during the 
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offshore islands crisis, that at Belgrade happened to coincide with a 
period of international tension. This time the issues were more serious 
than ever before - the bomb, disarmament, Berlin and Germany, 
nothing less than the purity of the world's air and water. The leaders 
of the non-aligned had been raised to the status of conservators of 
nature. This was the challenge that faced them at Belgrade, and they 
faced it before an expectant and hopeful world. 
The real issue at Belgrade was a question of priorities. 
World peace and colonialism were both important, but which issue, at 
that particular time, was the more urgent? According to the first eight 
speakers, including President Tito, Nasser and Nkrumah, it was 
colonialism. For the ninth speaker, Nehru, the conference's main task, 
almost its only task, was to do what it could to start negotiations to 
avert the immediate threat of war, 'for if war comes all else for the 
moment goes'. 
In the closing session, the conference addressed letters to 
the heads of government of the USSR and USA saying that the neutral 
leaders were "distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in 
international situation" and urged them to resume negotiations on 
dividing issues and save the world from the danger of war.'°' The 
letter to Khrushchev was brought by President Nkrumah and Nehru, 
who was, in fact, to come to the Soviet Union on his official visit. 
Nehru in his speech told Khrushchev that "in the world in these days 
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many new important problems have come up and I will be glad to 
discuss them with you".'°^ 
Nehru made his major speech on September 8, at the Indo-
Soviet friendship rally. He said : 
"I came to Moscow from Belgrade where the 
conference of 25 non-aligned countries was 
held. At the request of the participants of this 
conference, President of Ghana and I have 
brought a message for chairman Khrushchev, 
in which is expressed the concern for the 
dangerous developments in international 
situation. A similar message is addressed to 
President Kennedy of the USA. In this 
massage the participants of the conference 
express that the negotiations between these 
two great powers should start early for the 
solution of important contemporary problems 
and for lessening international tension, 
....They think that all that is necessary must 
be done for the solution of these problems in 
mutually acceptable ways. They feel that only 
negotiations can lead us to satisfactory results. 
There is no other way before us besides 
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negotiations which would solve these serious 
problems".'°"' 
In his reply, Khrushchev defended the resumption of nuclear 
testing on the plea that the Western powers were pursuing an 
aggressive line and had not responded to the Soviet proposals for 
complete and total disarmament. This had forced the USSR to resume 
testing with "heavy heart and deep regrets". However, the gravity 
of the talks did not constrain Nehru from thanking the Soviet for their 
economic aid : 
"I am afraid that after we receive this 
assistance (for India's third plan) my appetite 
will grow and I will ask for more".'°^ 
While Khrushchev did not bring the question of 
contemporary international situation in the short speech, Nehru 
brought in his still shorter speech. He expressed the hope that some 
questions concerning contemporary international situation which he 
had discussed during his brief stay with Khrushchev "would receive 
more attention".' Nehru discussed the German question with the 
Soviet leaders. In the joint communique, the Indian Prime Minister 
agreed with Khrushchev that : 
"The fact of the existence of the German 
states at present could not be ignored and that 
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any attempt to change the frontiers will have 
dangerous consequence".'°^ 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the Indian and 
Soviet views did not coincide on Germany beyond expressing the 
desirability of peaceful solution to all the parties concerned. Nehru 
only "noted the views expressed by Chairman Khrushchev" but "was 
not persuaded by them". It will be too much to presume that there 
was complete identity of views between the two countries on this 
issue. Anyhow, it may safely be concluded that a change was visible 
in India's hitherto followed German policy. It offered a de facto 
recognition to East Germany, obviously a concession to the 
demanding Kremlin. There is no denying that India moved closer to 
the Soviet point on yet another crucial international issue. 
Nevertheless, despite some irritants and despite their 
differences of opinion of various issues, such as methods of economic 
development or effective international organization, the relations 
between India and the USSR improved considerably during this 
period. Despite some obstacles occasionally cropping up largely by 
the relations of the two countries with other states, the flow proved 
stronger than the disturbing pulls. The friendly ties were further 
strengthened as a result of removal of certain misgivings and 
misunderstandings. The outcome of the Twentieth Party Congress of 
the CPSU, the abolition of the cominform, the reassessment of 
Gandhi, identity of views on issues like disarmament, Suez crisis and 
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above all, the Soviet veto on Kashmir helped in bringing India closer 
to the USSR. 
To sum up, India's foreign policy moved towards more 
cordial relations with the USSR during this phase. Cultural, economic 
and political relations were consolidated. India maintained a non-
aligned stance on "Cold War" issues vitally affecting the USSR and 
was less critical publicly of Soviet policy in Hungary or on 
disarmament than were many other Afro-Asian nations. In short, new 
Delhi continued to regard good relations with Moscow as a vital part 
of its foreign policy throughout this period. 
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CHAPTER-3 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR ERA-A 
STUDY OF ISSUES 
The ideological differences between the Western powers and 
the Soviet Union began to assume serious proportions after the 
Russian Revolution in 1917. The Bolshevism became a nightmare to 
many western countries, although Soviet Union joined the western 
powers to fight against Axis powers during Second World War. But, 
within months after Americans and Russians joined hands and became 
partners against Hitler there began to appear serious differences over 
post-war reconstruction policies. The rift between the US and Soviet 
Union began to develop as each nation planned to advance its own 
interests in the post war world. 
After the War, the world was divided into two hostile blocs 
the western bloc and the soviet bloc and this global polarization 
between USA and the Soviet Union came to be known as "Cold War". 
The Soviet thrust into Europe had aroused the deepest suspicions of 
the United States and her Western allies. The fear of Communism led 
to a widespread impression in the United States that any compromise 
with the Soviet Union would amount to appeasement of a potential 
aggressor. The Americans view the confrontation between the two 
blocs as a conflict in which a gain for one side was necessarily a loss 
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for the other. This implied that the Americans would be justified to 
intervene wherever there is a danger of a Communist success. 
The real beginning of the Cold War was the Truman 
Doctrine, President Truman's decision to provide substantial aid to 
Greece and Turkey. In his speech on March 12, 1947 he said: "we 
shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to 
help free people to maintain their national integrity against aggressive 
movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes".' With 
that step the United States came into Europe to try to balance and 
contain Soviet Power. 
The Marshall Plan followed directly from the Truman 
Doctrine, and effectively divided East and West Europe. Under the 
Marshall Plan massive economic aid was provided to European 
countries to help economic recovery. The Soviet Union Ambassador 
at the UN, Andrei Vyshinsky reacted strongly and said that Marshall 
Plan had finally split Europe into two camps. Speaking in the UN 
General Assembly on September 18, he said : "It is becoming more 
and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and 
political control of the United States and direct interference by the 
latter in the internal affairs of those countries". 
The Communists feared that the Marshall Plan and the 
Truman Doctrine would lead to the formation of a bloc hostile to the 
interests of the Communists especially to Soviet Union. Some 
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eighteen leading European Communist delegates met secretly in 
Poland and issued a manifesto on October 5, 1947. The menifesto 
read : "Two opposite political lines have been crystallized. On the one 
extreme the USSR and democratic countries aim at the whittling down 
of imperialism and strengthening of democracy. In these conditions 
the anti-imperialist democratic camp has to close its ranks and draw 
up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the 
chief forces of the imperialist camp".^ 
The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had 
further intensified under Eisenhower Dulles team also considered 
Communism as monolithic. Dulles believed that anti-communism was 
the only morality. On April 4, 1949, the USA signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty (NATO) with Canada and ten other nations of western 
Europe pledging mutual defense against Soviet aggression. This had 
gradually resulted in a series of military alliances on both the sides 
and intensified the cold war. 
It was against this background that Nehru thought the best 
policy that India should pursue was non-alignment i.e., non-
participation in military and political blocs. Nehru believed that non-
alignment provided an opportunity to hold an independent position in 
world affairs. Nehru right from the day's of independence emphasized" 
that non-alignment had nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or 
anything else. It is a policy of playing a positive role in world 
politics. It is not a mere plea for non-involvement in big power 
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rivalries. It means the power of independent judgement and action. To 
Nehru it meant "helping those forces that we consider right and 
disapproving of the things that we do not like but fundamentally 
keeping away from other countries and other alignments of power 
which normally lead to major conflicts"."* 
Nehru's refusal to join either of the bloc irritated both the 
sides. Americans denounced non-alignment as immoral, because 
Nehru failed to see the things in black and white as the Americans did 
with regard to the cold war. Acheson wrote in his memoirs, "Nehru 
and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship. He 
was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to 
deal".^ 
Soviet Union under Stalin was very suspicious of every one 
who was not fully with them. Stalin labelled Nehru running dog of 
imperialism and denounced non-alignment as a policy of imperialism. 
After a short period of suspicion Soviet Union abandoned its hard line 
and its policy towards India underwent a marked change. India's 
policy of non-alignment was accepted and recognized as a factor in 
favour of peace and her declaration that they would follow on 
independent policy and judge each issue on its merits was warmly 
welcomed by Moscow. India's recognition of Communist China; her 
position on various cold war issues; her disagreement with the United 
States and her refusal to attend the San-Francisco Conference on 
104 
Indo-Soviet Relations During Cold War Era-A Study of Issues 
Japan in 1951, further enhanced her prestige in the eyes of the Soviet 
Union. 
In the words of E. Varga, a prominent Soviet theoretician 
India was "a most valuable member of the zone of peace and closely 
cooperates with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic 
for the preservation of peace throughout the world".^ 
Israel-Palestine Issue : 
Prior to the 1914-18 war, Palestine was under Turkish 
occupation as a part of the Ottoman Empire. In return for a British 
promise of complete national independence for the Arabs, the 
Palestinians helped the overthrow of Turkish hegemony. As the war 
drew to a close the British Government went back on its solemn 
assurances to the Arabs and resumed its game of divide and rule. The 
result was the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. In a letter to 
Lord Rothschild, leader of the Zionist movement, Lord Balfour, who 
was then British Foreign Secretary, expressed Britain's sympathy 
with Jewish Zionist aspirations and declared that, his government 
favour the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
The British effort to carry out the provisions of the Balfour 
Declaration met with stiff Arab opposition from the very beginning. 
Their argument was straight and simple that the Arabs were not 
responsible for the oppression of the Jews in Europe. Besides, 
Palestine, with its limited resources, could not cope with large-scale 
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Jewish immigration. Finally, the creation of a Jewish State in 
Palestine would almost certainly exterminate its Arab national and 
cultural entity. The Arabs in short were not prepared to pay for the 
sins of the Europeans. All this, however, did not deter the British 
from opening the gates of Palestine for Jewish immigration. The 
influx of Jews into Palestine thereafter grew steadily, and in 1925 
reached 33,801. This inflamed the politically minded urban Arabs and 
the result was the Arab-Jewish riots of 1921 and 1929. 
By the end of Second World War, the Palestinian Arabs 
found themselves facing a powerful front composed of vested 
interests in Britain, America and the Zionist international all aiming 
at transforming Palestine into a Jewish State. The first formal move in 
this direction was made in 1946 when a mixed Anglo-American 
Commission was sent to Palestine. In its report the Commission 
recommended that Palestine be thrown open to Jewish immigration 
and that 100,000 more Jews be admitted at once. On a request from 
Britain the United Nations General Assembly met in an extraordinary 
session in May 1947 and resolved to send to Palestine a Commission 
of representatives of eleven states. Eight members of the Commission 
favoured the partition of the country and the establishment of a 
Jewish State there, with Jerusalem as an international district. The 
representatives of the remaining three countries i.e. India, Iran and 
Yugoslavia on the commission recommended making Palestine a 
federal State. India with its bitter experience of partition was 
naturally opposed to the division of Palestine. As Nehru said in 1947: 
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"we took up certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a 
federal state with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the other 
attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition 
which has now been adopted : the other was a Unitary State. We 
suggested a federal state with naturally, an Arab majority in charge of 
the federal state but with autonomy for the other regions - Jewish 
regions". On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution on the majority proposal. This was made possible as both 
the Soviet Union and the United States gave their support to the 
partition plan. 
India, Soviet Union and the Arab-Israel Conflict: 
Our national leaders and public opinion have throughout 
consistently upheld the cause of the Arabs. Way back in 1928, when 
India was still waging its fight for independence, the Indian National 
Congress expressed its full sympathy with the Palestinian Arabs in 
their struggle for liberation from the imperialist hold. The parallel 
between the Palestinian struggle and the Indian struggle was 
underlined by western imperialism as the common enemy of both. 
That the Indian National Congress was fully conscious of the fact that 
the Zionist movement in Palestine was part and parcel of western 
colonialism. 
However, the USSR played a limited role in international 
affairs during 1917-1945 as it was preoccupied with its internal 
problems. But immediately after Second World War, the Soviet 
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position on the Palestine question was just the opposite of the 
Western Powers. After the war the Soviet Union like India supported 
the efforts of the Arab countries for complete Independence. When 
the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine was set up in 
December 1945 the Soviet Union opposed it and declared that the 
settlement of the problem had to come through the United Nations 
o 
and that it could not be dealt with in any other framework. Soviet 
experts started analyzing the Arab Nationalist Movement. The 
establishment of the Arab league in March 1945 was described by a 
Soviet Commentator as the first stage in the Arab nation's struggle 
towards independence.^ In the opinion of V.B. Lutskiy, Palestine state 
ought to be an Arab State. He said : "The Palestine problem cannot be 
resolved by imperialist means. The majority of the population of 
Palestine regards the country as an Arab country and regards the Jews 
as citizens of an independent and democratic Arab Palestine".'^ 
Both Nehru and Soviet Union saw in the Palestine problem a 
manifestation of the wider problem of colonialism in the Arab 
countries and branded the Arab-Jewish conflict as a result of the 
British imperialist policy. They declared the Balfour Decleration of 
1917 was a betrayal of Arabs by the British in order to protect their 
own imperialist interests. 
Both Nehru and the Soviet leaders were convinced that the 
Palestine problem was created by the British and would never be 
solved by the British. The idea of an independent state of Israel never 
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found favour with Indian and Soviet Government, which saw Zionism 
to be a form of western imperialism, enjoying the patronage of the 
British, America, etc. Further, the role of Zionism in Palestine was 
denounced on the ground that "It really did not want independence 
but the perpetuation of a foreign mandate".'^ To illustrate this the 
New times quoted Ben-Gurion as having declared in a Zionist 
Congress in 1938 that "anyone who betrayed Great Britain betrayed 
Zionism".'^ 
Nehru expressed sympathy for the Jews when they were 
being persecuted and hounded out of various countries of Europe and 
acknowledged their considerable contribution to the country since 
they came to Palestine. However, he believed Palestine essentially to 
be an Arab country and must remain so. The Arabs must not be 
crushed and suppressed in their own homeland.'^ India could not 
understand the logic which argued that since many Jews were ill-
treated in Europe, Palestine had to give them a home. For Indian 
statesmen the Jewish refugee problem should be completely separated 
from the Palestine problem.''* For Nehru Palestine problem was not an 
Arab-Jew problem but a struggle for independence. 
In 1956 the Soviet Union not only supported Nasser but also 
congratulated him on "breaking the chain of enslavement of the 
colonial imperialism".'^ Nasser's decision was regarded as "an act to 
which a sovereign government has a legal right".'^ The Indian 
government regarded the aggression from Israel as the battle against 
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imperialism. India reiterated the opinion that the Suez Canal was an 
integral part of Egypt, the sovereignty of Egypt was thus beyond 
question. Nehru like Khrushchev regarded that Egypt was within its 
right to nationalize the Suez Canal. 
India and Soviet Union always supported the legitimate 
demands of the Arab people. Their consistent, principled stand on the 
Arab cause remained unchanged and both the governments believed 
that the only way to a lasting peace in the middle East was to free 
completely all Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967, to enable the 
Palestinian Arabs to exercise their legitimate rights, and give all 
states and people in the area an opportunity to live in peace and 
security. Thus, the unanimity of views on Arab-Israel conflict that the 
road to a settlement in West Asia could only be found through 
reconciliation between Israel and Palestine gave further strength to 
the Indo-Soviet relations. 
Vietnam Issue : 
The proximity of Vietnam with Chinese has subjected it to 
intermitten heavy Chinese pressure. For over a thousand years (186 
B.C. to 939 A.D.) Annam, as the country was then known, was under 
Chinese rule. The long period of Chinese rule was followed by an 
uneasy independence under a succession of Vietnamese emperors. 
The division of Annam into the two states of Tonkin and Cochin-
China in 1673 led to a series of dynastic quarrels which invited 
foreign intervention. Although the first initiative was taken in 1789 
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by a Catholic bishop who landed a party of French soldiers to support 
one of the warring parties, it failed to establish French control. A new 
emperor succeeded in uniting the whole Annam and French influence 
declined. However, seventy years later the persecution of missionaries 
provided an excuse for a determined French conquest of Indo-China 
was complete. 
In Indo-China the challenge to French colonialism began in 
1 R 
1940,'° the year when France fell in Europe and when Japan moved 
into North Vietnam. It was in this situation that Dr. Hochi Minh 
founded the National Independent Front. The Indo-Chinese 
Communist Party, the leading force, was born in May 1941. The Viet 
Minh Front led the struggle against the French. But with the 
occupation of the whole of Vietnam by the Japanese troops on July 
24, 1941, the character of the struggle changed. 
The Japanese, for reasons of expediency, had followed 
French to govern Indo-china for them. Meanwhile the Viet Minh 
stirred action against the Japanese near the Chinese border in North 
Tonkin. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese, realizing that their fate was 
sealed, suddenly overthrew the French administration and put 
Emperor Bao Dai as the head of the nominally independent Vietnam 
administration uniting Tonkin with Annam. The Viet Minh under Ho 
Chi Minh refused to recognize Bao Dai's government and proclaimed 
the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. After the war, 
Indo-China was occupied by British and Nationalist Chinese troops 
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with the 16"^  Parallel as the dividing line between them. The British 
refused to recognize the Viet Minh and helped French to seize power 
in Saigon in early 1946. It now became thebrimary objective of the 
French to fight the Viet Minh guerillas operating all over the 
countryside. But, the Chinese impeded French control and refused 
entry of French troops and civilians into Tonkin, until the France-
Chinese Treaty was signed on February 28, 1946 by which the 
Chinese agreed to withdraw after extracting generous concessions 
from the French. They also insisted on the French entering into an 
agreement with Ho Chi Minh before bringing their troops into 
Tonkin. 
Consequently, the French also concluded an agreement with 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as a free State with its own 
government. Parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indo-
Chinese Federation and the French Union. The French government 
pledged itself to hold a referendum to determine whether Cochin-
China should be United with Tonkin and Annam. 
On June 1, without holding a referendum. Admiral Thierry 
d' Argenlieu, High Commissioner for Indo-China announced the 
French recognition of the "Free republic" of Cochin-China in direct 
contravention of the French pledge. 
Since then, the Franco-Vietnamese relations rapidly 
deteriorated and finally resulted in open hostilities between the two 
parties. Serious incidents took place between the French troops and 
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the Vietnamese troops at Longson and Haiphong in the North in 
November 1946, on November 2 and 3, Haiphong was bombed by the 
French. By December 19, French strongholds were attacked by the 
Vietnamese and the following day fighting began at Hue, Turane and 
various other places all over Vietnam. The climax of the battle was 
reached when Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh on May 8, 1954, 
which sounded the death knell of French domination in Indo-China 
and transferred the question of Vietnam from the battlefield to the 
conference table. Thus, the fight that started in December 1946 ended 
only with the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Geneva in 1954.'^ 
The cease-fire agreement was signed on July 21, between 
the High Commands of the French Union Forces and the People's 
Army by which the two parties agreed to stop fighting and Vietnam 
was provisionally divided at the l?"* parallel between the French 
Union Forces High Command and the people's army of Vietnam. An 
international Commission composed of India, Canada and Poland was 
appointed to supervise the armistice with India as Chairman. 
Significantly, South Vietnam was excluded from the cease-fire 
agreement at the insistence of D.R.V.N., and hence the South 
Vietnamese Government denounced the agreement and held that it 
was not bound by the terms, as it had not signed the document. The 
Americans also did not accede to the conference declaration and 
refused to consider themselves bound by the decisions taken at the 
conference although they declared their intention of respecting the 
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terms of the Agreement as long as their was no violation from the 
10 
other side. 
In short, although apparently, the Geneva Agreement 
brought about a partition of Vietnam at the l?'** parallel; temporarily, 
they brought about a cease-fire, but they by no means ended the 
hostilities between the Viet Minh and Laos.^' 
Indo-Soviet and Vietnam Issue : 
India showed keen interest in the Vietnamese struggle 
against the French during 1945-1954. India, in spite of her internal 
difficulties, could not close her eyes to what went on in Vietnam.^^ 
Her nationalist leaders were strongly opposed to the resumption of 
French rule after the Japanese withdrawal. In December 1946, Nehru 
declared : "our hearts are with the people of Indo-China. The attempt 
to curb the spirit of freedom in Indo-China has deeply moved the 
Indian people".^" 
Again in January 1946, Nehru declared : "we have watched 
British intervention there with growing anger, shame and 
helplessness, that Indian troops should be used for doing Britain's 
dirty work against our friends who are fighting the same fight as 
» 24 
we . 
On February 18, 1947, Nehru stated in the Legislative 
Assembly that the government of India shared the feelings of public 
opinion in India in favour of Vietnam and the freedom of the people 
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of Indo-China, and was anxious not to be a party in any way to any 
action which might be prejudicial to their interests. He disclosed that 
the government had taken steps to limit the number of French 
aircrafts which might fly across India, and to exercise stricter control 
in the future. But, he added, although operational or combat type 
aircraft were not allowed to fly across India, air ambulance and other 
requirement on their onwards passage out of India were allowed to do 
25 
so. 
Nehru saw American action in Vietnam as a struggle for 
dominant world position and the continuation, in some form, of 
imperialism. Therefore, in his view the fight in Indo-China was 
essentially one of colonialism and imperialism. Speaking in the Lok 
Sabha, on April 24, 1954, Nehru observed : 
"The conflict in Indo-China is in its origin and 
essential character a movement of resistance to 
colonialism and the attempt to deal with such 
resistance by the traditional methods of 
suppression and divide and rule. Although 
Foreign intervention have made the issue more 
complex, but it nevertheless remains basically 
anti-colonial and nationalistic in character. The 
recognition of this and the reconciliation of 
nationalist sentiments for freedom and 
independence and safe-guarding them against 
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external pressures can alone form the basis of a 
settlement and of peace". 
Nehru's stand was one of non-interference and also non-
intervention by other nations in Vietnamese affairs. Nehru stated that 
India was opposed to any foreign army functioning in Asia, he 
refused to recognize either Ho Chi Minh or Bao Dai and announced 
that India would follow the developments until the people had 
reached some decision. Speaking on India's attitudes towards the 
Indo-Chinese issue Nehru made it clear that, it "is not a negative 
attitude but a slightly positive one, because we do not want to make it 
more difficult for Indo-China's fight for independence". Thus, we 
see that India adopted a neutral posture in Vietnam in order to help 
facilitate the solution of the problem and in accordance with its 
declared policy of non-alignment. 
India played an active role in the negotiations that 
culminated in the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China in 1954. Even 
later, India's basic position remained the same, i.e., that the people of 
Vietnam must have the right to decide their own future freely and 
without any interference. In 1966 Swaran Singh, Minister of External 
Affairs stated that "we firmly believe that the only way to solve the 
Vietnam problem is to abandon warlike activities and to hold 
discussions with the object of implementing the Geneva Agreement so 
that the people of Vietnam be able to determine the future with their 
wishes without any interference from any quarter whatsoever".^* 
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The Indian government believed that the best way of solving 
the Vietnam crisis was on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
and, therefore, extended full support to the Agreement. Since the 
Agreement provided specific clauses forbidding entry into Vietnam of 
foreign military personnel or material of any type, except in 
replacement of permissible quantities already in the country, India 
regrets that foreign interference has continued in spite of the Geneva 
Agreement and the reunification of Vietnam remains unachieved. The 
government of India always worked for the implementation of the 
Geneva Agreement.^^ 
Communism in Vietnam was indigenous but had strong 
international ties through its leader. Ho Chi Minh, who was the only 
South East Asian Communist of international stature, had made 
several visits to Russia, was a founder member of the French 
Communist Party, founded the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in 
1930. 
From the very beginning of the crisis the United States came 
under attack for its alleged intervention in Vietnam by the Soviets as 
part of a wider plan to suppress national liberation movements in Asia 
in general and in Vietnam in particular, and the protracted 
negotiations between the French government and Bao Dai were 
ascribed to American inspiration. When, on March 8, 1949, an 
agreement was signed under which Vietnam was described as an 
independent state within the framework of the French Union, the 
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Russians severely criticized and referred to the agreement as a hollow 
farce.^° 
Soviet Union Like India was always suspicious of the moves 
of the western powers which, it thought, were aimed at subverting 
independence and establishing colonies in the weaker states. The 
American involvement in Vietnam aroused deep concern among the 
Soviets along with the people and the government of India. From the 
American point of view the Soviet Union had been behind the 
communist North Vietnam from the beginning of the Vietnamese 
conflict, the Secretary of state Acheson on January 12, 1950 admitted 
that the U.S. "must be prepared to meet wherever possible all thrusts 
of the Soviet Union".^' Soviets believed that the Vietnamese had been 
fighting against the U.S. imperialist aggression for a just cause, that is 
peaceful reunification of the two Vietnams. From the Soviet point of 
view, the United States had been an aggressor and the Vietnamese had 
been fighting for the "liberation" of their country from the clutches of 
the foreigners. Like Nehru, they believed that the American 
involvement in Vietnam was a foreigners presence. The United States 
military activities in Vietnam were termed by the Soviets an 
"aggression". The Soviets also alleged that the Americans were 
continuing their economic penetration of the country with the ultimate 
aim of taking it over completely.^^ 
In 1954 a better climate prevailed for the talks on Indo-
China. At the conference the DRV's proposal for recognition of 
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Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
these countries the unification of each of them by free elections and 
the formation of national governments without foreign interference, 
and a mutual exchange of prisoners of war, was strongly supported by 
the USSR. In the view of Allan Cameron, it was the Soviet 
representative Foreign Minister Vyecheslav Molotov who "engineered 
compromise on the points of greatest contention such as : non-
representation of the resistance movements in Cambodia and Laos, 
the selection of the 17' parallel as the cease-fire line, and a two year 
delay in holding elections"." Thus, the agreements on Indo-China 
were an important step reducing international tension and both India 
and Soviet Union played an important part in the peace settlement in 
Indo-China. It also halted (temporarily) the foreign intervention in 
Indo-China. 
Thus, evidently, the Soviet Union and India stood firm 
behind the Vietnamese people in their just cause the liberation of 
Vietnam from foreign imperialist yoke. They promised to stand by the 
Vietnamese people to the last, and it seems that the world has 
witnessed that they have kept their words, that is, the people of India 
and the Soviet Union have always stood firm behind the Vietnamese 
people in their struggle against the foreign intervention. 
Korean Issue : 
Korea became a cold war issue after the termination of the 
Second World War. This was the defeat of Japan in the war which 
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brought the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces North 
of the 38"" parallel by the Russian forces and South of the 38'^ parallel 
by the American forces. Thus Korea was divided into North Korea 
and South Korea and this parallel separate the North Korea from the 
South Korea.^" 
It was the failure of the U.S. and the USSR not to agree on 
steps to implement the wartime promise of independence for Korea, 
which led the United States to submit the Korean question to the UN 
General Assembly. Despite the protests of the USSR the General 
Assembly noted a resolution^^ to establish a United nations 
Temporary Commission on Korea with authority to observe elections 
for a national assembly which in turn would establish a national 
government for Korea. The commission could not function effectively 
because they were refused facilities to enter North Korea. 
Both North Korea and South Korea wanted to re-unite' the 
country under their respective leadership on June 25, 1950 came the 
catastrophe when North Korean forces crossed the 38' parallel and 
fightmg started. This issue of the incursion from North Korea into 
South Korea was brought to the United Nations by the United States. 
Consequently the Security Council met and demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38'^ parallel. The council also 
described the incursion in the absence of the USSR as an act of 
aggression. A unified command under the UN flag was set up by the 
Council on July 7, 1950, and General MacArthur was appointed 
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Supreme Commander of the UN Korean forces. On October 7, 1950, 
the UN authorized MacArthur to extend the war into North Korea, if 
necessary. The crisis reached its climax when the UN forces 
approached the Yalu river and the Chinese volunteers in large number 
entered Korea. On October 11, 1950, a spokesman of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry declared that the Chinese people could not 'stand 
idly while Korea was invaded by the United States and its 
accomplices'. The intervention of the Chinese volunteer forces, as a 
reaction to the crossing of the 38*^  parallel by the UN command made 
the UN condemn China as 'aggressor'. The heavily out numbered 
troops under the command of MacArthur fell back and were unable to 
restore the line until Chinese were some seventy miles inside South 
Korea. 
After serious reverses, the UN forces began to advance 
again early in 1951. But there came another heavy North Korean-
Chinese counter-attack in April 1951, which developed into a virtual 
stalemate at the 38"" parallel. 
It was early in July 1951 that negotiations between the two 
sides began but could not prove to be a success as they were twice 
broken off. The exchange of prisoners was a serious problem before 
the parties concerned. However, they reached an agreement on the 
repatriation of prisoners on June, 8, 1953 and, later on, signed an 
armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. The agreement, among other 
things, provided also for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of 
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war under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission. 
Indo-Soviet Stand and the Korean Crisis : 
Relations between India and Soviet Union began to show 
some improvement during the Korean conflict of 1950-1953, 
essentially because of India's pursuit of a policy of non-alignment. 
This was the period when the Korean war took dramatic turns, 
sometimes in favour of the United States-led United Nations and 
sometimes in favour of North Korea backed by China and the Soviet 
Union. 
India had been concerned with the Korean question in one 
form or the other and was very anxious for a negotiated settlement of 
the Korean problem. It was during this crisis that India realized the 
grim realities of Cold War and in turn, impressed the world with her 
policy of non-alignment. India wished to play a mediatory role 
between two Big Powers, not to take a leading role or seek authority 
in Asia or elsewhere. But, as Nehru said; "we are compelled by 
circumstances to play our part in Asia and in the world, because we 
are convinced that unless these basic problems of Asia are solved 
there can be no world peace".^^ 
Immediately after the outbreak of war Nehru on July 13"* 
addressed identical messages to Stalin and Acheson"**^  in which he 
proposed to localize the conflict and to facilitate a peaceful and 
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permanent solution of the Korean crisis by breaking the deadlock in 
the Security Council and to facilitate the return of the USSR to the 
Security Council. He also insisted on the restoration of the People 
Republic of China's lawful status in the UN. 
The Soviet Union responded favourably to this Indian 
initiative. A reply was sent on July 15 in which it stated that it was 
"expedient to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question 
through the Security Council with the mandatory participation of 
representatives of the five great powers including the People's 
Republic of China."*^ But Nehru's effort failed because USA rejected 
the proposal and termed it as an appeasement to aggression. Soviet 
Union also welcomed India's refusal to send arm forces to Korea and 
denied support for the Security Council resolution that gave the US 
led forces the status of UN forces. 
Both India and the Soviet Union were of the view that 
maintenance of world peace was the fundamental objective of their 
respective foreign polices and the UN was the most effective 
instrument for maintaining as also restoring international peace and 
Security. In the case of Korea both agreed that it was their primary 
consideration to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea and 
in fact to end it their itself. Therefore, India and the Soviet Union 
severely criticized the September resolution which endorsed the 
crossing of the 38'^ parallel by the UN armed forces. Because both 
were convinced that this could extend the area of conflict. This 
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observation was a result of the declaration made by China on 
September 30, that China would not stand aside if the UN forces were 
to cross the SS'*" parallel. 
Both India and the Soviet Union adopted similar stand that 
for a speedy solution to the Korean issue, it was important that the 
People's Republic of China should be recognized and her 
representative should take a seat in the Council. Nehru believed that 
the new power in Beijing was a reality and this should be recognized 
as a fact. At the S"* General Assembly the Soviet delegation proposed 
the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea so that the 
Korean question could be decided by the Korean people themselves. 
The Soviet delegate also stressed that an effective settlement to the 
Korean question could only be achieved with the participation of the 
People's Republic of China.'*^ 
In February 1951, both India and the Soviet Union opposed 
the US sponsored resolution in the UN branding China as aggressor 
because they were aware of resulting consequences to world peace. 
India warned against the proposal to brand China as aggressor, and 
Nehru said : "This proposal cannot lead to peace. It can only lead to 
an intensification of the conflict and might, perhaps close the door to 
further negotiations".'*^ The Indian government believed that the 
Beijing's entry into the Korean war was a reaction to the crossing of 
the parallel line by the UN Command. A more fundamental 
consideration was a belief that not all problems could be solved by 
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resorting to military means. In India's view, conciliation, negotiation 
and mediation could be equally effective methods. This approach was 
very much in keeping with India's policy of non-alignment and hence 
received warm welcome from Stalin. India's differing stands on 
various issues during the crisis, such as her opposition to the US 
sponsored resolution to brand China as an aggressor, Nehru's call to 
the United Nations forces not to cross the 38 parallel, and India's 
position on the prisoners of war issue made an impact on Soviet 
policy-makers and thus brought India closer to Russia. 
Suez Crisis : 
The Universal Suez Canal Company which owned and 
operated the Suez Canal was an Egyptian joint-stock company 
registered in Egypt, even though the majority of its share holders 
were foreigners (the British government being its biggest, owning 43 
per cent) and had its office in Paris. It enjoyed a 99 years concession 
from the Egyptian government, which was due to expire in 1968 after 
which the control was to revert to Egypt, and Egypt had already 
announced its intention not to renew the concession. The use of the 
canal was regulated by an international treaty, the Constantinople 
Convention of 1888, which in particular assured freedom of 
navigation in the canal and non-discrimination to all its users. 
Presumably as a riposte of Anglo-American decision of withdrawal 
suddenly a week earlier of offers of aid to build the Aswan High Dam 
in Egypt, President Nasser of Egypt announced on July 26, 1956 the 
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Egyptian government's nationalization of the Company. The 
government proposed to use the income from the company to build 
the Aswan Dam and that the company's share holders would be paid 
compensation in accordance with the last closing prices. He described 
the company as an 'exploiting company' and as a 'state within a 
state'. A couple of days after, in reply to criticism of the move in the 
West, the Egyptian government pointed out that the company had 
always been an Egyptian Company and therefore subject to Egyptian 
law, that nationalization did not in anyway or to any extent effect 
Egypt's international commitments in respect of the use of the canal 
under the 1888 Convention, as well as the more recent Anglo-
Egyptian agreement of October 1954, and that freedom of navigation 
on the canal would not be affected in any manner or to any degree. 
The reactions of the British and French Governments were 
quick, sharp and vehement, they denounced the move, and the other 
Western Governments and the Western press and public opinion were 
also severely critical. The British, French and United States 
Governments immediately took certain financial and economic 
measures against Egypt, the former two also took what were called 
military and naval precautions within their countries and in the 
Mediterranean. The three governments held urgent consultations in 
London and announced on August 2" a plan to hold 24 power 
(including India) conference at London on the 16"^  in order to 
consider the establishment of an international agency for the canal to 
ensure freedom and security of transit with due regard to the interests 
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of Egypt. The three powers did not question the right of Egypt to 
enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign and 
independent nation, including the generally recognized right, under 
appropriate conditions, to nationalize assests, not impressed with an 
international interests, which are subject to its political authority. But 
they held that the Egyptian act of nationalization was not such an act, 
but an 'arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an 
international agency'. They alleged that the act threatened freedom 
and security of the canal guaranteed by the 1888 convention.'*'' 
India, Soviet Union and Suez Crisis : 
The outbreak of the Suez War further cemented the bonds of 
friendship between India and the Soviet Union. The crisis also 
revealed the common approach of India and the USSR. The reaction 
of the governments and people of India and the Soviet Union to the 
Egyptian act of nationalization was just the opposite of that of the 
western governments and press. Both India and the Soviet Union 
termed it as 'a perfectly legitimate and domestic act'. The Soviet 
government publicly stated that it "considers the decision of the 
government of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal as a fully lawful 
act stemming from Egypt's sovereign rights".'*^ According to Nehru, 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal was a step towards the 
weakening of the domination of European powers over West Asia 
which had lasted for over a hundred years, 'Asia now was on march, 
and was emerging to take its rightful place in world affairs'.'*^ 
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Furthermore, in a statement in the Lok Sabha, on August 8, 1956, 
Nehru said : "The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company and, 
in Egypt's view, subject to the laws of the country. No question of 
expropriation has arisen since the shareholders are to be compensated 
at market value. Even if there remain any outstanding differences in 
matter, they do not call for developments which lead to an 
international crisis".'*^ 
US advocated calm and patient negotiation and called a 
conference on August 16, 1956, of 22 countries largely concerned 
with the problem posed by the nationalization of the Suez. Egypt 
refused to attend the conference which, according to Nasser, had "no 
right in anyway to discuss any issue concerning the sovereignty of 
Egypt or the Sovereignty of her parts".*** Nasser Instead proposed a 
conference of the 45 nations whose ships used the canal so that it 
could "reach an agreement confirming and guaranteeing the freedom 
of navigation through the Suez Canal".'*^ His proposal however did 
not come through. 
The approach of Britain, France and US differed from that 
of India, and the USSR. While Britain and France sought to dramatize 
the political implications of Egypt's actions and expected some 
enforceable decisions, India and the Soviet Union desired to use the 
conference for purpose of negotiation and to thrash out day to day 
administrative problems arising from the use of the canal. Besides 
they did not challenge the right of Egypt to nationalize the canal and 
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even agreed to respect the sovereign rights of the nation through 
whose territory it passed. 
Soviet delegation presented a draft communique on August 
23, to be adopted by the conference, which called for negotiation of a 
Suez settlement 'solely by peaceful means' through a committee 
including the USA, Britain, France, India and the USSR. This 
communique if adopted, would have barred the use offeree by Britain 
and France in the event negotiations failed. Failing in this the Soviet 
delegation favoured the alternative Indian proposal which was termed 
by the Soviet Foreign Minister as "a plan for a just and peaceful 
settlement of the Suez problem".^" The proposal called for an 
international advisory body, and a new version of the convention 
which Egypt would be required to sign and which would be made 
subject to UN sanctions. It did not infringe Egypt's sovereignty and at 
the same time protected the interests of the user states. But 18 of the 
22 nations that attended the conference favoured the American 
proposal which was to be presented to Nasser by a committee headed 
by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Menzies. India and the 
Soviet Union disassociated themselves from the proposals but urged 
Nasser to grant an audience to Mr. Menzies even if he was not going 
to accept them. 
Military action against Egypt was first launched by Israel 
and then joined by Britain and France. All of the three parties, France, 
Israel and Britain wanted to get rid of Nasser but all of them were 
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restrained by the US. After a series of meetings between the leaders 
of the three countries they decided to act independently of the United 
States.^' The final agreement was signed on October 23, at Sevres in a 
secret meeting. Israel invaded the Sanai in the night of October 29-30. 
It was followed by the Anglo-French ultimatum and aerial attacks. 
M.S. Venkataramani, however, held the view that the three power 
aggression could not have been undertaken without the indirect 
blessings of the US. 
The reactions of both the governments and their people to 
this triple aggression on Egypt was quick and vigorous. In view of the 
need to stop hostilities India and the Soviet Union and many other 
democratic countries called upon Israel for immediate withdrawal of 
all its forces behind the armistice lines, Mr, V.K, Krishna Menon 
termed this aggression as the battle against imperialism. Nehru held 
the view that when every United Nations Member should have tried to 
stop the invasion, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt. 
Nehru, reiterated the opinion that the Suez Canal was in Egypt and an 
integral part of Egypt, the sovereignty of Egypt was thus beyond 
question. So according to Nehru, "this ultimatum was a violation of 
the principles of Charter and an aggression against a sovereign 
country and a threat to violate its territory".^' Nehru publicly branded 
Israeli action as a case of naked aggression. 
The Soviet government on October 31 declared its 
condemnation of the triple aggression against Egypt and demanded 
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that in order to preserve peace and security in the Middle East the 
Security Council must take prompt measures to end this aggression. 
The Soviet government on November 5, 1956 demanded that Britain, 
France and Israel immediately halt the hostilities against Egypt and 
warned them that "responsibility for all possible consequences of 
such actions rests with the British and French governments".^^ 
The Soviet government took a firm stand in defence of 
Egypt and its resolve to take an active part in curbing the aggression. 
In a message to US President Eisenhower, Bulganin asked for the 
collaboration of the American Mediterranean fleet with the Soviet 
Navy and air force to stop the aggression. He warned the British and 
French Premiers "that their aggression on Egypt could turn into a 
catastrophe for them since the Soviet Union was firmly resolve to use 
force to destroy the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle 
East".^ '* The Soviet Union also proposed to send its volunteers "to 
defend the freedom of Egyptian people' 55 
Thus, the diplomatic efforts and unparalled support given by 
both India and the Soviet Union to the people of Egypt helped to take 
off ihe steam from the dangerous crisis and averted a major 
catastrophe. As the New York Herald Tribune wrote on November 12, 
1956 that the "Soviet warning was what in fact compelled Britain, 
France and Israel to pull out".^^ 
Assessing the role India had played in the crisis, Romesh 
Chandra wrote in an article, entitled 'The Aggression against Egypt 
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and its Lessons for the work of the Indian Peace Movement', that the 
"stand taken by India against aggression helped considerably in 
rousing opinion in Asia and Africa and indeed in the whole world, 
including Britain and France, against the war". 
Hungarian Issue : 
A closer examination would suggest that the events in 
Hungary in October 1956 were almost similar to what had happened 
in many parts of the world in the fifties. The Hungarian people 
revolted against the USSR. Their main demand was the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops stationed under the Warsaw Pact and restoration of Imry 
Nagy to power. A civil conflict broke out. On October 31, the New 
Hungarian government headed by Imry Nagy informed the UN 
Secretary General about Hungary's decision to withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact. It appealed the UN to guarantee Hungary's permanent 
neutrality. Moreover after Soviet forces withdrawal, there was a good 
deal of mutual killings. A rival government under J. Kadar was set up, 
and finally at dawn, on November 4, the Soviet troops started 
suppressing the revolutionary movement with an iron hand ultimately 
they succeeded in crushing the popular upsurge in a ruthless manner. 
For once, the Indian judgment of an issue had taken time for 
deliverance. For, as Nehru had said, India, not having any senior 
Indian diplomat present at the time in Budapest was not in a position 
to ascertain the facts about the events that had occurred. India, 
however, did receive news of the happenings from various sources, 
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Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, Western newspapers and the Soviet 
Prime Minister Bulganin himself. But Nehru could not take any one 
of them as authentic, since each of the sources had a stake in the 
issue. The Yugoslavs were keen to see that the defiance by Hungary 
would not be too open as to spread over to the rest of East Europe 
which could make Russia doubly repressive, thereby endangering in 
the process, Yugoslavia itself. The western press, Nehru felt, had a 
tendency to seize an opportunity of this kind to blow the issue out of 
all proportions. Mr. Bulganin's version of the events however came as 
late as November 8 and that too, at India's request. In any case, it was 
the version of a country which was the main party in question. Not 
being therefore, in a position to procure reliable information about the 
issue at stake, India opted to be cautious in expressing any opinion 
concerning the Issue. Besides, Nehru was anxious not to make any 
critical statement of the Soviet Union which had taken a firm stand 
against the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. He, therefore refrained 
from criticizing the Soviet Union in public. 
In his first comment at a press conference on October 25, 
Nehru said that it was clear to him that the Hungarian Revolution was 
a "nationalistic upsurge".^^ Speaking at the 9"^  General Conference of 
the UNESCO in New Delhi, Nehru publicly expressed his views and 
observed that: "we see today in Egypt as well as Hungary both human 
dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to 
suppress peoples and to gain political objectives''.^ *^ The official 
attitude of the government of India was reflected in a resolution 
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passed by the All India Congress Committee (AICC) on 9' 
November. It expressed grave concern about the developments in 
Western Asia and Europe and expressed strong condemnation of the 
Anglo-French aggression. It also expressed the hope that foreign 
troops would be withdrawn from Hungary and the Hungarian people 
would decide their own future by peaceful methods. There was no 
reference in the resolution to the Soviet action in Hungary. Later, in 
answer to criticism from some AICC members Nehru referred to the 
letter of Premier Bulganin in which the Soviet leader stated that they 
went back to Budapest at the invitation of the new government and 
said that they would pull out as early as possible and as soon as order 
has been established. Nehru felt that the Hungarian problem was 
complicated and the government of India wanted to help and not to 
hinder. 
During the emergency session of the UN General Assembly 
the Indian delegation abstained on most of the Assembly Resolutions 
concerning Hungary. India abstained on the resolution passed on 
November 4, because the resolution while asking the Soviet Union to 
withdraw its forces from Hungary immediately, also called for free 
elections to be held under the supervision of UN observers designated 
by the Secretary General. India's representative to the UN, Krishna 
Menon, objected to the several parts of the resolution, particularly 
those condemning the Soviet action and calling for an investigation 
under UN auspices into Hungary's internal affairs. But India's 
abstention could not be treated, argued Menon, as "unconcerned or 
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neutral, for India would never be neutral where human freedom was at 
stake".^' 
On November 9 came the controversial vote by the Indian 
delegate which provoked the most anger in the west and criticism at 
home. The resolution urged the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces, 
suggested holding o elections in Hungary under the auspices of the 
United Nations. All of the non-aligned Asian and Middle Eastern 
nations abstained with the exceptions of India and Ceylon which 
joined the Communist bloc in casting negative vote.^^ In explaining 
his vote, Krishna Menon said, "we cannot subscribe to the idea that 
any sovereign state can agree to elections under the UN 
organization". Replying to criticism in Parliament, Nehru explained 
that provision about election was contrary to the UN Charter. He also 
referred to the 'Cold war' context in which the resolution was 
adopted. To him, it was not a responsible resolution and the motive 
behind it was to run down India.^ '* The Indian vote against the 
resolution Nehru said, "was a correct vote and if a similar situation 
arises, in future, we shall again vote in the same way".^^ 
The Indian vote against the resolution was bitterly criticized 
in many countries as well as in India. Speaking in Madras on 
November 17, Jayaprakash Narayan remarked: "I am concerned over 
our foreign policy. We are following a double standard, one standard 
of measurement for Egypt and another for Hungary. That is why I am 
opposing it".^ ^ 
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Nehru realized the depth of feelings in India over her 
opposition to the November 9 resolution on Hungary. In Parliament 
on November 16 Nehru said that, "There was no immediate 
aggression in Hungary in the sense of something militarily happening 
as there was in the case of Egypt. It was really a continuing 
intervention of Soviet armies in Hungary based on the Warsaw Pact. 
The fact is that as subsequent events have shown, the Soviet armies 
were there against the wishes of the Hungarian people".^' On 
November 19, Nehru remarked, "From the very beginning we made it 
clear that in our opinion, the people of Hungary should be allowed to 
determine their future according to their own wishes and that foreign 
troops should be withdrawn".^* 
We can safely conclude that Nehru's reaction through out 
the crisis was slow, cautious and hesitant.^^ Nehru, while had 
expressed sympathy with the people of Hungary and even criticized 
the Soviet intervention, he wished to avoid straining his friendship 
with the Soviet Union. From the Indian point of view, the security of 
her vital interest lay in not antagonizing the USSR when the latter 
was supporting her on Kashmir issue and providing valuable 
economic assistance rather than the Western powers in the Hungarian 
crisis. 
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Cdina, India and H^fie Soviet 
Vnion: 'The Emerging TriangCe 
CHAPTER-4 
CHINA, INDIA & THE SOVIET UNION : THE EMERGING 
TRIANGLE 
The contacts between India and China date back to ancient 
times. Even long before the spread of Buddhism to China and Japan. 
Hindu traders were carrying on commerce with those countries. 
Buddhism gave a new impetus to these contacts, and a new synthesis 
of culture on a remarkable scale took place between India and China. 
In spite of the absence of any official contacts between the two 
Governments, the peoples of India and China continued to cherish 
feelings of affection for each other. They continued to maintain a live 
interest in their respective struggles for emancipation. The Indian 
National Congress, which met at Madras in 1927, passed a resolution' 
sending its "warmest greetings to the people of China and its 
assurances of full sympathy with them in their fight for 
emancipation". The Congress also expressed its resentment against 
the use of Indian troops by the British Government to further their 
imperialist designs in China and to hinder and prevent the Chinese 
people from gaining their freedom. 
When Japan attacked China in 1937, the All India Congress 
Committee, which met at Calcatta condemned Japan as trying to 
emulate the Western imperialists. In order to express its solidarity 
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with China, India observed many China days against Japanese 
aggression. The first of its kind was observed on September 26, 1937. 
Nehru in a press statement said on September 14, 1937, "I suggest 
that Sunday September 26, should be observed as a special day for 
this purpose, when we should condemn the Japanese aggression on 
China and send our full sympathy to the Chinese people".^ The AICC 
commended the heroic struggle of the Chinese people for maintaining 
the integrity and the independence of their country. The committee 
went further and called upon the Indian people to refrain from the use 
of goods of Japanese origins as a mark of their sympathy with the 
people of China.^ The Congress which met the following year at 
Haripura passed a similar resolution. In 1938, the Congress gave a 
practical demonstration of its sympathy for the Chinese people by 
deciding to send a Medical Mission to China. The Medical Mission 
which was sent in 1939, with Dr. M. Atal at its head succeeded by its 
devotion to duty in establishing Indo-Chinese relations on a firm basis 
of goodwill and affection. The visit in 1941 of Generalissomo Chiang 
Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang to India served to cement the feelings 
of solidarity existing between the peoples of China and India. 
Nehru looked at China as India's natural ally. Among 
foreign countries, China drew his utmost attention and that was why 
China found maximum coverage in his writings and works. He longed 
for every piece of news from China. After Japan's invasion on China, 
he at once condemned Japan's undeclared war and atrocities 
perpetrated by the aggressor on the innocent Chinese people. It was 
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his desire to see the Chinese people resisting the Japanese in the hour 
of trial and suffering with his own eyes, and convey the support and 
sympathy of Indian people to the Chinese people personally. 
After sending the Indian Medical Mission to China, Mao 
Zedong had thanked the Indian National Congress in his letter of May 
24, 1939, and had expressed pleasure and privilege of receiving the 
mission. He had praised their spirit of sharing hardships with Eighth 
Route Army which Mao said left a profound impression on all who 
came in touch with them.'* Nehru replied to Mao on July 11, 1939. It 
was here in this letter that Nehru expressed his wish to visit China, as 
he wrote, "There is just a possibility of my going to China for a brief 
period at the end of August or in September if the international 
situation permits it. In the event of my going there, I shall look 
forward with great pleasure to meet you and paying my homage to the 
men of the 8* Route Army".^ The purpose of his visit as he had said 
was to forge an alliance between Indian and Chinese nations and 
enable the movements of independence of the Indian and Chinese 
people to establish intimate contacts.^ 
When India became free in 1947, the first Government 
which came forward to establish diplomatic relations with her was the 
Nationalist Government of China. In 1949, however, the Chinese 
Nationalist Government was overthrown by the communist who 
established the Central People's Government. In October 1949, the 
People's Republic proclaimed itself as the only lawful Government of 
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china and expressed a desire to enter into diplomatic relations with 
India. The Government of India accorded de jure recognition to the 
New Government of China on December 30, 1949, and reached an 
agreement with the People's Republic of China for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations. In order to strengthen the cultural relations 
between the two countries a Chinese Cultural Delegation visited India 
during the last quarter of 1951. The Delegation stayed for over six 
weeks in India and visited places of historical, scientific and cultural 
importance.' An Indian cultural Delegation visited China during the 
second quarter of 1952. 
Chinese Communists did not agree with the foreign policy 
of India. According to them a foreign policy which was independent 
of the two blocs was irresolute and this was neither desirable nor 
possible. Before the formal proclamation of their Government their 
press had ver>' often attacked the Indian Government and stated that it 
was the agent of the Imperialists. Replaying to a message of greetings 
from the Indian Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung stated on October 
19, 1949: 
"I firmly believe that relying on the brave 
Communist Party of India and the unity and 
struggle of all Indian patriots, India will 
certainly not remain long under the yoke of 
imperialism and its collaborators. Like free 
China, a free India will one day emerge in 
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the Socialist and People's Democratic 
family; that day will end the imperialist 
reactionary era in the history of mankind".^ 
This statement was made by Mao before he became the 
formal Head of the State. There was no doubt that the attitude of the 
Chinese Communists towards the present Indian Government would 
be fundamentally the same as that outlined in Mao's letter quoted 
above. But this did not prevent the two Governments maintaining 
friendly relations with each other on a diplomatic level. 
The Tibetan Problem : 
A source of friction between the Government of India and 
China was the question of Tibet. Tibet was traditionally ruled by the 
Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama. Early in the 1920's the two lamas 
disagreed on some political issues, including that of the extant of 
British influence in Lhasa. Since 1924 the Panchan Lama had lived in 
China. He intended to come back to Tibet with the communist armies, 
who wanted to 'liberate' Tibet. Also, these circumstances tempted the 
Dalai Lama to make a futile request to the British and American 
Government to receive diplomatic mission from him, perhaps with the 
ultimate aim of asking for military aid against communist pressure. 
The Dalai Lama had been in effect absolute ruler over 
Western Tibet for the past many years. The Panchen Lama, who had 
some influence in Eastern Tibet, was potentially a religious and 
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political rival. From a purely legal standpoint China's Suzerainty over 
Tibet was accepted by other Powers. But in practice Tibet was 
autonomous. In 1904 Lord Curzon, the Governor-General of India 
sent a military mission to Lhasa and forced a treaty on the Tibetan 
government. China ratified the treaty two years later, both Britain and 
China engaging not to annex Tibetan territory. To some extent the 
Republic of India inherited British responsibilities in Tibet, which 
meant accepting Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet on condition that 
China would respect its autonomy. But radical and epoch-making 
changes were taking place in China as a whole, and it would have 
been futile to expect that Tibet would remain unaffected. Her 
fantastically feudal structure of society would have to change in 
relation to the changes in China. 
In July 1949 there was a report of an incident in Tibet, 
which aroused interest in other parts of the world. It was stated that 
the local authorities had expelled the Nationalist Government's 
Mission from the country. The Chinese Communists contended that 
this was done under the instigation of the British and American 
Imperialists and their 'stooge', the Indian Nehru Government with the 
Ultimate purpose of repudiating the Chinese central government's 
authority over Tibet there. An Indian Government representative 
visited Tibet on July 24. Later the government of India declared that 
no revolt had occurred in the country. The incident created 
considerable resentment in Communist China against the Indian 
Government. 
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Almost immediately after the establishment of People's 
Republic of China Beijing announced that it would shortly march into 
Tibet. India protested at once. New Delhi warned the new government 
that military action in Tibet would jeopardize India's efforts to get 
recognition for Mao's government, and its entry into the United 
Nations. Beijing ignored the warning and walked into Tibet, claiming 
it was an integral part of China and entirely a domestic problem. At 
that time, India was willing to accede to China a relationship with 
Tibet akin to India's with Bhutan, but no more. The Chinese 
responded by wondering whether India was preparing to make Tibet a 
second Bhutan an action, incidentally, which would have earned the 
applause of Harry Truman, for it would mean a second front for 
China, with the situation tense in Korea. Nehru believed that this 
region could see the beginning of a third world war and decided to 
handle the issue with the utmost care. 
In the last week of June 1950, conflict broke out in Korea 
with the North Koreans crossing the frontiers then Known as the 38'^ 
parallel. In the Security Council, North Korea was declared the 
aggressor and the United State of America was authorized to enforce 
the sanctions by sending troops on October 2, 1950, Chou-En-lai, in a 
midnight interview with the Indian Ambassador, whilst thanking 
Nehru profusely for all that he had done in the cause of peace, clearly 
indicated that if the Americans crossed the 38"" Parallel, China would 
intervene in Korea. Prime Minister Nehru continued his efforts to 
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bring peace and to nullify the U.N. Resolution authorizing the united 
states to cross the frontiers. 
Thus whilst India and her Ambassador were engaged with 
the problem of Korea and Chou-En-lai was outwardly effusive about 
Pandit Nehru's efforts to advocate China's cause in the United 
Nations and for the establishment of peace, the Chinese quietly 
moved into Tibet to implement their predetermined plan. The Indian 
Ambassador Pannikar knew nothing about it. He has mentioned in his 
book, In Two Chinas, that "by the middle of the month (October, 
1950) rumours of a Chinese invasion of Tibet began to circulate. 
Visits and representations to the Foreign office brought no results. 
The Foreign office officials were polite but silent. Things were 
certainly moving on that side. The only information I was able to ring 
out of them was that certain pacificatory measures were being taken 
in west sikang, that is on the borders of Tibet proper". 
On October 7, 1950, the Chinese launched an attack on 
Eastern Tibet and quickly occupied chamdo and defeated and 
slaughtered or captured most of the Tibetan troops, including 
Governor Ngapo Shape. China did not think it necessary to take India 
into confidence. On October 27, India sent its first protest note to the 
Chinese Government against military measures being taken in Tibet. 
Indian Ambassador Pannikar asked for details and conveyed 'Delhi's 
surprise and regret', adding that this would also make it difficult for 
India to support the Mao Government's admission into the United 
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Nations. China's reply was firm : 'Tibet is an integral part of China. 
The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the 
Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of china'. For good measure, 
China warned India that no foreign interference would be tolerated. 
Whilst the exchange of notes between India and China was 
going on Tibet requested India to sponsor her case in the United 
Nations but was informed that she should send her appeal direct. 
Tibetan National Assembly and cabinet addressed on 7 November 
1950 a complaint to the United Nations seeking the woild body's help 
to preserve her independence tracing the history of Tibet from the 
earliest times and taking its stand on the Simla Convention of 1914, 
where Tibet accepted nominal Chinese Suzerainty conditionally, the 
representation went on to say, "The armed invasion of Tibet for the 
incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical 
force is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are 
compelled by force to become a part of China against their will and 
consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of 
the violation of the weak by the strong". But this effort failed due to 
the converted actions of the major world powers. India also decided 
not to worsen the international situation by condemning China in the 
form of United Nations. El Salvador was the only country which 
wanted the General Assembly to take action against this act of 
unprovoked aggression on November 24, when the General Assembly 
Considered this question, the British delegate argued that, as the legal 
position of Tibet was not clear, it would be better if the matter was 
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allowed to wait till the Assembly had a better idea of the possibilities 
of a peaceful settlement. The Indian delegate said that the Indian 
government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled 
by peaceful means. His reason for this hope was that the Chinese 
forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo. India, 
therefore, supported the United Kingdom's proposal that the question 
should be adjourned. 
But the USSR took a more strong position while supporting 
the adjournment. The Soviet delegate said that the representative of 
El Salvador did not cite any international instrument in support of the 
argument that Tibet was an independent country. He contended that 
Chinese Sovereignty over Tibet had been recognized for a long time 
by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR; and that the 
question was one which came essentially within the national 
jurisdiction of China. He questioned the United Nations right to 
consider Tibet, and that if it did so it would be guilty of unwarranted 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese people. 
Ultimately the Tibetan leaders had to agree to Beijings 
terms, and they signed an agreement (17 points) on May 23, 1951. 
What emerged from the agreement was not the 'legitimate Tibetan 
autonomy within the framework of Chinese Suzerainty, as the 
Government of India wanted, but full fledged Chinese Sovereignty 
over Tibet, with restricted Tibetan rights to autonomy in certain 
limited spheres'. Thus Tibet lost the autonomy which she had enjoyed 
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for centuries and which had developed into an almost independent 
status since 1912. 
After the Tibetan question was closed, in its policy towards 
China the Indian government showed that it appreciated the need to 
recognize the appearance of a common border between India and 
China and did much to build up friendly relations with the Chinese 
People's Republic. One of India's more significant actions in this 
direction was its criticism of the draft "Peace Treaty" with Japan 
prepared by the United States and its refusal to take part in the 
conference convened to discuss the draft treaty in September 1951 in 
San Francisco and to sign the treaty. One of the reasons for the Indian 
Government action was the fact that the treaty failed to stipulate that 
Taiwan was to be returned to the Chinese People's Republic. On the 
question of Taiwan, India while pleading for a peaceful solution, had 
all along supported Chinese claims to the Island. Since India accepted 
the government controlling the mainland of China as the real 
Government of China, she felt that Taiwan should go to New China. 
Tibetan leaders comment on this agreement did not become 
known until after the Revolt^ when the Dalai Lama fled to India and 
said at a press conference that Tibetans were forced to agree under the 
threat of military action and out of desire to save the country from 
total destruction. 
A wide gulf divided the Chinese and the Tibetans, and hopes 
for conciliation and cooperation becoming dimmer everyday and the 
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situation being regarded as dangerous by the Dalai Lama's advisors, 
the Dalai Lama and his Government secretly left the country for 
India. It was after the departure of Dalai Lama from Tibet that a full-
scale rebellion broke out on March 20, 1959, according to the 
information reaching the Government of India. A factual account of 
the rebellion, which continued for weeks, has not yet become 
available. There was no foreign correspondents in Tibet, and the 
stories published in Indian and Western newspapers came from the 
border of Assam or from Hong Kong and were based on treveller's 
tails. 
Repercussions in India of what had been going on in Tibet 
were natural because India had trade and cultural relations with Tibet 
for a long time, because some 12,000 refugees from Tibet had entered 
India, because China's entry into Tibet had given rise to serious 
problems pertaining to the Indo-Tibetan border, and because of 
several other things. On top of this all was the charge, again and again 
repeated by the Chinese, that Kalimpong had been a centre of the 
Tibetan rebel organization, and they urged the Government of India to 
repress the subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibet 
region. The uprising in Tibet was put down by China and the Chinese 
army entrenched itself well across the borders of India. 
At first Nehru was reluctant to discuss the situation as he 
did not want to open himself to charges of interference in China's 
domestic affairs."' But Beijing did not appreciate Nehru's stance. 
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Also the Chinese were annoyed by the criticism levied against Beijing 
by the Dalai Lama after the Tibetan spiritual leader and his entourage 
were given political asylum in India. Left with no other recourse, 
Nehru pointed out that the magnitude of the Tibetan uprising reflected 
a strong feeling of nationalism. He urged that fighting cease and that 
the Chinese respect the earlier autonomy which was promised to the 
Tibetans. He then expressed his hope that China and India should not 
develop feelings of hostility towards each other over the issue. But 
hostility did exist and Sino-Indian relations continued to deteriorate. 
In their first announcement in March of the Tibetan Revolt 
the Russians backed the Chinese contentions, but thereafter the 
Russian press remained silent when the Chinese intensified their 
reproaches against India's alleged role in the upheaval. It can be 
assumed that the Kremlin derived, a modicum of satisfaction from 
China's problems in Tibet, as Khrushchev recalled Beijing's criticism 
of his handling of the Eastern European situation after the debunking 
of Stalin in 1956. Khrushchev reluctance to support China's 
accusations against India reflected the increasing friction in Sino-
Soviet relations, as well as his reluctance to jeopardize his carefully -
nurtured friendship with India. 
Panchsheel Agreement : 
China's occupation of Tibet was in itself an expression of 
Supreme unconcern for Indian sensibilities. Chinese publications 
repeatedly printed maps showing large areas of India as part of China. 
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Only after the Korean truce talks began and Beijing's policies begin 
to shift towards a more conciliatory line. But this shift was not a 
response to India's policy of conciliation toward China. Instead it 
reflected a general shift in her international tactics. China declared in 
1952 that "ccuntries with differing social systems and ways of life 
can co-exist peacefully".*^ 
India welcomed the thaw in China's policy and may for this 
reason have believed the time was propitious to define formally a new 
relationship between the two countries. Negotiations were begun in 
Beijing on December 31, 1953. Although quick agreement was 
expected, the negotiations dragged on for four months. Dr. Krishnalal 
Shridharane, Amrit Bazar Patrika's well informed political analyst, 
speculated that India unable to consider Tibet "an absolute foreign 
country" wanted to maintain its trade agencies even though this right 
exceeded normal diplomatic privileges, while China wanted "to show 
that India cannot inherit the traditions left behind in Tibet by British 
imperialism".'^ 
The negotiations lasted longer than expected. It took four 
months for agreement to be reached. The Eastern Economist of 
Bombay speculated that the signing of the accord was timed by the 
Chinese to coincide with the Colombo conference in Ceylon, while 
The Hindustan Times linked the sudden successful conclusion of 
negotiations with opening of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. 
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The formal title of the Sino-Indian Pact on Tibet is 
Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic 
of China on Trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China 
and India. With this agreement whose preamble included the 
declaration of Panchsheel pledging the two countries to respect the 
territorial integrity, and to refrain from interference in the internal 
affairs of each, India also signed away her right to ask the 
Government of China now or in future for Tibet's autonomy, in which 
she had displayed a great interest in 1950, and which the Chinese 
themselves, under the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, were pledged 
to maintain. 
Parliamentary and Public reaction in India to the new pact 
was nevertheless generally favourable working within the realization 
that free India did not want to continue the same privileges in Tibet 
which the British had exercised, India was satisfied that she would be 
able to maintain her trade and cultural relations with Tibet. The Press 
glorified India's new approach to international affairs. The National 
Herald wrote, "with Tibet having become 'The Tibetan region of 
China' changes became inevitable and since India does not seek extra 
territorial advantages in any country she was willing to regularize 
relationship with Tibet through Beijing".''* Nehru was given credit by 
Amrit Bazar Patrika for "getting a tacit Chinese approval of Mc 
Mohan Line".'^ The General View was that Beijing "with its firm 
control over Tibet" could not be expected to acquiesce in India's 
retention of rights and privileges which had been "rendered obsolete". 
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and that India's "vital trade and cultural interests" had been 
"safeguarded by putting them on a more stable basis.'^ The 
Agreement was supposed to have satisfied "in a very large measure 
the requirements of both the countries".*^ 
The singing of the Sino-Indian Agreement with regard to 
Tibet in 1954 was perhaps, the proper occasion when the question of a 
categorical acceptance by China of the traditional frontiers between 
India and Tibet should have been raised and settled once for all. 
"There has been no reference to maps and disputes about the border", 
wrote the National Herald, and added, "there could have been none". 
The explanation given was : "the frontiers, as Prime Minister Nehru 
had occasion to remind the House of the People a few weeks ago, 
remains fixed and cannot be altered".'* The Agreement on the part of 
China "to respect the territorial integrity of India" under the 
declaration of Panchsheel was regarded as sufficient, the general view 
in India being that the traditional frontiers of India were well known 
and beyond any challenge. Nehru himself was not completely 
oblivious of the importance of good relations with China from the 
point of view of maintaining India's frontiers secure. 
But the most significant development during this period was 
the Soviet endorsement- of Panchsheel. The Soviet Union supported 
Panchsheel from the time of its endorsement by China. The Soviet 
Party newspaper wrote : "There cannot be any doubt that the 
acceptance of these important principles by Asian as well as other 
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countries would diminish the possibility of wars, serve to alleviate 
tension in the world community and improve valuable cooperation 
between the countries"/^ In September 1954, during the visit of the 
Soviet leaders to China, the Soviet Union Officially acknowledged 
her acceptance of the five principles contained in Panchsheel. This 
was exactly when the South East Asian Organization was formed. 
To Nehru, the signing of the Panchsheel meant that India 
and China, "which have now almost above 1800 miles of frontiers, 
should live in terms of peace and friendliness and should respect each 
other's sovereignty and integrity, should agree not to interfere with 
each other in any way and not to commit aggression on each other". 
Since Nehru "time and again" reiterated India's contention that the 
Mc. Mohan line marked her border with China, "where was the need", 
it was asked, "to raise the border line question all over again"? But 
unfortunately it did not work out this way. The Praja Socialist weekly 
newspaper vigil expressed it well at the time when it editorialized, "It 
is rather an irony that a treaty which guarantees between India and 
China peaceful coexistence and mutual respect for each other's 
territorial integrity and sovereignty should be the first international 
document to set a seal on the abolition of Tibet's autonomy".^' 
While addressing the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1954 
Chou En-lai had made a highly significant plea for solidarity. He had 
urged the countries of Asia to "consult among themselves with a view 
to seeking common measures to safeguard peace and security in 
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Asia". Two months later when Chou visited New Delhi from 
Geneva, he discussed with Nehru this same thing, suggesting the 
concept of an "Asian consultative committee" and the extention of a 
"peace area". While Nehru himself had earlier proposed a series of bi-
lateral non-aggression pacts among non-aligned nations he was 
definitely opposed to China's concept of solidarity. The Lucknow 
Pioneer commented on the difference between India's belief in co-
existence and China's broader ambition. Probably reflecting the views 
of the government, the paper wrote : "India subscribe wholeheartedly 
to the demand of 'Asia for the Asians' but she will not tolerate the 
domination of the continent by a single great power in the name of 
unity".^^ 
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute : 
Within three months of the signing of the Sino-Indian 
Agreement on Tibet, on July 1954 Chinese armed forces entered the 
Bara Hoti area in the central sector and claimed that Bara Hoti was 
traditional Chinese territory. The Government of India, however, 
treated the intrusion as an act of misunderstanding on the part of the 
Chinese. While the dispute with regard to Bara Hoti was pending, in 
September 1955 the Chinese soldiers entered Damzan, some ten miles 
South of Niti Pass, recognized as one of the border passes by the 1954 
and 'clearly within Indian territory', and when the attention of the 
Chinese government was drawn to this 'trespass' they coolly asserted 
that it was within the Tibet region of China. Also in 1956, Chinese 
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Patrols willfully crossed three times into India over the Shipki pass in 
the border province of Himachal Pradesh and an armed Party camped 
on Indian territory near Milang in Uttar Pradesh.^ "* In October 1957 
Chinese troops reached Walong in the Lohit Frontier Sector of India's 
Northeast Frontier Agency.^ ^ 
In 1956-57 the Chinese had taken possession of the 
undemarcated, uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.^^ There the 
Chinese built a motorable road linking Sinkiang with Tibet. The road 
had the immediate value of enabling the Chinese to send more troops 
and equipments from Sinnkiang across the Aksai Chin into rebellious 
Tibet. The Government of India expressed its 'surprise and regret' 
that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through 
what was indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the 
permission of the government of India and without even informing the 
government of India. 
Following the publication, in an official Chinese magazine, 
China Pictorial of July 1958 of a map of China showing China's 
historical claims to part of Lodakh and the North East Frontier 
Agency. It was contended that the borders imposed on a weak China 
under duress by Imperial Britain were subject to renegotiations. These 
claims were reiterated in September 1958. Early in 1959 Chou En-lai-
let it be known that his nation would forego its recent claims and 
accept the Mc. Mohan line as the boundary in the eastern sector if 
India would recognize China's claim to the Aksai Chin area. In reality 
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Chou was asking for Indian acceptance of a fait accompli. Nehru 
rejected this precondition for a settlement as unacceptable, and moved 
to step up Indian defenses in the remainder of Ladakh. Several 
Skirmishes took place in mid 1959 between Chinese and Indian 
atrols in the area, and the border conflicts was brought to the 
world's attention. 
The border conflict placed the Soviets in the precarious 
position of choosing between a "fraternal" state with whom relations 
were deteriorating rapidly or a state with whom relations were being 
carefully cultivated. The stakes in this decision were quite high 
confronted by a direct military threat from a communist power, the 
Indian government might have overreacted by swinging sharply to the 
west for military and political support, and perhaps even abandoning 
the policy of non-alignment. Moreover, it had to consider that Indian 
military dependence upon the West might have led to the construction 
of American military bases in the border areas, contiguous not only to 
China but also to the Soviet Union. 
After a clash occurred near Longju in the NEFA in late 
August, a Radio Moscow broadcast and subsequent TASS bulletin on 
September 9 called on the two Governments to resolve their border 
problems : 
"The incident on the Chinese-Indian border is 
certainly deplorable...The Chinese and Soviet 
peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds 
160 
China, India & The Soviet Union: The Emerging Triangle 
of fraternal friendship....friendly cooperation 
between the USSR and India is successfully 
developing in keeping with the idea of 
peaceful coexistence...Its (the dispute's) 
inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of 
peaceful coexistence between states with 
different social systems and to prevent the 
strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity 
in the struggle for consolidation of national 
independence". 
This was the first occasion on which the USSR, had not 
automatically extended full public support to a communist country 
engaged in a conflict with a non-communist state. 
So far as the Chinese were concerned Soviet neutrality 
virtually amounted to Soviet support of the ruling elite, the 
bourgeoisie nationalists of India. The Chinese condemned the soviet 
communique of September 9 as 'tendentious' and maintained that, "It 
revealed our differences to the world".^* The Chinese later revealed 
that this Soviet neutrality was an act of treachery. 
The government of India also saw the significance of the 
Soviet statement. At a press conference in New Delhi on September 
U, Nehru reflected on the meaning of the TASS statement 
"considering everything, the statement was a fair one and an unusual 
one for the Soviet Government to sponsor" .^ ^ Krishna Menon was 
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more precise. It was the first time, he noted, that the USSR has ever 
come out "speaking about peaceful settlement between communist 
and non-communist parties". When probed about the possibility of 
Russian mediation in the dispute, the Indian defence minister replied 
that India and China could settle the matter themselves.^° 
It was hoped in New Delhi that Khrushchev could exert 
some restraint on his Chinese comrades. In October, the Soviet 
premier flew to Beijing shortly after his September meeting in the 
United States with President Eisenhower. He tried to persuade the 
Chinese that improved Soviet-American relations did not imply that 
he was truckling under the imperialists. The CCP leaders, however, 
were not impressed with Khrushchev's explanation of his recent 
conduct. Khrushchev publicly urged the merits of 'peaceful 
coexistence' and warned the Chinese against any attempt to test the 
stability of the imperialist system by force. 
Khrushchev's plea that "disputes should be settled by 
negotiations" evidently did not impress the Chinese shortly after his 
return from Beijing, a border incident occurred in Ladakh in which 
nine policemen were killed. The first reaction in the Soviet press to 
the incident was an article in Pravda on October 29, six days after the 
news was released by New Delhi. The Pravda account printed both the 
Indian and Chinese versions of the incident. All the essential facts 
and contradictions of the two conflicting accounts were included, but 
no commentary was given. Then on October 30, in a major policy 
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speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev made extensive reference 
to the incident. After repeating that the USSR was 'bound by 
unbreakable bonds of friendship' to the Chinese People's Republic 
and also to India, 'with whom we are successfully developing friendly 
relations; he continued : 
"we are especially sorry that these incidents 
have resulted in loss of life to both sides. 
Nothing can make up for the loss of the 
parents and relatives of the victims. We 
would be happy if there were no more 
incidents on the Sino-Indian frontier [and] if 
the existing frontier disputes were settled by 
way of friendly negotiations to the mutual 
satisfaction of both sides''.^' 
A week later Khrushchev called the whole dispute "sad" and 
"stupid". On December 19 a high ranking Soviet diplomat openly 
spoke of his government's "embarrassment" over the border situation. 
"It is more than untimely", he said, "it would be inopportune at any 
time".^^ And on December 22 the Soviet press departed from its 
normal procedure and for the first time published an Indian charge 
against China without waiting for the Chinese rebuttal.^^ 
The reaction within official New Delhi circles was that the 
Soviet attitude was indirectly helpful to India. While the Soviets had 
not expressed any opinion publicly on the merits of the dispute, they 
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had not supported the Chinese. By October's end, Nehru appeared to 
be loosing hope for a "reasonable negotiated settlement" with China. 
He sent a "confidential memorandum" to Indian diplomats abroad, 
preparing them for the eventuality of India using armed forces to push 
the Chinese from occupied territory in Ladakh.^ "* Henceforth in his 
public statements he drew a clear distinction between the conduct of 
the Soviets and the Chinese. On October 21 he told a Calcatta Press 
Conference that Khrushchev was eager and anxious for a East-West 
settlement, "but the same eagerness for peace is not there" in China's 
case. Nehru then asserted : "I consider the USSR first of all as having 
reached normalcy after a revolution. Secondly, I consider the USSR 
as a territorially satisfied power of course, they might have a desire 
for supremacy in economic and other fields. But China has not gotten 
over the first flush of its revolutionary mentality". The USSR, as 
Nehru has pointed on an earlier occasion, adapted itself to changing 
realities. "In other countries where communist parties function 
without that touch of reality and a sense of responsibility they become 
much more rigid".^^ 
On the same theme Nehru told the Lok Sabha in November : 
"There is a marked difference between the broad approach of the 
USSR to world problems and the Chinese approach. I do not think 
there is any country in the world....Which is more anxious for peace 
than the USSR. And I think that is the general view of people-even of 
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their opponents. But I doubt if there is any country in the world which 
cares less for peace than China today". 36 
The USSR was characterized by Nehru as working for a 
peaceful settlement of world problems, while China was characterized 
as caring little for peace and as being opposed to any constructive 
moves by the Soviet in this direction. 
In answer to those in his own Congress party who thought 
that India should make basic changes in its defence policy, Nehru 
cautioned that if India were to enter into an alliance with the western 
powers, Russia would then be forced to support China. Nehru felt that 
the USSR was the only country which could possibly restrain the 
Chinese, but as early as November 5, 1959, he voiced some doubt 
whether China would heed the USSR." 
The Chinese Invasion on India : 
Indo-Soviet friendship was put to test in the face of the 
Chinese hostility culminating in armed aggression in October 1962. 
China attacked India in both sectors, NEFA and Ladakh. Though the 
Chinese later claimed that they had consulted the Soviets regarding 
the aggressive action they were going to take against India, the latter 
denied any foreknowledge of it. Moreover, there was no official 
Soviet comments on the Chinese claim that India had provoked a 
Chinese counter attack. The rapidity with which the Chinese forces 
marched into the Indian territory (so much so that within four days 
they had captured all the land they claimed to be theirs), exploded the 
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myth that India took the first provocative step in launching the war. 
The Soviet leadership also seemed to be unhappy for their inability to 
deter the Chinese from indulging in such a misadventure. 
As soon as Nehru came to know of the explosive situation, 
he immediately got Khrushchev informed of this development. Within 
hours through the Soviet envoy in Delhi Khrushchev's message was 
received in which he expressed his regret over the fighting between 
two friendly nations and called for a ceasefire to be followed by 
negotiations between the two countries. On October 24, the Chinese 
proposed a ceasefire on the condition that the line of actual control on 
that day should be the new border line between the two countries. On 
October 25, editorials of Pravda and Izvestia praised the Chinese 
three - point peace proposal as constructive even after India's 
outright rejection of these proposals and implicitly blamed India for 
holding up the negotiations in Sino-Indian border dispute, and further 
endorsed the Chinese views on the Mc. Mohan line. On October 29, 
the Soviet sponsored world peace council refused to discuss an Indian 
motion on the Chinese aggression on India.^^ In the UN General 
Assembly, the Soviets asked India to accept the Chinese peace 
proposal for ending the border conflict.'**^ 
The Soviets knew that the acceptance of the Chinese 
proposal by India under duress was unthinkable as it would cause Joss 
of face to Nehru. But they had to make the move under the stress of 
serious situation. It may be recalled that on October 24 the American 
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President had declared blockade to the ships carrying war material to 
Cuba. This in itself was a challenge to the Soviet Union which if 
resisted would result in a war between the two Super Powers. To meet 
this crucial situation, the Soviet Union decided to rally the communist 
camp behind it on the Cuban front and there was no question of 
alienating China at this stage by taking an anti-China stand on Sino-
Indian border war. The best way to get an unhesitating support of a 
communist ally was to extend support to it in its policies which even 
though they were not in good taste and were earlier opposed by 
Moscow. 
On his part Nehru not only rejected Russia's call for a 
cease-fire but also imposing preconditions of his own. He asserted 
that the Chinese forces must return to the pre-September 20, 1962 
positions before any negotiations could take place.'" Nehru undoubtly 
was disturbed by the Pravda editorial of October 25, but withheld 
comments. His sentiments were conveyed to Khrushchev several days 
later by several Indian officials, including K.D. Malviya, the minister 
of oil, who had a two hour meeting with the Soviet premier. 
But China like India, was not satisfied with the Soviet stand. 
The Russians, even during the height of Cuban crisis, had not 
supported the charge of aggression made by Beijing against New 
Delhi. The Chinese had given their fullest backing to Khushchev, but 
according to an October 31 editorial in Jenmin Jih Pao, the Soviet 
leader had bowed to the "United States imperialist attempt to 
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browbeat the people of Cuba" and had removed his missiles from 
Cuba. As a final exhortation to the Soviets, the Chinese published a 
statement, "More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-
Indian boundary", which held that Moscow should renounce the 
"reactionary" Indian government and return to the folds of Marxism-
Leninism. 
As if in reply to the blunt Chinese demands, Moscow 
gradually shifted its stance on the border dispute during the first week 
of November. In an important editorial in Pravda on November 5 the 
USSR again called for a negotiated settlement between India and 
China. There was danger that the conflict might, spread, and it was in 
both nations' interest that this should not happen. But in contrast to 
its October 25 editorial, Pravda did not term the supporters of India's 
national effort "Chauvinistic," and in no way endorsed Beijing's 
proposals over those of New Delhi. In a veiled criticism of China, 
Pravda pointed out that the non-democratic forces in India were using 
the present crisis as an excuse to put pressure on the "progressive 
elements" to end the policy of non-alignment. The following day, 
Soviet Deputy Premier Alexei Kosygin called for a cease-fire on a 
reasonable basis and added that "there are no basic contradictions 
between India and China that could not be solved in round-table 
talks".''^ Several days later the position taken by the USSR in the 
November 5 editorial was endorsed by the Premiers of Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, and later by the other Socialist nations. 
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Considering its prevailing alliance with China and its other 
cold war commitments, the Soviet Union was not prepared to say 
openly anything stronger on the issue. India was fully aware that the 
Soviet Union was basically sympathetic to India, and on November 9 
Nehru expressed confidence that the USSR would fulfill its previous 
pledges of assistance, including the first consignment of MIGs 
scheduled for delivery in December. But Soviets tactically delayed 
the delivery of MIGs....The Soviets undoubtly wished to see Sino-
Indian hostilities ended but it was not known to what extent, if any, 
Moscow influenced Beijing's decision to declare unilateral ceasefire 
on November 20. It might be added that the USSR encouraged the 
mediatory efforts of the six nonaligned Afro-Asian states which met 
in Ceylon in December 1962 and put forth the so-called Colombo 
Proposals to resolve the Sino-Indian dispute. 
Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 
Khrushchev referred to the Sino-Indian border Strife.'*'' He welcomed 
the Chinese gesture in declaring unilateral cease-fire but he 
questioned the propriety of this step by asking how could it be called 
a reasonable step when it was taken after so many lives had been lost. 
In his view, it would have been better if the parties had not at all 
resorted to hostilities. Likewise, he questioned the Chinese bonafides 
in withdrawing its troops to the lines on which the conflict began; it 
would have been better if the troops had not at all moved from their 
original points. By implication, he warned China that the Chinese 
action was drawing India away from the path of nonalignment 
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towards the "imperialist camp". In effect Khrushchev disapproved the 
entire policy of China towards India. 
It may sound somewhat odd but it was believed in certain 
quarters that the Sino-Indian war was brought to an end by the 
pressure that the Soviet Union tried to exert on the Chinese 
particularly by their threat to cut off oil supplies to China's air force. 
The Soviet Union was said to have taken this step at the instance of 
India. This seems to be too facile a way to view an international event 
which was going to cause world wide repercussions. Moreover, 
Khrushchev, endowed as he was with a strong common sense, would 
have been the last man to think in terms of a proposal which, he 
knew, the Chinese would immediately spurn. He also knew that the 
Chinese had the resources to buy oil in international market, 
particularly from Romania, their close ally. 
The Chinese attack on India was an essay in the Chinese 
forcing tactics. It forced Moscow into taking a definite stand between 
Chinese comrades and Indian friends, especially when there were 
divided USSR opinion over Soviet conduct in Cuba. But by providing 
military and economic assistance to India, the Soviets made it clear 
that they opposed the Chinese move. 
The Soviet military aid in 1962 was meager compared to the 
massive flow of military assistance provided by the West, but it had 
tremendous political implications in view of the Sino-Soviet mutual 
defence pact of 1956. It enabled India to grasp the much needed 
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Soviet Support when her political neutrality was slipping under the 
impact of the Chinese attack. 
The speed with which the West rushed assistance after the 
border clash, earned tremendous goodwill for those countries among 
Indian leaders. It is important to note that the US welcomed 1962 
Soviet assistance to India. 
At the end of 1962, the total situation stood as follows : 
China more adamant toward Moscow, and belligerent towards India; 
Moscow more eager to edge towards India, and India more amenable 
to the west. 
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Cftapter - 5 
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Co-operation with Soviet Vnion 
* ^ '" 
CHAPTER - 5 
ECONOMIC and DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH 
SOVIET UNION 
The contacts between the people's of India and Russia went 
back before the period of British occupation of India or the 
communist revolution in Russia. These relations, however, were not 
merely cultural but economic too. A Russian writer maintains that 
trade between the Indian and Russians was going on in the 18'*' 
century A.D.' There is now fairly well established evidence to support 
the history of Indo-Russian trade from the l?"" century onwards. The 
famous Russian Czar, Peter 1, took some interest in establishing trade 
relations with Moghal India and accordingly he instructed his Vice-
Admiral, D. Vilster, to go to India with a view to negotiating for 
trade. There were about hundred Indian merchants who were doing 
business in various commodities at Astrahan in the IS"" century. The 
Indian merchants were coming with their goods from Astrahan to 
Navgorad, Moscow, northern Kavkaz and Petersburg Peter III on 
showed special interest in India. On March 22, 1762, he directed that 
the trade with the east and "especially with India" be developed "as it 
is the only way to develop the economy of Russia and improve the lot 
of her people".^ The famous Russian Pundit, M.V. Lamonosov, who 
lived in the middle of the IS'*' century and whose authority on 
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different branches of knowledge made him known as "living 
encyclopaedia", recorded the growing Indo-Russian trade and cultural 
ties in his days."^ 
After the British conquest of India, Indo-Russian trade did 
not stop, but changed its route via London. In the middle of the 19"" 
century Russia was one of the principal importers of Indian cotton. 
She occupied 5"^  place among importers of Indian cotton. In the 
sixties of the 19"^  century, in the Petersburg port alone more than four 
million pods of Indian goods were imported.^ According to some 
Russian economists of those days, every third textile article woven in 
Russia was made of Indian cotton.^ Exhibitions of Indian goods were 
held in Petersburg and Moscow in early 1870, which proved to be a 
grand success. Many Russian newspapers published articles about 
Indian tea, jute and cotton. Towards the close of the 19"' century 
Russia occupied a major place in the foreign trade of British India, in 
the ten years of the last century her place varied from the 1^ ' to the 5"' 
in British India's overall foreign trade.^ 
One of the reasons why Indo-Russian trade increased 
irrespective of the type of regimes existing in both countries was that, 
after the opening of the Suez canal, Russia's Odessa was the nearest 
European port to India and hence the trade was proving economical. 
Compared to the Indo-Russian trade under Tsarist regime, 
the position of the Indo-Soviet trade after the October Revolution 
remained more or less similar. Major Indian commodities that were 
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imported by Soviet Russia from British India during this period were 
jute, tea and cotton. The volume of India's trade with the USSR was 
almost negligible in consideration of the total jute, tea and cotton 
exports of India. For instance, in 1931, raw jute exported to 
communist Russia represented less than 1 per cent and gunny bags 3 
per cent of the total exports of jute from India.^ Prior to the Russian 
Revolution, India had quite a large share in the Russian import of tea. 
According to 1913 figures, 11.1. per cent of the total tea exported 
from India went to Russia, but the percentage heavily fell in 1931-32 
when only 0.7 per cent of India's total tea exports went to the USSR, 
as the Russian preferred Chinese tea to the Indian.^ Principal Soviet 
exports to India during pre-independence period were mineral oils, 
wood and timber, paper and paste board, dyeing and tanning 
substances, chemicals, sugar, etc.^° 
Economic Policy Under Stalin : 
Post-War Soviet economy was stronger and the USSR was 
in search of foreign markets towards the close of the Stalinist era. By 
the beginning of 1952 her foreign trade amounted to 18,000 million 
roubles a year, about three times the pre-war figure.'^ Soviet exports 
and imports in 1938 were around 0.2 and 0.3 billion roubles 
respectively; by the 1950 they had gone upto 1.6 and 1.3 billion 
roubles.*^ But the search for the markets, on the part of the USSR had 
not led it to develop any meaningful trade relations with India under 
Stalin. In accordance with separate pacts made in 1948, 1949 and 
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1951, the Soviet Union agreed to supply wheat in exchange for Indian 
tea, tobacco, jute, etc. During the whole of 1953 Indo-Soviet trade 
amounted to Rs.81 lakhs both ways.'^ In fact, Indo-Russian trade 
relations towards the close of the 19"* century were much better, both 
in terms of quantity and a variety of goods exchanged. During the last 
days of Stalin the Soviet were realizing that the self-imposed isolation 
of the USSR from the newly independent non-communist countries 
was going against to their economic interests. In the report submitted 
to the 19'^ Congress of the Party in 1952, Malenkov stated that one of 
the four-fold objectives of soviet Union's foreign policy was to 
increase trade relations with all countries.''* In the same year India 
was among the 42 countries which participated in the International 
Economic Conference held in Moscow. In his speech at the 
conference, the President of the USSR chamber of commerce 
expressed willingness of the USSR to increase trade relations with 
India and other newly independent countries on mutually 
advantageous terms. He stated that the trade could be balanced in 
terms of imports and exports and could be made in local currencies of 
the countries concerned. As he put it : 
"Soviet foreign trade organizations are 
prepared to establish and develop commercial 
relations with business interests in India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, 
Thailand, Malaya and other South-East Asian 
countries. The mere mention of such a state 
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as India speak of the potential broad 
prospects of expanding trade in this part of 
Asia."'^ 
Thus it becomes clear that despite the failure on the part of 
the USSR to establish any large-scale trade relations with India, a 
desire had become manifest towards the end of the Stalinist era to 
increase economic relations with India on mutually advantageous 
terms. Indian merchants, who attended the International Economic 
Conference in 1952, were able, to some extent, to assess Soviet 
export potentialities and import requirements. During the same 
period, following the Soviet participation in the International 
Industrial exhibition held in Bombay in 1952, the Indian public too 
had a chance to acquaint itself with Soviet goods. On this occasion 
the Russian pavilion turned out to be a major attraction to Indian 
visitors. It exhibited mainly agricultural machines like excavators, 
tractors and industrial products like automobiles, textile machines 
motors, radios, opticals, etc. 
Policy Under Khrushchev : 
A real start in Indo-Soviet economic transactions was 
effected by the new Soviet regime after the death of Stalin. As both 
the Soviet Union and India follow development plans of five or more 
years, to suit the convenience of both parties, five year trade 
agreements were concluded between the two governments in the 
following period. This enabled the Indian government to have in 
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advance a clear view of the quantum of assistance available from the 
Soviet Union for each one of its five year plans. As the Soviet 
planners too estimate their industrial production in terms of five year 
programme, such five year trade transactions prove helpful to them 
too. The First Five Year Trade Agreement was concluded between the 
two governments on 2 December 1953. 
The distinguishing feature of the agreement was that the 
trade between the two countries was to be carried on in Indian rupee 
and the imports and exports of both countries were to balance with 
each other. Thus the traditional handicap of the Indian foreign trade -
that it was to be in a western currency and the Indian imports were to 
exceed her export to the west - were removed. As the Soviet Trade 
Representative in India commented upon it. 
"Owing to such agreements India could, for 
the first time in her history, get a real 
opportunity to develop her trade on a 
balanced basis-a basis on which proceeds 
from the sales of her goods as well as 
repayments of credits are to be fully used 
by the Soviet Union exclusively for the 
purchase of Indian goods. It was also for 
the first time that the Indian rupee was 
recognized as a currency for payment in 
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foreign trade and other transactions with an 
industrial country."'^ 
The prospect of Soviet aid was attractive to India primarily 
because the Soviets were willing to help the expansion of India's 
public sector, particularly in the field of heavy industry. Negotiations 
for Soviet assistance in building an Indian steel plant were begun in 
September 1954. A Russian survey team selected a site and signed 
the agreement for the Bhilai plant in Madhya Pradesh five months 
later. To finance the project the USSR authorized credits worth about 
rupees 64.38 crores for use in India's Second Five Year Plan. It was 
projected that the Bhilai Plant, with its million ton capacity, would 
help to raise India's annual output of steel to six million tons by the 
end of the Second Five Year Plan. 
Bhilai was the first major project undertaken by the Soviets 
in a non-communist nation, and much careful planning went into its 
preparation and construction. The favourable impression made by the 
Soviet technicians and their on the job training of their Indian 
counterparts had been contrasted with the west German and British 
efforts in constructing steel plants at Rourkela and Durgapur for the 
Indian public sector. In conjunction with the Bhilai project, over 800 
Indian engineers and skilled workers gained productions experience 
in Soviet factories. 
The Russians did an excellent job at Bhilai; the plant, 
though started later than the one at Rourkela, reached its full 
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production capacity before any other steel plant in the public sector. 
The distinguishing feature of Bhilai is best stated in the words of Earl 
C. Smith, Chief Metallurgist and Director of Research of the Republic 
Steel corporation of the USA, in whose opinion Bhilai is "better 
designed for continous production than anything that I have seen 
either in the USA or in Russia proper".^' 
Other Soviet assistance for India authorized during the 
Second Five Year Plan included credits for structural steel to be used 
in the construction of several large industrial plants. A Russian 
Survey in February 1957 recommended that a plant be built in Ranchi 
to produce eventually about three-fourths of India's needs for new 
steel plant machinery. The Ranchi plant was to produce 80,000 tons 
of machinery for steel industry. On reaching the designed capacity 
this plant was to produce metallurgical equipment sufficient to build 
steel plant with a capacity of one million tons per year, i.e. equal to 
the Bhilai plant before its expansion. It had an expansion capacity for 
165,000 tons a year. The coal mining machinery plant at Durgapur 
had an annual production capacity of 45,000 tons of various 
machinery and equipment, including coal-cutters and loaders, 
conveyors, electric locomotives, fans, pumps, winches, etc. The 
products of this plant would enable the full mechanization of mines to 
the capacity of 8 million tons per year. 
Negotiations for the Soviet contribution to India's Third 
Five Year Plan began late in 1958. In May 1959 the Indian minister of 
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steel, mines, and fuel headed an eighteen member delegation to the 
USSR. The group reviewed the progress of projects already 
undertaken in collaboration with the USSR and discussed potential 
projects for India's Third Five Year Plan.'^ In September 1959 the 
USSR announced that it would contribute credits worth rupees 180 
crores for the plan. The agreement in February 1960 called for : 
1. Expansion of the Bhilai Works capacity to 2.5 million tons of 
steel per year; 
2. Expansion of the Ranchi heavy machinery plant in Bihar to 
80,000 tons output per year; 
3. Completion of the oil refinery at Barauni, Bihar-Capacity 
planned for 2.6 million gallons of crude oil per year; 
4. Manufacture of heavy electrical equipment and precision 
instruments; 
5. Exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in 
Cambay and other areas. 
6. Expansion of mining equipment plants; 
7. Expansion of the capacity of the Neyveli and Korba Power 
Plants.'^ 
Significantly the Soviets announced their contribution to 
India's Third Five Year Plan in September 1959, the very month when 
the world learned for the first time of the Sino-Indian dispute. In 
August 1960 New Delhi revealed that the USSR had offered an 
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additional rupees 60 crores for use by the Third Five Year Plan. 
Coming shortly after the Bucharest Conference of June 1960, this 
additional Soviet aid to India had important political significance. 
Among other issues at Bucharest, Premier Khrushchev and Marshal 
Peng had clashed sharply on the respective policies of the USSR and 
China towards India. The USSR answered the Chinese charge that 
their aid was being used to bolster up the "reactionary" Nehru 
government by further increasing its developmental aid to India. On 
February 20, 1961, the Soviet deputy premier, A.N. Kosygin, arrived 
in Delhi for talks with the Planning Commission on utilization of the 
aid, and the following day Six projects, to be financed by the rupees 
60 crore pledge, were announced. The projects included : 
1. A hydroelectric plant on the bank of the Bhakra with a planned 
capacity of 480,000 kilowatts; 
2. an oil refinery in Gujrat; 
3. a washery for coking coal at Kathara in Bihar - capacity three 
million tons per year; 
4. a refractories plant near Bhilai to produce annually 125,000 
tons of magnesite and fire clay; 
5. oil exploration in Cambay; 
6. production of pumps and compressors. 
The total Soviet Commitment to the Third Five Year Plan 
was increased to rupees 240 crores (about $500 million US) by the 
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additional credits authorized in February 1961. In addition, several 
eastern European allies of the USSR were encouraged to give 
assistance to the Plan (Czechoslovakia pledged rupees 23.10 crores 
and Poland 14.3 crores by January 1961). 
Detailed pJans for the Barauni project were discussed during 
the Kosygin visit to India in February 1961. K.D. Malaviya, who in 
June 1960 had conducted talks with the Soviets on the import and 
refining of oil by the Indian government, returned to Moscow in 
October 1962. At the height of the Sino-Indian crisis he conveyed 
Nehru's views on the possible consequences that the military setback 
might have on India's policy of nonalignment. At that time the 
Russians promised to speed up aid to India's coal and oil industries.^° 
The Soviets themselves gave considerable publicity to the 
construction of the refinery at Barauni. An editorial in Pravda in 
January 1963, for example, stressed that "with assistance of the 
Soviet specialists, Indian technicians and engineers are mastering the 
most modern means of construction. Many of these methods are being 
adopted for the first time in India".^' The Soviet aid to India 
constituted almost a third of an estimated total of $3.56 billion in 
Soviet credits and grants extended to the less developed non-
communist countries between January 1, 1954, and June 30, 1962. 
During this period the bulk of the credits were given in 1955 ($116 
million) to cover the exchange costs of the Bhilai plant; in 1956 ($126 
million) for the purchase of steel products; and in 1959 ($375 million) 
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and in I960 ($125 million) for those projects listed in this chapter. 
Almost all of the Soviet aid is in the form of credits, repayable in 
goods at two and a half per cent interest over twelve years with a two 
year grace period. The Indian government had been repaying the 
Soviet bloc credits almost as per schedule. With the exception of 
several small grants valued at about $6 million (For the Suratgarh 
model farm in Northern Rajasthan, equipment for the Bombay 
Institute of Technology, and personal airplanes for Nehru and Krishna 
Menon), the Soviet assistance during Nehru's era was almost entirely 
in the form of repayable credits, in contrast to the substantial 
proportion of grants contained in America's contribution to Indian 
development. 
Late in 1963 it was announced that the USSR's assistance 
for India's Fourth Five Year Plan would equal the $500 million 
pledged to the Third Five Year Plan. As before, the emphasis would 
be towards helping to strengthen the basic industries in the public 
sector. The major Soviet project during the Fourth Five Year Plan 
will be the Bokaro Steel Plant, which when completed will be India's 
fourth public sector steel plant. Amid much publicity the Soviets 
agreed on May 1, 1964, to finance the construction at Bokaro, an 
undertaking which the United States had considered for some time but 
declined. The USSR then decided to subsidize the 1.5 million ton first 
stage of the plant, which would later be expanded to a four million 
ton annual capacity. On February 19, 1965, the minister of steel, 
Sanjiva Reddy, told the Lok Sabha that the Russians had thus far 
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extended rupees 1,005 million ($211 million) for the first stage of the 
plant. He predicted that Bokaro would begin its production in 1970. 
The heavy engineering plant at Ranchi was expected to supply 40 
percent of the needed machinery for Bokaro. 
The first decade of Soviet aid to India ended in February 
1965. During that period the USSR had authorized an estimated 4,842 
million rupees ($1,017 million U.S.) in loans for various 
developmental projects in India.^^ 
Mutually Advantageous Trade : 
The Soviet Union's foreign trade with the developing 
countries is normally balanced throughout all these years, and 
therefore, gives opportunities to her trading partners to increase their 
exports in proportion to the imports from the Soviet Union. Because 
of its rapidly expanding economy with an annual growth rate of 
around 7-8 per cent, and with its helpful trade policy, the Soviet 
Government offered unprecedented opportunities to developing 
countries like India to increase their exports. In 1938, foreign trade of 
the Soviet Union was around 0.2 billion roubles; soon after the war in 
1946 it went up to 0.6 billion roubles and in the following 17 years it 
increased 12 times till the end of 1963." In 1963 her trade with East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia alone exceeded her trade with the rest 
of the non-communist world. 
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In the non-communist developing countries, India topped 
the list of trading partners of the USSR in 1963; next came the U.A.R. 
and the Mali federation. Soviet trade with India increased from 162.8 
million roubles in 1958 to 285 million roubles in 1963.^'' As a matter 
of policy Indo-Soviet trade was doubled every five years between 
1953 and 1963 and in the trade agreement concluded in 1963 it was 
again agreed to double the trade turn over from 1,000 million rupees 
in 1963 to 2,100 million rupees in 1966." 
Indo-Soviet trade continued to increase in volume, and the 
1955 agreement had to be replaced by another five-year pact in 
November 1958.^^ The greatest increase were in 1955-56, when 
Indian imports rose from $5.2 million to $26.2 million and exports 
increased from $6.4 million to $31.3 million over the one-year span. 
In 1958 India's-imports from the USSR, valued at $45.6 million, 
constituted approximately 1.8 per cent of its total imports. Exports to 
the USSR in 1958 totaled about $49 million, or 4.2 per cent of India's 
overall exports. The percentage increase in Indo-Soviet trade from 
1953-59 was very impressive. Russian statisticians almost always 
pointed to these percentages representing a "fifteen fold increase" 
from 1951-1959 rather than to the actual total volume of the trade. In 
fact only slightly more than one per cent of the USSR's total world 
trade in 1959 was conducted with India, but this did not negate the 
political advantages which accrued from the trade combined with the 
programme of economic and technological assistance, changing trade 
patterns provide an effective indicator of the direction of Soviet 
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policy.^^ Increased commerce helped to normalize and later to solidify 
a cooperative relationship with India. 
In the 1960's India became the USSR's most important 
trading partner among the developing nations while India's main 
trading partners in the early 1960's were still the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Japan, the percentage of India's trade with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries 
continued to increase. By 1963-64 the USSR ranked fourth behind 
these nations in total trade with India, and in 1965-66 the Soviets 
displaced Japan as the third ranked.^* An Indo-Soviet agreement, 
signed in Moscow on June 10, 1963, had called for an average annual 
increase during 1964-68 double that of the 1962 volume of trade. 
In 1966 the estimated total trade between the two countries 
was rupees 198 crores ($416.8 million), and in 1967, rupees 280 
crores ($373.3 million after devaluation at the new exchange rate of $ 
1= 7.5 Indian rupees).^^ The projected total trade for 1968 was rupees 
300 crores ($400 million). 
The most important Indian exports have been jute and tea, 
which together accounted for 35 per cent of India's total exports in 
1964-65 and for 27.5 per cent of India's exports to the communist 
nations. During the same year, coffee, cashews, tobacco and iron ore 
each accounted for from 5 to 6 per cent of Indian exports. On the 
other hand, machinery (excluding electric) comprised fifty four 
percent of the value of Indian imports from the communist nations in 
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1964-65, followed by base metals (15.2 per cent) and electrical 
machinery and appliances. These and previous Soviet goods were 
important in providing an infrastructure for public-sector industrial 
•J A 
development in India's Second and Third Five Year Plans. 
During the 1950s India's percentage of the world's total 
trade decreased, as she was hard pressed even to maintain her 1948 
level of exports.^' The Indian government was seriously concerned 
over the yearly decline in its sterling balance. Thus India welcomed 
the trade agreements with the USSR and Eastern Europe which called 
for a parity in the value of the products exported and imported. Trade 
with the USSR and other communist nations was expected to help 
case the strain on New Delhi's balance of payments difficulties and to 
help create long-term stability and growth for exports. 
The manner in which the USSR's aid policy was 
implemented during this period proved to be of great help to the 
planners in India unlike the US Government, which requires annual 
Congressional sanction for its foreign aid programme, the Soviet 
Government has followed a policy of sanctioning aids quite in 
advance to help the Indian planners to work out future programmes in 
their development plans. This helpful Soviet attitude has considerably 
eased difficulties of planning in India. Thus, for instance, loans 
amounting in the aggregate to Rs.2,803 million authorized by the 
USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia during the second plan period 
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were for projects not included in that plan but figuring in the Third 
Plan Programme."^ 
Limitations : 
Even though Indo-Soviet economic relations had thus 
developed to the advantage of both countries, and especially to 
India's advantage, the growth suffered from certain limitations. The 
phenomenal growth of Indian imports of Soviet machinery was due to 
the needs of India's development plans. There appears to be a sectoral 
imbalance in Indo-Soviet trade. In exporting her machinery to India, 
the Soviet trading organizations supply the needs of India's public 
sector economy, but in importing Indian goods the Soviet trading 
organizations depended upon the Indian suppliers in the private 
sector. That is to say, the Indian Government purchased Soviet 
machinery for use in the industries directly run by her, but it is not in 
a position to supply the various agricultural and consumer goods 
required by the Soviet market and therefore depended upon the 
supplies from private traders in India. In these circumstances, unless 
the Indian private sector is directly brought in trading relations with 
the Soviet market, both in terms of exports and imports; it is unlikely 
that the growth of Indo-Soviet economic transactions would keep up 
the existing pace, once India reached the self-reliant stage in her 
economy. At such a stage India's public sector demands from Soviet 
market are likely to shrink; unless the private sector compensated the 
probable shrinkage in public sector demands, the soviet trading 
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organizations may find their Indian market not so attractive from the 
point of view of exporting their own goods. 
Apparently, due to such limitations, Indo-Soviet trade had 
neither kept the pace of growth of Soviet foreign trade during this 
period, nor in fact disturbed the past pattern of India's foreign trade. 
The Soviet Union's global exports shot up from an estimated 4,298 
million dollars in 1958 to 7,272 million dollars in 1963, but India's 
share during this period fell from over 3 percent to 1.6 percent. 
Similarly global imports in the Soviet Union soared from an estimated 
4,350 million dollars to 7,059 million dollars during these years; but 
India's share languished at 1 percent in 1958 and 1.4 percent in 
1963.^'* From the Indian side too, even though the Soviet Union came 
up to the third place in India's foreign trade partners by 1963, the 
position of India's major western trade partners remained unaffected, 
as the gap between the leading western trade partners and Russia had 
been too much. For example, India's sales to the Soviet Union in 
1963 formed about 6 percent of India's total exports, but the sales to 
Britain formed 22 percent and to the United States 16 percent.^^ 
Besides the relative inferiority in quality of Soviet goods 
compared to the goods from the western countries, which by itself 
might affect adversely Indian demands at a later stage when trade by 
aid would diminish or vanish, efforts to increase bilateral trade during 
this period also seemed to have suffered from, what one observer 
called, "Sporadic efforts" on both sides. Of the six aid agreements, 
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five came between February 1955 and September 1959. Only one new 
aid agreement was signed in the following five years.^^ Another factor 
which seemed to have created some misunderstanding is the 
unfortunate tendency in certain quarters in New Delhi to "treat the 
Soviet Union as the rescuer of last resort". The impression seemed to 
have existed that India during this period approached the Soviet 
Union only when her western partners rebuffed her. In case of 
Bokaro, for example, the Soviet Union was sounded for about two 
years, but there was no follow-up as some people in New Delhi 
wanted the US Government to make up its mind. A formal approach 
was made to the USSR at a later date only when the Americans 
37 
rejected such a plant in India's public sector. 
The more important determinant of foreign trade of major 
powers in the post-war period, including the foreign trade of the 
United States of America and that of the Soviet Union, was the 
political considerations involved in aiding or trading with the country 
concerned. As the Indian economic commentator put it : 
"What we get by way of trade is largely 
determined by our own evaluation of Soviet 
association, by our trading preferences, by 
the speed with which aid is utilized and 
trade expanded, and, above all, by our 
willingness to base some of our plans on 
the use of Soviet equipment and 
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technology. At the Soviet end the limits are 
set by Soviet resources, but more 
particularly by the value attached to the 
Indian links. The problems involved here 
are, therefore, not merely of economic 
significance, but they also concern 
respective attitudes, evaluation, preferences 
and policies".^^ 
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's overall policy 
towards India, including its economic policy, was motivated by the 
considerations of strengthening India's independence from the west 
and her utility against China. It is in this context that the policy of 
non-alignment received support in Moscow, as it was serving its ends 
too. As the Soviet Union's economic aid programme to India had 
lessened India's economic dependence upon the west and thus made 
her non-alignment policy more meaningful, the lack of importance 
attached to non-alignment itself or to India in the Kremlin's foreign 
policy considerations, or the development of strained relationship 
between the two countries, might take away the aid that came from 
Moscow to New Delhi and diminish the pace of growth of their trade 
too. 
Soviet Military Assistance to India : 
There is still another important aspect of the friendly Indo-
Soviet relations which had a direct bearing on our country's defence 
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and security. India, four years after independence, was forced by 
historical circumstances to lean on industrialized nations of the west 
for the purchase of arms, including sophisticated weapons. But the 
western powers and the USA in supplying highly strategic weapons to 
India formulated its policy by what it called "balance of power in the 
region". This is confirmed by the fact that during the Chinese 
aggression on India in 1962 and thereafter up to 1965 - when the 
USA placed an arms embargo - the total US military assistance 
received by India constituted only a negligible percent of the defence 
budget of any year. On the other hand, Pakistan which had joined the 
CENTO and SEATO, in the first year of its military partnership with 
the USA, received from Washington 30 B-57 bombers, 20 F-104 star 
fighters, 120 F-86 sabre-jets and a large number of C-130 giant 
transport aircraft and other types of military hardware. 
By 1959, indications started coming to New Delhi that 
China was likely to create problems on the Indo-China border. 
Though it was a period of euphoria of "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai", 
India's defence experts had started paying attention to the 
strengthening of the country's defences on the border. It was in this 
situation that India made an approach to Washington for the supply of 
C-130 transport planes and helicopters to enable its men and material 
to be carried to high altitude areas. The USA summarily turned down 
this request. 
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Seen in this context, the Soviet Union's decision to help 
India in building industries in the public sector, particularly in the 
field of precision instruments, oil, aircraft, etc. had a direct bearing 
on India's defence preparedness. In 1955 military attaches were first 
exchanged by India and the USSR and assigned to their respective 
embassies in New Delhi and Moscow. As early as May 1957 Nehru 
mentioned that "there is nothing to prevent India from purchasing 
Soviet aircraft or any other type of machine" from the USSR if it 
desired to do so. He denied that the Soviets as yet had made an offer 
to supply aircraft or that India had requested to purchase aircraft from 
the USSR. 
"what has happened and what normally 
happens is that our Defense Ministry keeps 
in touch with developments in various 
countries; whether it is the USA, Great 
Britain the USSR or any other 
country It is true that apart from 
defense the Soviet leaders...(have) said, 
generally speaking, that they would like to 
cooperate with us and help us wherever 
they could".^^ 
After both India's and the USSR's relations with China 
worsened, the Soviets offered to supply certain kinds of aircraft to the 
Indian Defence Ministry. An Indian delegation went to Moscow in 
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October 1960 to negotiate the purchase of Russian transport planes, 
helicopters, and heavy road making equipment. 
In March 1961 it was announced that India had purchased 
from the USSR eight AN-12 transports for use in the Ladakh area/° 
Forty Russian pilots, navigators, and mechanics came to India to 
instruct Indians in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. 
Some concern was evinced by opposition members in Parliament that 
the Soviet airmen were permitted to go into strategic areas on their 
training missions. In answer to a question put to him by Dr. Kunzru in 
the Rajya Sabha on March 31, Nehru replied that "adequate 
precaution has been taken to see that no secret information could leak 
out". In 1964 it was estimated that thirty AN-12 transport planes had 
thus far been purchased from the USSR and that an unknown number 
of MI - 14 helicopters had also been purchased, more than twenty of 
which had been delivered by May of that year.'*' 
The Indian procurement of Soviet MIGs has been a 
controversial and rumor-fraught issue. From 1959 on, the Defence 
Ministry, headed by Krishna Menon, sought to increase the strength 
of the Indian armed forces and to move in the direction of military 
self sufficiency. One key priority was the obtaining of aircraft equal 
in capability to the F-104s supplied by the United States to Pakistan. 
In 1962 negotiations were carried on with both Britain and the USSR 
for the purchase of supersonic aircraft and for help in building aircraft 
factories in India.'*^ Nehru on June 23 told the Lok Sabha that the 
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United States was attempting to block India from getting the 
MIGs. Several weeks later the Indian government signed an 
agreement under which the Russians would assist India in 
manufacturing a modified MIG engine for the Indian built HF-24. In 
October it was announced that the Soviets would supply two 
squadrons of MIG-21s to match Pakistan's F-104s and would later 
build several factories in India for the manufacture of MIGs and 
ancillary equipment. The soviet decision to supply the aircraft to 
India became another of the numerous grievances the Chinese were 
accumulating against India and the USSR. After prolonged 
speculation on whether or not the MIGs would be delivered, a 
consignment of four fighters arrived in Bombay in February 1963. In 
all, perhaps another eight partially equipped MIGs were received by 
India in the year that followed. Factory sites were selected by April in 
Maharashtra and Orissa for the manufacture of the MIG airframes and 
engines. Six months later, plans were revealed for a factory in 
Hyderabad which would produce air to air missiles and radar 
equipment for the aircraft. 
For some time it was unclear whether the Soviets actually 
were going ahead with the MIG factories as scheduled. In an article in 
the Washington Post on December 17, 1963, Selig Harrison noted that 
one reason for the USSR's vacillation was that the cost estimates for 
the project rose from the original "$143 million at its inception in 
August, 1962, to a current working figure of $336 million". He also 
indicated that there were important differences of opinion in Indian 
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official circles over the MIG question. American Supersonic planes 
would have been preferred - at least in 1962-63 by the Indian air 
force and Finance Ministry. The air force in particular was concerned 
that a long term commitment to the MIG programme might enable the 
USSR to wield undue influence over its activities. Concern was 
expressed lest the Soviets supply only the blueprints for the factories, 
rather than assume total responsibility until the plants are completed. 
Early in February 1964, the Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, 
declared with certainty that the projects were going according to 
schedule. Addressing pressmen at Nagpur, Chavan said that it was 
only "wishful rumour" by some who did not want the project to 
materialize. Then he announced that the first group of Soviet experts 
would arrive shortly to commence work.'*^ 
In August 1963 an Indian military mission was sent to 
Moscow to procure equipment, including missiles, to be used for 
India's defences against China.'*'* In May 1964 it was reported that a 
missile programme for India, estimated to cost "slightly more than 
$40 million", had been worked out and that fifty ground to air 
missiles had already been delivered. The cost included radar 
equipment and fixed and mobile installations. By mid 1964 India had 
also received from the USSR air-to-air missiles, samples of infantry 
support weapons, and army engineering equipment.'*^ 
An authority on the Indian defence programme characterized 
India's post-1962 military planning as based upon four major 
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assumptions : "the people's Republic of China posed the major threat 
to Indian security; a Pakistani threat could materialize at any time; 
Sino-Pakistan collusion against India was conceivable; and India 
required a credible military sanction for her diplomacy"/^ In this 
context Soviet military aid assumed great importance to India after 
the suspension of shipments of American and British military 
equipment to India and Pakistan during the fighting in September 
1965. Since 1945 the flow of Soviet military wares to India has 
increased considerably. It was reported in May 1968 that the USSR 
was in the process of sending India about one hundred SU-7 fighter 
bombers. The aircraft were designed for close air support and would 
complement the MIG high altitude fighters. During his January 1968 
visit to New Delhi, Premier Kosygin attended India's Republic Day 
celebration and witnessed a flyover of Soviet supplied MIGs and 
transports and the first Russian built surface-to-air missiles shown 
publicly in India. Surface-to-air missiles have been deployed at least 
since 1965 for the defence of a number of major Indian cities.'*' 
Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations : 
The cultural contacts between India, and Russia went back 
hundreds of years ago. Recent excavations and researches have 
brought to light links from Buddhist times to medieval ages and later. 
Russian literature and outstanding writers like Tolstoy, Gorky, 
Chekhov, Turgenev, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Gogol and many others 
have always been popular in India. The new cultural resurgence 
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which took place after the October Revolution, the poems of 
Mayakovsky, the novels of Sholokhov, the films of Eisenstein, stirred 
the imagination of the Indian people. Translations of Russian literary 
masterpieces began to appear in Indian languages. 
With the establishment of diplomatic relations, the cultural 
exchange between the two countries grew apace. Delegations from the 
USSR to India and from India to USSR became a normal feature. 
Translations of Indian classics and modern writings were undertaken 
in the Soviet Union and a corresponding effort was made in India. 
Soviet films in India and Indian films in the USSR were shown 
widely and appreciated by large audiences. The works of Tagore and 
Nehru, of Premchand and other luminaries were made vailable to 
Soviet readers. Music and song and dance forged warmer and warmer 
bonds between the two countries. 
The activities of the Indo-Soviet cultural society, formed on 
March 14, 1952, and of the society for Soviet Indian cultural 
Relations, established on January 24, 1958, have contributed a great 
deal in stimulating interest in each other's culture. 
Soon after independence in October 1947, S.M. Nanavali, a 
Bombay businessman, visited the USSR in a trade delegation. He was 
greatly impressed by all aspects of Soviet life, and the phenomenal 
recovery the country had made so soon after the ravages of World 
War 11. At a meeting organized by the Friends of the Soviet Union in 
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Bombay on April 3, 1948 he spoke of the cultural activities in the 
USSR : 
"their theatres and operas are much better 
than those of the British and the Americans. 
They have great love for their artistes. The 
state looks after them while the people 
simply worship them. Their folk dances are 
very, very beautiful and they have 
wonderful festivals".''^ 
In September 1950, Soviet film festivals were organized in 
Bombay and Calcatta. These were followed at the end of December 
by a delegation of film artistes, including Nikolai Cherkassov, 
People's Artist of the USSR, and V.I. Pudovkin, the famous film 
director, which came to India. They toured many cities and met 
people from all walks of life. They acquainted themselves with the 
achievements of Indian art, theatre, film and drama and were greatly 
impressed by the artistic sensibility of the Indians. 
In the summer of 1953, a troupe of Indian dancers, singers 
and musicians visited the Soviet Union. 
In August of the same year, India sent an exhibition of 
Indian art consisting of reproductions of Ajanta and Ellora, Moghul 
and Rajput miniatures, and several specimens of modern Indian 
painting. 
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On January 15, 1954, a 31-member troupe of Soviet 
musicians and dancers including Maya Plisetskaya, the famous 
ballerina, arrived in Bombay. It was headed by the USSR Deputy 
Minister of Culture N. Bespalov. 
Cultural contacts embraced other fields also. A delegation 
headed by Academician G.F. Alexandrov of the USSR Academy of 
sciences arrived in India to attend the 41*' session of the Indian 
Science Congress, held in Hyderabad from January 2 to 7, 1954. 
Nehru gave a luncheon in honour of Academician Alaxendrov and 
A.V. Engelgardt. On January 31, this delegation presented to Nehru a 
collection of books in Russian which included translations of Indian 
epics - the Mahabharata and the Ramayan. 
In December 1954, AH Sardar Jafri and Khwaja Ahmad 
Abbas went to Moscow to attend the Soviet writer's Congress. In the 
same month N. K. Singh's The History of India was issued in 
Moscow in Russian. 
The year 1956 started with the inauguration of the Indian 
Children's Art Exhibition in Moscow, and with the visit of a cultural 
delegation from Uzbekistan to New Delhi. 
In September 1956- an Indian delegation of educationists 
visited the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Ambassador received from 
Nehru 11 prizes won by the Soviet Children in the Shankar's weekly 
Painting Competition. On October 29, 1956, Nehru after inaugurating 
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the "Public Education in the USSR" exhibition in Delhi noted in the 
visitor's book : "After seeing it new ideas came to my mind and the 
hope arose that in our country also education will develop rapidly and 
our children will also get full opportunity to learn and do big things". 
The growing Soviet interest in Indian culture was also 
evidenced at the Indian Film Festival held in Udarnik Cinema in 
Moscow in October of the same year. 
In December, the Soviet circus performed in Bombay, 
Madras, Calcatta and Delhi and "as a mark of soviet friendship with 
India" the amount fetched from shows was donated to Nehru's 
National Relief Fund. 
An important event was the adaptation on stage of the 
Ramayana by Natalia Guseva. It was presented by the Central 
Children's Theatre of Moscow in 1961. Mrs. K.P.S. Menon helped in 
the production of this play. It has continued to draw packed halls 
whenever it has been staged. 
An agreement was signed on October 17 1965, for 
establishing the Institute of Russian Studies in India. It was an 
important landmark in the growing cultural cooperation between the 
two countries. 
In February 1969 the death centenary of the great Urdu poet 
Mirza Ghalib was widely celebrated in the Soviet Union, where works 
of and commentaries on Ghalib were published in Russian and other 
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languages of the USSR. Several jubilee sessions, dedicated to 
Ghalib's memory were held in different parts of the Soviet Union. A 
delegation of Soviet academicians, headed by Babajan Gafurov, came 
to India to take part in the celebrations here, 
India has been existing as an independent state for more 
than five decades. During all these years friendly relations developed 
successfully, facilitating the advance of world culture and universal 
progress. This factor is of enormous international importance. 
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CONCLUSION 
A study of Nehru's policies and attitudes towards the USSR 
is both a crucial and meaningful study of India's foreign policy. 
Nehru's desire to establish friendly and tactical relations with the 
Soviet Union was an important event in international affairs as it was 
the first effective expression of the policy of non-alignment as 
enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru. His foreign policy made him stand 
out as a great leader of the world, as a champion of the cause of 
international brotherhood and world peace. It was a new and fresh 
approach in a world divided into two power blocs. Nehru refused to 
take sides in the historical quarrels of the two super powers and 
started promoting international understanding and peace through 
dialogue and discussion. It was in this spirit that Nehru extended his 
hand of friendship to the Soviet Union. 
His visit to Europe in 1927 and participation in the Brussels 
Congress against imperialism marked a turning point in his life and 
thought. Contact with nationalist leaders from different parts of the 
world and revolutionaries of Europe, who were fighting against 
imperialism gave him not only better insight into the nature of 
imperialism but also a world-wide picture of the forces which were 
ranged against it. He at once realized that the fight against 
imperialism was not to be construed in a narrow nationalist spirit but 
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in a wider framework. While all these heightened his anti-imperialist 
feelings, he also became convinced that it was necessary to work in 
close cooperation with the different forces which were ranged against 
imperialism. Among these forces, he considered Soviet Union as the 
foremost. His admiration for what the Soviets had done to bring about 
a new order began to unfold itself at this time. 
It was in this mood of admiration for the Soviet Union and 
his keen interest in socialism that Nehru visited Moscow in 1927. He 
was deeply impressed by the social and economic achievements of 
Soviet Union and he saw their relevance to India's own future 
development. He was already deeply impressed by the foreign policy 
course pursued by the new Soviet State, particularly its declarations 
on self-determination for peoples, including the subject nations. 
The study of India's relations with the USSR reveals that 
despite wide differences in outlook and policy great advance towards 
mutual understanding and cooperation was made. In spite of the 
earlier Soviet indifference and basic differences in Socio-political 
systems of the two countries, mutual relations improved markedly 
from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which demanded India 
to move closer to the USSR. Among many underlying factors, geo-
political considerations are of considerable importance. Secondly, 
there was the practical consideration of the Soviet economic aid. 
Thirdly, to secure political and diplomatic support on Kashmir issue. 
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The most important factor was the identity of views of both the 
countries on imperialism, colonialism and racialism. 
However, it was the US military pact with Pakistan which 
transformed the entire context of Indo-Soviet relations and greatly 
affected India's policy. To Nehru, the military alliances were opposed 
to non-aligned India's view that military blocs were a step towards 
war rather than peace. He was also convinced that the inclusion of 
Pakistan into military alliances would threaten to introduce a system 
of military blocs into India's immediate neighbourhood, thereby 
transforming the subcontinent into a theatre of cold war and at the 
same time would strengthen the latter not against the USSR but 
against India with which many important and explosive problems still 
remained unresolved. In short, military pacts had given India a sense 
of encirclement. The US military presence in the subcontinent and 
massive flow of American arms into Pakistan had a tremendous 
impact on India's policy makers. As a result India began to move 
closer to the USSR. The indication of this trend was Nehru's 
acceptance of Soviet invitation to visit Moscow. It was largely around 
Nehru's perspective of the world, his initiatives and preferences that 
India's relations with the USSR developed. The image of Soviet 
Union in his mind was that of anti-imperialist nation trying to build a 
new socialist order. He attached highest priority to India's relations 
with the USSR. Nehru's policies on the international issues involving 
the subcontinent were dominated primarily by domestic conditions 
and pressures. And on these matters Soviet support for the Indian 
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positions on Kashmir and Goa were of crucial importance. Besides, 
the USSR respected and encouraged India's desire to remain non-
aligned and helped to enhance her international prestige. 
By 1955, India had achieved considerable success in its long 
cherished aim of establishing an understanding with the USSR 
without entering into any formal pact or alliance. Nehru's visit to the 
USSR in early 1955 was one of the most important events in the 
annals of Indo-Soviet relations. The enthusiastic reception given to 
Nehru in the Soviet Union and later, the hearty reception accorded to 
the Soviet leaders in India manifested the feelings of the genuine 
respect, sympathy and friendship developing between the two nations. 
The exchange of state visits affirmed the tremendous goodwill that 
had been generated in the preceding two years in relation between the 
two countries. 
The Sino-Indian conflict of interests and the Sino-Soviet rift 
further contributed to this trend of Indo-Soviet friendship. In the 
period between 1956-1959, India gained in stature as an influential 
non-aligned power between the Soviet and the western blocs. In her 
efforts to maintain peace in the 1956 Suez crisis, India received full 
backing from most of the Afro-Asian countries. China, being an 
integral part of the Soviet bloc, could not exert an independent voice 
in world politics. In contrast to this, India became significant as an 




In the year 1958-59 Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of 
strain. The emerging differences between Moscow and Beijing 
coincided with major Soviet attempts at rapprochement with the west. 
China's changing attitude on Sino-Indian border problem in 1958-59 
resulted in chillness between India and China. Therefore, when China 
claimed 25,000 square miles of Indian territory in the beginning of 
1959, India suddenly faced hostile China. 
Hostility to India was a deliberate choice of policy on the 
part of China. It was no longer in China's interest to play second 
fiddle to the Soviet Union. In asserting China's claims to leadership 
of the communist bloc and in attaining what China believed to be a 
more equitable distribution of power, it became necessary to disrupt 
the existing equilibrium of forces in South Asia. This could be 
achieved only by destroying India's prestige. It was a policy designed 
to expose India's weakness in order to consolidate China's position 
among the Afro-Asian countries. At the same time China wanted to 
challenge the Soviet thesis of co-existence with the West, and USSR's 
support to India's policy of nonalignment. Thus, China became a 
source of common concern to both the countries. This added a new 
dimension to Delhi-Moscow relationship and greatly strengthened the 
bonds of friendship between the two countries. Their national 




The attractive power of the Soviet relationship for India was 
heightened by identification of the USSR with the national aspirations 
of industrial independence. Beside the Bhilai Steel Plant, Soviet 
finances and technical help were available to India in creating a fairly 
large complex of basic industries manufacturing heavy electrical 
equipment, mining and allied machinery, precision instruments, drugs 
and aluminum. Other areas of Indo-Soviet collaboration included 
power plants, oil exploration, oil refineries and iron-ore mining. 
Trade with the USSR enabled India to make good the ground lost in 
the western market. As far as military equipment was concerned, 
India turned to the USSR for help and received a good deal of it. 
When India was frustrated in obtaining F-104 aircrafts, it found 
Moscow willing to offer the MIG-21, to meet India's peculiar border 
requirements and later help in setting up a factory to manufacture the 
planes in India. 
Moreover, both India and the Soviet Union attached great 
significance to peaceful settlement of international issues, specifically 
through the United Nations. These crisis appeared as a common 
concern of Soviet Union and India alike as they characterized them as 
western colonialism. Thus Nehru and Soviet leaders had their 
identical viewpoints on many international issues and, particularly, 




Nevertheless, the course of relationship during this decade 
had not always been quite smooth. There were, of course, differences 
in the international aspirations and policies of the two nations during 
this period. For instance, Nehru had regretted the harsh Soviet 
suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the resumption of nuclear 
tests on the eve of the 1961 non-aligned conference. He had also 
opposed Khrushchev's threat to send volunteers into the Middle East 
and the Congo and the Soviet Prime Minister's 'Troika' plan to revise 
the UN secretariat. On the other hand, Soviet leaders had resented 
among other things, India's criticism though mild of their policies 
towards Hungary and Yugoslavia and India's contribution to the UN 
peace-keeping forces in Congo. But the differences did not interfere 
with the broad accord on fundamentals that had developed during 
Nehru Khrushchev era. The friendship was put to severe tests, but it 
emerged successfully with added confidence and trust. 
To sum up, it may be said that a community of interests 
between India and the USSR resulted in the steady growth of 
friendship and mutual diplomatic support. India-USSR relations 
developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarity of 
actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though, for 
different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in 
Asia, checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO 
and NATO, and at a later stage, containing China. Almost through out 
this decade i.e. from 1953-1964, India had a sense of common 
purpose with the USSR. During this decade, the USSR remained 
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India's principal source of strength in international affairs, as well as 
in her material needs. It goes to the credit of shrewd diplomacy of 
Jawaharlal Nehru that without entering into any formal treaty or 
alliance or giving the impression of being subservient to the USSR, 
he secured all from the USSR to suit the national interest of India. 
India under Nehru's stewardship always retained the freedom of 
action in her foreign policy. 
Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the relations 
between the Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and 
there is a great scope for deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. 
The Indo-Russian relations are based on the strong foundations of 
good neighbourly ties, liberal political ideology, convergence of 
national interests, geopolitical settings, economic opportunities and 
international interdependence. 
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 
dealt a blow to India's foreign policy framework. Events happened 
with such rapidity for which India had not prepared itself. The shock 
was the more devastating as it was so unexpected and the collapse 
was so dramatic. India could not remain untouched of the 
consequences of the events taking place in international scenario. For 
India, the events in Soviet Union had been a major blow because 
changes in Soviet Union occurred at a time when India herself was 
going through a severe economic crisis and an internal turmoil of 
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such a magnitude which changed the nature of the political 
complexion of India. 
Some important steps were taken to sort out these problems 
as early as January 1993 by the then President Boris Yeltsin when he 
visited India. He tried to recreate the spirit of the Indo-Soviet 
friendship. During the visit he conveyed the impression that Russia 
put a high value on Indo-Russian relations. He described India and 
Russia as natural partners and that the Indian and Russian interests 
were identical. Significantly, he reiterated Russian support for India's 
position in Kashmir. At the same time India was turning again to 
Moscow with a long and expensive list for modern weaponry and 
hence emerged as the largest arm purchaser from Russia. 
The most concrete expression of the new thinking was 
provided during the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov in December 1998, when he told reporters that it would be 
very good if Russia China and India were able to form a regional 
bloc. A lot depends in the region on the policies of China, Russia and 
India, he said that India is a great power and our relationship is based 
on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two countries for 
stability in the world. Primakov also reiterated the Russian stand that 
Russia supports India's claim to a permanent seat in the United 
Nations Security Council. 
Many developments had and were taking place to reveal the 
identity of viewpoints as well as long term convergence of interests 
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between New Delhi and Moscow. The events involving Yugoslavia 
and Kosovo, the bypassing of the United Nations, the devastation of 
Iraq, the spread of religious fanaticism, the Kargil war all these 
happenings continued to bring them together. 
Putin's visit in December 2002, sealed a new special 
relationship between India and Russia. President Putin described that 
he was the best friend of India. A statement endorsed by Prime 
Minister Vajpayee, describing the Russian leader as a trusted friend 
of India. The Putin-Vajpayee summit produced a strong statement 
called upon Pakistan to fulfill its obligations by preventing 
infiltration of terrorists across the line of control and eliminating the 
infrastructure of terrorism as a pre-requisite for the renewal of 
peaceful dialogue. Russia unambiguously endorsed India's stand that 
the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore declaration provide the sole 
framework within which any India-Pakistan dialogue should 
eventually take place. 
Significantly, on Iraq issue the two sides expressed 
complete unanimity of views, opposing unilateral use of force and 
supporting a comprehensive settlement of the issues only through 
political and diplomatic efforts under the UN aegis. 
To sum up it can be concluded that there is a great scope for 
deepening the Indo-Russian relations not only to create conditions for 
improving the socio-economic conditions of their people but also to 
play an important role in shaping the future world order. The unipolar 
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world order which came into existence after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union can be replaced by the multipolar world order if India, 
Russia and China came closer to each other to counter the Anglo-
American hegemony. This relationship is equally marked by the 
absence of any national irritants, no border disputes, and no negative 
legacy of history. The identity of their views on the political and 
economic order and on major international issues ensures that their 
'strategic partnership' would contribute to play the role in shaping the 
21*' century world order. 

APPENDIX 
Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 2 December 1953 
The Government of India and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the desire to develop trade 
relations between the two countries, have agreed on the following : 
Article -I 
1. Both the Government will, in every possible way, develop and 
strengthen the trade relations between the two countries on the 
principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will study and 
with utmost goodwill take decisions on the suggestions which 
either of them would like to present for consideration of the 
other with the purpose of achieving closer economic relations. 
2. For the goods imported and exported from one country to the 
other, both the Governments pledge themselves to grant 
maximum facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules and 
regulations. 
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall, not, however, apply 
to the grant or continuance of any 
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a) advantages accorded by either of the Governments to 
contiguous countries, in order to facilitate frontier 
traffic; 
b) advantages resulting from any Customs Union or free 
areas to w h^ich either of the Governments is or may 
become a party; 
c) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any 
country, existing on the date of this agreement or in 
replacement of such preferences or advantages that 
existed prior to the 15"* August, 1951; or 
d) advantages accorded by virtue of a multilateral 
economic agreement relating to international 
commerce. 
4. Mercantile ships of both countries while entering, staying in or 
leaving the ports of the other country will enjoy the most 
favoured facilities granted by the respective laws, rules and 
regulations to ships under the third countries' flags. This 
principle shall not apply to the ships engaged in coastal 
navigation. 
Article II 
The export of goods from the U.S.S.R. to India and from 
India to the U.S.S.R. during the period of validity of the present 
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Agreement will be carried upon by the two Governments for every 
contractual year. The goods agreed for export from the U.S.S.R. to 
India and from India to the U.S.S.R. during the first year of the 
present Agreement are set out in schedules A and B respectively. 
Article III 
The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article II 
will be carried out in accordance with the import, export and foreign 
exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and 
on the basis of contracts to be concluded between the Indian Parties 
on the one side and the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations on the 
other. 
Article IV 
The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the 
rights of the Indian Parties and the Soviet Foreign Trade 
Organizations to conclude between themselves, subject to the import, 
export and foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in 
both the countries, commercial transactions for the import or export 
of goods not included in the schedules referred to in Article 11. 
Article V 
The two Governments will render all possible assistance for 
the export and import of the goods mentioned in Article II and those 
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to be exported and imported under the transactions referred to in 
Article IV. 
Article VI 
All payments between India and the U.S.S.R. described in 
Article VII may be made in Indian Rupees. For this purpose the State 
Bank of the U.S.S.R. will maintain one or more accounts with one or 
more commercial banks in India authorized to deal in foreign 
exchange. In addition, the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will, if that 
Bank considers necessary, maintain another account with the Reserve 
Bank of India. All the commercial transactions to be financed in 
Rupees will take place through the account (accounts) maintained 
with the commercial bank (banks). The account with the Reserve 
Bank of India will be used only for replenishing the balances with the 
commercial bank (banks) as and when necessary. 
Payments permitted under the Indian Exchange Control laws 
to be made by residents of India to residents of the U.S.S.R. will be 
effected by crediting the amount of such payments to the above 
mentioned account (accounts) of the State Bank of U.S.S.R. with the 
commercial bank (banks). Payments to be made to residents in India 
by residents in the U.S.S.R. will be effected by debting the said 
account (accounts) with the commercial bank (banks). The account 
(accounts) will be replenished as necessary by one of the following 
methods, namely : 
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(a) by transfer of funds from another account of the State Bank 
of the U.S.S.R. with another commercial bank or with the 
Reserve Bank of India; or 
(b) by the sale of Sterling to the bank concerned. 
Article VII 
The provisions of the present Agreement cover the 
following payments: 
(a) payments for the goods delivered under the present 
agreement; 
(b) payments connected with commercial transactions and 
covering insurance, freight (in case of shipment of goods by 
Indian or Soviet ships), port charges, storage and forwarding 
expenses and bunkering; 
(c) payments for distribution of films; 
(d) payments for technical assistance; 
(e) payments of the expenses connected with the tours of a 
commercial or cultural nature as well as those of official 
delegations; 
(f) payments for the maintenance of the Embassy of India in the 
U.S.S.R. and of the Embassy and the Trade Representation 
of the U.S.S.R. in India; and 
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(g) Other non-commercial payments on which agreement may be 
reached between the Reserve Bank of India and the State 
BankoftheU.S.S.R. 
Article VIII 
Any balances in the Rupee accounts maintained by the State 
Bank of the U.S.S.R. with the Reserve Bank of India or with a 
commercial bank (banks) authorized to deal in foreign exchanges, 
will be convertible on demand into Sterling at the usual banks selling 
rate for Sterling as fixed from time to time by the Indian Exchange 
Banks Association. The above mentioned balances will also be 
convertible into Sterling after the expiry of the present Agreement. 
Article IX 
Both the Governments will render all possible assistance for 
the shipping of the goods to be exported or imported under the 
present Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible by 
Indian and Soviet ships. 
Article X 
The present Agreement will come into force from the date of 
its signature and will remain valid for a period of five years. 
The Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiation 
between the Parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry. 
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Done in New Delhi on the 2"** day of December 1953, in two 
original copies, each of them in English and Russian, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
(Sd.) H.V.R. lENGAR, (Sd.) M.A. MENSHIKOV 
On behalf of the Government On behalf of the Government of 
of India the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics 
Soviet-Indian Agreement on Shipping Service, 6 April 1956 : 
The Government of India and the Government of the Union 
of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the Joint Soviet-
Indian Communique issued on IS'*" December 1955, for the purpose of 
further development of economic co-operation and expansion of trade 
between the two countries, have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
For the purpose of maintaining regular cargo shipping 
communication between the Indian ports of Bombay and Calcutta on 
the one part and the Soviet ports of Odessa and Novorossisk on the 
other part, a regular steamship service is hereby organized with equal 




The vessels specified in Appendix No.I (not included here) 
to the present agreement are assigned for the service mentioned in 
Article I. 
Each party has the right to substitute its vessels mentioned 
above by other vessels, as well as to assign by mutual agreement 
additional vessels depending upon the volume of cargo moving and 
other circumstances relevant to the operation of the service and 
involving the necessity of such substitution or increase in the number 
of vessels. 
The schedule of sailings of the service shall be fixed every 
three months after mutual consultation and agreement between the 
organizations specified in Article VII of the present agreement and 
shall be announced a month in advance of the following three-month 
period. 
Article III 
The parties to the present agreement shall each operate their 
respective ships assigned to this service independently and bear 
responsibility for financial results of such operation as well as for any 





Indian vessels in the Soviet ports and Soviet vessels in the 
Indian ports shall upon their entry into, stay in and departure from the 
ports, enjoy the most favourable conditions allowed by the 
corresponding laws, rules and regulations applications applicable to 
those ports. 
All the dues on the vessels assigned to the service shall be 
levied at the ports of India and at the ports of the U.S.S.R. in 
accordance with the laws and regulations which are in force at the 
ports of the two countries. 
Tonnage dues on Indian vessels assigned to the regular 
service shall be levied on such vessel in the ports of the U.S.S.R. at 
preferential rates and only once a year irrespective of number of calls. 
No income-tax shall be levied or collected by the 
Government of India on the freight earnings at Indian ports of Soviet 
ships and no income-tax shall be levied or collected by the 
Government of the U.S.S.R. on the freight earnings of Indian ships at 
Soviet ports. 
Article V 
In pursuance of their general policy of minimizing delays to 
shipping and accelerating their turn-round at the ports, the parties to 
the agreement will, consistently with their international obligations 
228 
APPENDIX 
and the laws and regulations applicable to each port, adopt all 
possible further measures for the improvement of work such as: 
(a) increasing the norms of output of loading and unloading; 
(b) introduction of one or two additional work shifts as the case 
may be; 
(c) working on Sundays and on holidays other than closed 
holidays; 
(d) earmarking berths for the loading and unloading of special 
commodities; 
Where such measures are in the opinion of the Port 
Authority concerned operationally feasible and conductive to the 
better working of the port generally. 
Article VI 
All payments arising out of the operation of the service 
including payments for freight for transportation of cargoes on 
vessels on the regular line covering the Indian-Soviet goods turnover 
shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of the trade 
Agreement dated 2"** December 1953 between the Government of 
India and the Government of the U.S.S.R. 
Freight shall be paid in accordance with the rates indicated 
in Appendix No.II (not included in this issue) to the present 
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agreement. These rates are liable to modification and revision from 
time to time by mutual agreement between the organizations specified 
in Article VII of the present agreement. 
Settlement of freight shall be effected by the organizations 
specified in Article VIII of the present agreement by means of 
submitting invoices for collection through authorized banks of their 
respective countries. 
Article VII 
For co-ordination of all questions connected with the 
operation of the service the Government of India hereby nominate the 
Directorate-General of Shipping as representative on their part and 
the Government of the U.S.S.R. likewise nominate the Vsesojuznoje 
Objedinenje "Sovfracht" as representative on their part. 
In particular, these organizations are entrusted to compute 
the schedule of sailings, to distribute cargoes between the vessels of 
both the parties on a parity basis, to revise freight rates, and to solve 
all other questions connected with the actual operation of the service. 
For this purpose, the Directorate-General of Shipping may 
have a representative in Moscow and the Vsesojuznoje Objedinenje 




By agreement between the organizations specified in Article 
VII of the present agreement, the ships of the regular steamship 
service may call at Indian and Soviet ports other than those specified 
in Article I and also at ports of third countries. 
Article IX 
The Indian ships at the Soviet ports will be handled by 
"Inflot". The handling of Soviet vessels at the Indian ports will be 
effected by Indian firms to be appointed by the Soviet party as their 
agents in consultation with the Directorate-General of Shipping, 
Government of India. 
Indian vessels in the Soviet ports and Soviet vessels in the 
Indian ports may receive bunkers (liquid and coal), lubricating 
materials and other provisions including food-stuffs for the crew at 
usual prices and on usual conditions prevailing at the ports of both the 
countries. 
Article X 
The present agreement will come into force from the date of 
its signing and shall continue to be in force until either party declare 
their intention to terminate it by giving three months' notice in 
writing to the other party. 
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Soviet-Indian Trade Agreement, 16 November 1958 
The Government of India and the Government of Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the desire to develop trade 
relations and to increase the volume of trade between them to as high 
a level as possible, have agreed upon the following : 
Article I 
1. Both the Governments will, in every possible way, develop 
and strengthen the trade relations between the two countries 
on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will 
study, and with utmost goodwill take decisions on, the 
suggestions which either of them would like to present for 
consideration of the other with the purpose of achieving 
closer economic relations. 
2. For the goods imported and exported from one country to the 
other, both the Governments pledge themselves to grant 
maximum facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules 
and regulations. In any case the said goods will enjoy full 
most favoured nation treatment with respect to customs duties 
and charges of any kid imposed on imports or exports or in 
connection therewith, with respect to the methods of levying 
such duties and charges, and with respect to rules, formalities 
and charges in connection with customs clearing operations. 
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Further, the two countries will accord to each other in 
respect of the issuance of import and export licences treatment no less 
favourable than that granted to any other country in the Soft Currency 
Area or to any other country with which the contracting country 
makes payments in its own national currency. 
Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
either of the Contracting Parties to any product originating in the 
territory of a third country or destined for its territory, shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in the territory of either of the contracting parties or 
destined to be imported into its territory. 
3. The provisions of the above clauses shall not, however, 
apply to the grant or continuance of any. 
(a) advantages accorded by either Government to 
contiguous countries with the purpose of facilitating 
frontier traffic; 
(b) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any 
third country and existing on December 2"'', 1953 or in 
replacement of such preferences or advantages that 




The export of goods from India to the U.S.S.R. and from the 
U.S.S.R. to India during the period of validity of the present 
Agreement will be carried out in accordance with schedules to be 
agreed upon between the two Governments for every calendar year 
before the beginning of the year to which they refer. The goods 
agreed upon for export from the U.S.S.R. to India and from India to 
the U.S.S.R. during the first year of the present Agreement are set out 
in schedules 'A' and 'B ' respectively. 
Article III 
The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article II 
will be carried out in accordance with the export, import, and foreign 
exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and 
on the basis of contracts to be concluded between Indian physical and 
juridical parties, including Indian State owned organizations, on the 
one side, and Soviet foreign trade organizations, on the other. 
Article IV 
The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the 
rights of the Indian physical and juridical parties and the Soviet 
foreign trade organizations to conclude between themselves subject to 
the import, export, and foreign exchange regulations, in fore from 
time to time in both the countries, commercial transactions for the 
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import or export of goods not included in the schedules referred to in 
Article II. 
Article V 
The two Governments will render ail possible assistance for 
the export and import of the goods mentioned in Article II, and those 
to be exported and imported under the transactions referred to in 
Article IV. 
Article VI 
1. All payments between India and the U.S.S.R. described in 
Article VII, will be effected in Indian rupees. 
2. For this purpose the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will 
maintain a Central Account with the Reserve Bank of India 
and one or more accounts with one or more Commercial 
Banks in India authorized to deal in foreign exchange. 
3. (a) The Central Account will be used for depositing the rupee 
holdings, for replenishing the accounts with the 
Commercial Banks, and for operating transactions 
relating to technical credit. 
(b) The Accounts with the Commercial Banks in India will be 




4. (a) The Central Account will be replenished by transfers of 
funds from the accounts with the Commercial Banks 
mentioned in Clause 2, and by receipts under the 
technical credit. 
(b) The Accounts with the Commercial Banks will be 
replenished by transfers of funds from other similar 
accounts mentioned in Clause 2 and from the Central 
Account. 
(c) Payments permitted in accordance with the Indian 
Foreign Exchange Control Laws and Regulations and the 
rules made there under, will be effected on the basis of 
this Agreement to the physical and juridical persons 
residing in the U.S.S.R., by the physical and juridical 
persons residing in India, by crediting the amount of such 
payments to the said Accounts of the State Bank of the 
U.S.S.R. with the Commercial Bank (Banks). Likewise 
the payments to be effected by the physical and juridical 
persons residing in the U.S.S.R. to the physical and 
juridical persons residing in India, will be effected by 
debiting the said account (accounts) with the Commercial 




The following payments will be effected through the 
accounts mentioned in Article VI: 
(a) Payments for goods exported and imported in accordance 
with this Agreement; 
(b) Payments connected with commercial transactions and 
covering insurance, foreign port charges, storage, for 
warding expenses and bunkring; 
(c) Payments for distribution of films; 
(d) Payments for technical assistance, including maintenance of 
experts and technicians and for technical and other training; 
(e) Payments for expenses connected with tours of a 
commercial and cultural nature and of official delegations; 
(f) Payments of the expenses for the maintenance of the 
Embassy of India in the U.S.S.R. and of the Embassy and 
Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in India; 
(g) Any other payments on which agreement may be reached 





Any balances in the Rupee Accounts of the State Bank of 
the U.S.S.R. or any debt of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. in 
connection with the grant of technical credit will upon expiry of this 
Agreement, be used during the ensuing 6 months for the purchase of 
Indian or Soviet goods, as the case may be, or will be settled in such 
other way as may be agreed upon between the two Parties. 
Article X 
Both the Governments will render all possible assistance for 
the shipment of the goods to be exported or imported under this 
Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible in Indian 
and Soviet ships. 
Article XI 
In order to facilitate the implementation of this agreement 
the two Governments shall consult with each other as and when 
necessary, in respect of matters connected therewith. 
For this purpose the representatives of the two Governments 
will meet, on request by either party, at a place and time to be 
mutually agreed upon, the meeting being held on a date within 45 




The present Agreement will come into force on January T', 
1959 and will remain valid for a period of five years. 
The Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiations 
between the parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry. 
The current Trade Agreement between the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of India 
dated December T^, 1953, is extended up to 31"' December, 1958. 
Done in Moscow on the 16*** day of November 1958, in two 
original copies, each of them in Russian and English languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. 
By Authority By Authority 
of the Government of India of the Government of the Union 
Signed of Soviet Socialist Republics Signed 
K.P.S. MENON POTOLICHEO 
Joint Statement by Indian and Soviet Trade Minister, 24 October 
1960 : 
At the invitation of the Government of India, His Excellency 
Mr. N.S. Patolichev, Minister for Foreign Trade of the USSR arrived 
in India on Friday, October 21, 1960. During his stay in the country, 
His Excellency was received by the President of India and the Prime 
Minister. He held discussions with the Minister for Commerce and 
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Industry, the Minister for Steel Mines and Fuel and the Minister for 
Mines and Oil, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
businessmen in regard to the expansion of trade between India and the 
USSR. He also visited Calcutta and his programme includes a visit to 
Bombay. The officials on the two sides have also held detailed 
discussions. 
The working of the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement signed on 
November 16, 1958, was reviewed by Mr. Patolichev and Shri Lai 
Bahadur Shastri, Minister for Commerce and Industry, in the context 
of India's developmental plans during the Third Plan period. It was 
noted with gratification that considerable improvement had taken 
place in the mutual trade between the two countries. The further 
development of the market for Indian goods in the USSR and the 
requirements in India of industrial raw materials and machinery from 
the Soviet Union were then broadly considered. The measures to be 
taken by both the sides for planning and enlargement of the trade 
between the two countries in terms of rupees and the repayment of 
credits in terms of goods during the remaining three years of the 
Trade Agreement were examined, and a broad understanding was 
reached on the need for increasing the volume of trade and 
diversifying its content. The anticipation is that at the end of the 
Trade Agreement period, the present level of exports and imports will 
have nearly doubled itself. 
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Exports from India will cover fabricated materials as well as 
agricultural products. Among the manufactures are rolled steel 
products, metal manufactures for household purposes, handicrafts, 
leather footwear, coir goods, jute and woollen fabrics. Increasingly 
larger quantities of tea, coffee, spices, tobacco, shellac, mica, 
vegetable and essential oils are expected to be purchased by the 
USSR. The USSR will also buy an increasing proportion of hides and 
skins in tanned and semi-tanned varieties. 
On the side of imports from the USSR, non-ferrous metals, 
newsprint, tin plate, steel materials, oil products and machinery and 
equipment for the various metallurgical, powder and construction 
projects in the country will be available. 
Press Statement on the Grant of Rs.600 Million Soviet Credit to 
India, 21 February 1961 
In the presence of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the First Deputy Prime Minster of the U.S.S.R. Mr. 
A.N. Kosygin, and the Finance Minister of India, Mr. Morarji Desai, 
an agreement was signed in New Delhi on February 21, 1961 for 
further economic collaboration between the Governments of India and 
the U.S.S.R. The agreement provides for the establishment of 
industrial enterprises and other projects in India under a long term 
credit of 112.5 million roubles (approximately Rs.600 million) 




The agreement follows a series of discussions between 
representatives of the two Governments in New Delhi which began on 
the 8*^  February 1961, in a cordial atmosphere and with mutual 
understanding. 
The enterprises and projects which will be financed through 
this credit area: 
1. Hydro-electric Power Station on the right bank of Bhakra with 
a total capacity of 480,000 KW by the establishment of four 
complete units of Hydro-generators with a capacity of 
120,000 KW each. 
2. Oil Refmery in Gujarat with a capacity for refining two 
million tons of crude oil per year (Fuel Scheme) together with 
Thermal Power Plant for the Refinery. 
3. Washery for Coking Coal with a capacity of three million tons 
of coal per year at Kathara in Bihar. 
4. Refractories Plant near Bhilai for production of about 125,000 
tons of magnesite and fire-clay products per year. 
5. Exploration, development and production of oil and gas by 
the Oil and Natural Gas Commission in Cambay Ankleshwar 
and in other areas. 




The Soviet organizations will prepare detailed project 
reports and working drawings required for the establishment of the 
above enterprises and projects, supply equipment, machinery, spare 
parts and other materials as well as render technical assistance in the 
establishment of the projects and putting them into operation. 
Mr. S.A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee of the 
Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Foreign Economic Relations, 
signed for his Government and Mr. L.K. Jha, Economic Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance, signed for the Government of India. 
The signing of this Agreement will further strengthen Soviet 
Indian co-operation and will serve the cause of further development 
of the friendship between the peoples of both the countries. 
Soviet Indian Joint Communique on Completion of Bhilai Plant, 3 
March 1961 
The historic visits of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchov to India and the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of India Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to the USSR 
have laid the firm foundations of development of the friendly 
relations and co-operation between the people of the Soviet Union 
and the people of India on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 
The Agreements entered into between the Government of the 
USSR and the Government of India in the field of economic and 
cultural relations are the proof of such a co-operation. 
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The Agreement signed on February 2, 1955 for the 
construction at Bhilai of an integrated Iron and Steel Works is a 
striking example of the Soviet-Indian economic co-operation. In 
accordance with this Agreement for the establishment of the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR, and S.A. Skachkov, Chairman of the USSR 
for External Economic Relations, who are at present in India at the 
invitation of the Government of India, and Sardar Swaran Singh, 
Minister of Steel, Mines and Fuel of the Government of India, note 
with great satisfaction that the construction of the integrated Iron and 
Steel Works at Bhilai with the capacity of one million tons of steel 
ingots per year has proceeded generally according to plan. Thanks to 
the desire of both the parties to perform efficiently their obligations 
under the Agreement and the close co-operation of the Soviet 
specialists with Indian engineers, technicians and workers, the 
construction work of the factory, which has been provided for with 
the equipment and mechanisms of high technical standard, has been 
completed and the main shops required for establishing a capacity of 
one million tons per year have been put into operation. This colossal 
task has been accomplished in a relatively short period and before the 
end of the Second Five-Year Plan period of India. This is a significant 
event in the economic life of the Indian people. 
The first blast furnace was commissioned and the production 
of iron started as far back as February 1959. Since then with the help 
of Soviet experts Indian technicians and workers of whom more than 
600 had undergone industrial training in the Soviet Union have 
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progressively learnt the technique of production. More than one 
million tons of pig iron and about 400,000 tons of rolled steel besides 
various types of chemical by products have already been produced. 
With the continuance of this co-operation there is every reason to 
hope that production to full capacity will be reached within a short 
period. 
The Agreement between the Government of the Soviet 
Union and the Government of India dated February 12, 1960 provides 
for the expansion of the Bhilai Steel Works with the assistance of the 
USSR to the capacity of up to 2.5 million tons of steel ingots per 
year. The preparatory work on the expansion has been already started. 
During the construction of the first stage of one million tons, Soviet 
specialists have already transmitted a good deal of their knowledge 
and experience to Indian engineers and workers on the construction of 
the works and have thus helped to create Indian cadres capable of 
independent work. With the experience so gained, there is good 
reason to believe that the work on the expansion of the works will be 
successfully accomplished and the bonds of friendship and co-
operation between the two countries will be further developed and 
strengthened. 
"Negotiations is the road to Settling the Conflict", Pravda 
Editorial on India-China Conflict, 5 November 1962 : 
It is not the first week that armed clashes resulting in 
numerous casualties are occurring on the Indo-Chinese border. The 
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ferocity of the clashes and political tension are mounting instead of 
diminishing. This causes serious concern to world public opinion, all 
those who stand for peace and progress. Soviet people, the peoples of 
socialist countries, are deeply concerned over the developments. The 
point is that these are clashes between two great countries, one of 
which is a socialist state, and the other a great force in a large group 
of young sovereign states actively participating in the struggle against 
colonialism, for peace and international security. More, the conflict 
has arisen between neighbour countries which in the past maintained 
traditional friendly relations. 
Can the People's Republic of China or the Republic of India 
be interested in the development of the armed conflict? By no means. 
The Chinese people are dedicating their efforts to constructive labour, 
working with enthusiasm for realizing the plans of socialist 
construction. The desire for war is alien to the very nature of a 
socialist state. Military complications can only worsen the position of 
the Indian people too. The continuation of the conflict exhausts the 
economic resources of India, limited as they are, sidetracks the Indian 
people from solving the tasks of social and cultural regeneration of 
the country that confront them, of carrying to the end the anti-feudal, 
anti-imperialist revolution. Facts show that it is those circles in India 
which strive to suppress the progressive democratic forces of the 
country, to push India from the position of non-alignment into the 
arms of aggressive military blocs, that want to use for their own 
purposes the atmosphere of war hysteria. 
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The expansion of the scale of hostilities on the Indo-Chinese 
border can profit only the imperialist camp, the forces of world 
reaction which never miss a chance to set friendly peoples at 
loggerheads, to sow dissension in the ranks of the fighters for peace, 
democracy and progress, to counterpoise the socialist countries to 
young sovereign states which have achieved national independence. 
The imperialist circles are trying to utilize the present 
conflict for their own incendiary purposes. The main participants in 
the aggressive military blocs of the Western powers would like to 
make some pickings out of the hostilities on the Indo-Chinese border. 
The imperialists plainly strive to set the two great Asian nations at 
loggerheads. Persistently they are trying to butt into the conflict, with 
a persistence worthy of a better cause, they are pouring oil on the 
flames, they are persistently offering arms and assistance to one of 
the sides, expecting thus to increase the scale of the clash. It is not 
accidental that on the part of the ruling circles of the United States 
and other Western powers one does not hear appeals for a cease-fire 
on the Indo-Chinese border. 
Such intrigues of the imperialist camp are all the more 
dangerous that they are taking place in the conditions of continuing 
attempts of the forces of war to keep up international tension caused 
by the provocative actions of the militaristic quarters of the United 
States in the Caribbean area. The present international situation 
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makes imperative the consolidation of all peace-loving forces in order 
to wage a joint struggle for ensuring international security. 
As to the Soviet Government, from the very beginning of the 
conflict on the Indo-Chinese border, it has urged a negotiated solution 
of the dispute. 
The People's Republic of China is a state whose relations 
with the Soviet Union are fraternal and based on the common 
fundamental aims of building socialism and communism. With India 
the Soviet Union is bound by good friendly relations which we prize 
highly. The Soviet people cannot remain indifferent seeing how flows 
the blood of our brothers and friends, the Chinese and the Indian 
peoples. Therefore, the Soviet people feel that in the present situation 
nothing should be done to aggravate it, but it is necessary to cease 
fire and sit down at the round table of negotiations without setting 
any terms. 
The threat of expansion of the Indo-Chinese conflict and the 
dangerous plans which the Western militaristic forces are hatching in 
this connection, evoke legitimate anxiety of the peoples which are 
India's and China's neighbours. Deeply concerned are all the states 
which, together with representatives of India and China, took part in 
the Bandung Conference and signed the historic declaration on 
peaceful co-existence which made a major contribution to the cause 
of world peace. Public opinion of these countries with good reason 
points out that the present conflict harms both sides participating in it. 
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harms all peace-loving peoples, and insistently suggests that it be 
settled peacefully. 
"Indonesian workers", says, for instance, a letter addressed 
by the Central Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions to the 
Governments of India and the People's Republic of China, "like the 
people and workers of India and of People's China, do not want war 
between two Asian countries which support the ten Bandung 
principles. Neither side will gain from differences among Asian and 
African countries. These differences can profit only the imperialists". 
"We who are friends both of India and China", declares the 
Cambodian newspaper Depeche du Cambodge, "believe that at all 
costs it is essential to avoid the use of force". The Cairo Al Gumhuria 
writes: " The serious events occurring on the Chinese-Indian 
border fill with bitterness the hearts of all Asian and African 
peoples". Appeals to end hostilities were addressed to the participants 
in the conflict by many outstanding political leaders of Afro-Asian 
countries. 
It is perfectly obvious that the longer the conflict lasts, the 
more casualties there will be, the more obstacles to a peaceful 
solution will accumulate on each side. If firing continues, the conflict 
will extend and deepen, an ever greater part will be played not so 
much by questions of disputed territories, as by considerations o^ 
prestige. The continuation of the conflict would lead to more 
extensive mobilization of manpower and material resources on both 
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sides, which could lead to a prolonged bloody war. This would bring 
tremendous calamities on the peoples of both states, and would most 
adversely affect the international situation. 
There is a way out of the present situation. The long 
experience accumulated by the history of international relations 
shows that to end a conflict it is necessary to start with the main 
thing, to ceasefire, to overcome the war hysteria. The bloodshed 
cannot be allowed to continue. 
The Soviet people are of the firm opinion: in the present 
situation the thing to do is to ceasefire and start negotiations on a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. They sincerely want the 
representatives of India and China to sit down at the conference table 
as quickly as possible. It is necessary to patiently analyze the 
questions at issue, display a spirit of understanding and co-operation, 
to make an effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. Such a 
decision would be in the interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, 
would serve the cause of preserving and strengthening peace in Asia 
and the world over. 
Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 10 June 1963 : 
The Government of India and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics noting with satisfaction the successful 
development of trade relations and being desirous of further increase 
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of the volume of trade between the two parties, have agreed upon the 
following : 
Article -1 
The Contracting Parties will, in every possible way, develop 
and strengthen trade relations between the two countries on the 
principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will study and with 
utmost goodwill take decision on the suggestions which either of 
them would like to present for considerations of the other with the 
purpose of achieving closer economic relations. 
Article - II 
The Contracting Parties will accord upon importation and 
exportation of goods from one country to the other maximum 
facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules and regulations. In 
any case the said goods shall enjoy full most-favoured-nation 
treatment with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind 
imposed on imports or exports or in connection therewith, with 
respect to the methods of levying such duties and charges, with 
respect to rules, formalities and charges in connection with customs 
clearing operations, and with respect to the application of internal 




The Contracting Parties will accord to each other in respect 
of the issuance of import and export licences treatment no less 
favourable than that granted to any other country. 
Article - III 
Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
either of the Contracting Parties to import or export of any product 
originating in the territory of a third country or destined for its 
territory, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in the territory of either of the Contracting 
Parties or destined to be imported into its territory. 
The provisions of Articles II and III shall not, however, 
apply to the grant or continuance of any 
a) advantages accorded by either Government to contiguous 
countries with purpose of facilitating frontier traffic; 
b) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any third 
country and existing on December 2, 1953 or in replacement 
of such preferences or advantages that existed prior to the 
15'%f August, 1947. 
Article - IV 
Juridical and physical persons of either Contracting Party 
shall enjoy the most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of personal 
protection and protection of property when effecting commercial 
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activities in the territory of the other Party provided that the 
enjoyment of this treatment shall be subject to the laws and 
regulations of such other Party which are generally applicable to all 
foreigners alike. 
Article - V 
Mercantile ships of either country with or without cargoes, 
therein will, while entering, staying in or leaving the ports of the 
other country, enjoy regulations to ships under third countries' flags. 
This principle shall not, however, apply to ships engaged in coastal 
navigation. 
Article - VI 
The export of goods from India to the U.S.S.R. and from the 
U.S.S.R. to India during the period of validity of the present 
Agreement will be carried out in accordance with the Schedules to be 
agreed upon between the two Governments from time to time. The 
schedules, as agreed, are attached to the Agreement. 
The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the 
rights of the Indian physical and juridical parties and the Soviet 
foreign trade organizations to conclude between themselves, subject 
to the import, export and foreign exchange regulations, in force from 
time to time in both the countries, commercial transactions for the 




The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article VI 
will be carried out in accordance with the export, import and foreign 
exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and 
on the basis of contracts to be concluded between Indian physical and 
juridical parties including Indian State-owned organization on the one 
side and Soviet foreign trade organization on the other. 
Article - VIII 
1. All payments of commercial and non-commercial nature 
between India and the U.S.S.R., will be effected in Indian 
rupees. 
2. For this purpose, the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. 
will maintain a Central Account with the Reserve Bank of 
India and one or more accounts with one or more 
commercial banks in India authorized to deal in foreign 
exchange. 
3. (a) The Central Accounts will be used for depositing the 
rupee holdings, for replenishing the accounts with the 




(b) The accounts with the commercial banks will be 
replenished by carrying out all operations of commercial and 
non-commercial nature. 
(a) The Central Account will be replenished by transfers of 
funds from the accounts with the commercial banks 
mentioned in clause 2, and by receipts under the technical 
credit. 
(b) The Accounts with commercial banks will be replenished 
by transfers of the funds from other similar accounts 
mentioned in clause 2 and from the Central Accounts. 
(c) Payments permitted in accordance with the Indian 
Foreign Exchange Control Laws and Regulations and the 
rules made thereunder will be effected on the basis of this 
Agreement to the physical and juridical persons residing in 
the U.S.S.R. by the physical and juridical persons residing 
in India, by crediting the amount of such payment to the said 
account (accounts) of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the 
U.S.S.R. with the Commercial bank (banks). Likewise the 
payments to be effected by the physical and juridical 
persons residing in the U.S.S.R. to the physical and juridical 
persons residing in India, will be effected by debiting the 




Article - IX 
The Reserve Bank of India and the Bank for Foreign Trade 
of the U.S.S.R. will jointly establish the technical procedure of 
keeping the accounts under this Agreement. 
Article - X 
Any balances in the Rupee Accounts of the Bank for Foreign 
Trade of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the grant of technical credit 
will, upon expiry of this Agreement, be used during the ensuing six 
months for the purchase of Indian or Soviet goods, as the case may 
be, or shall be settled in such other way as may be agreed upon 
between the two parties. 
Article - XI 
The two Governments will render all possible assistance for 
the shipment of the goods exported and imported under this 
Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible in Indian 
and Soviet ships. 
Article-XII 
The Contracting Parties shall consult with each other, as and 
when necessary, in respect of the matters connected with the 
implementation of the Agreement. 
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For this purpose representatives of both Parties will meet on 
request by either Party at a place and time to be mutually agreed upon 
but not later than 45 days after the date of the request. 
Article-XIII 
The present Agreement will come into force on January 1, 
1964 and will remain valid for a period o five years. 
The Agreement may be extended or renewed by negotiations 
between contracting Parties. 
Done in Moscow on June lO' , 1963 in two original copies 
each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally 
authentic. 
(Sd.) MANUBHAI SHAH, (Sd.) N.S. PATOLICHEV 
By Authority of the Government By Authority of the Government of 
of India Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the 
Republic of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 9 
August 1971 : 
Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing 
relations of sincere friendship between them. 
Believing that the further development of friendship and 
cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the States as 
well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world. 
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Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace 
and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of 
international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of 
colonialism, 
Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation between States with different political 
and social systems, 
Convinced that in the world today international problems 
can only be solved by cooperation and not by conflict, 
Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Character, 
The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side, 
Have, decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which 
purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed : 
On behalf of the Republic of India : 
Sardar Swaran Singh, 
Minister of External Affairs. 
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic : 
Mr. A.A. Gromyko, 
Minster of Foreign Affairs. 
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Who, having each presented their Credentials, which are 
found to be in proper form and due order, 
Have Agreed as follows : 
Article -I 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring 
peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their 
peoples. Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in 
the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall 
continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere 
friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation 
existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well 
as those of equality and mutual benefit. 
Article -II 
Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to 
ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High 
Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their 
efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the 
world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete 
disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under 
effective international control. 
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Article - III 
Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all 
peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High 
Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms 
and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their 
final and complete elimination. 
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other 
States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the 
peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination. 
Article -IV 
The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening 
friendship and cooperation with all nations. 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's 
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an 
important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and 
international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world. 
Article - V 
Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, 
attaching great importance to their mutual cooperation in the 
international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting 
Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major 
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international problems affecting the interests of both the States by 
means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading 
statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two 
Governments, and through diplomatic channels. 
Article - VI 
Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and 
technological cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties 
will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and 
comprehensive cooperation in these fields as well as expand trade, 
transport and communications between them on he basis of the 
principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation 
treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special 
arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-
Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970. 
Article - VII 
The High Contracting Parties shall promote further 
development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of 
science, art, literature, education, public health, radio, television, 
cinema, tourism and sports. 
Article - VIII 
In accordance with the traditional friendship established 
between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties 
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solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any 
military alliance directed against the other party. 
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any 
aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its 
territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military 
damage on the other High Contracting Party. 
Article - IX 
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from 
providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed 
conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being 
subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties 
shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove 
such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace 
and the security of their countries. 
Article - X 
Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall 
not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more 
states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting 
Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any 
obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or 
States, which might cause military damage to the other Party. 
262 
APPENDIX 
Article - XI 
This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years 
and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five 
years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to 
terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party 
twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will 
be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the 
exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in 
Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty. 
Article - XII 
Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of 
this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will 
be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect 
and understanding. 
The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in 
Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have 
affixed thereto their seals. 
Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year 
one thousand nine hundred and seventy one. 
On behalf of the On behalf of the 
Republic of India Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic 
SWARAN SINGH A . A . GROMYKO 
Minister of Minister of 
External Affair Foreign Affairs 
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